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Abstract. 
In a class of decision making situations known as risky situations 
subjects are presented with information concerning payoffs which are 
dependent on the occurrence of some events and the likelihood of 
achieving these payoffs, and are asked to make decisions or judgments 
in terms of these payoffs and probabilities. The question of whether 
subjects' judgments of the likelihood of achieving these payoffs are 
independent of the value of the payoffs is an important one for the 
understanding of decision making behaviour and has attracted some 
attention, but these investigations have not resulted in any unequivocal 
answers. 
The difficulty of answering this question was seen as bound up 
with the difficulty of making inferences about subjective probability 
or about changes in subjective probability from responses which are not 
probability estimates but are decisions which reflect both the 
Probabilities and the payoffs in the situation. 
This study was concerned with asking what kind of experiment could 
overcome these inference problems to provide unambiguous evidence 
about such change in subjective probability. Two kinds of experimental 
design were considered. 
In the first, a distinction which had been made in the literature 
between outcomes dependent on response (D.O.) and outcomes dependent 
only on the occurrence of an event (I.O.) was maintained. Changes in 
subjective probability were to be inferred from changes in the value of 
D.o. selected by subjects. Three experimen~s showed no evidence of 
change in these responses while one did show evidence of change in 
choice of D.O. Closer examination of individual protocols suggested 
that it was difficult to separate change in subjective probability 
from changes in decision strategy following the introduction of I.O. 
In the second kind of experiment the dependent variable was the 
evaluation of the worth of a gamble composed of payoffs and probabilities 
of achievin& them. In one experiment a prediction about the independence 
of payoffs and probabilities in such evaluations was derived from 
expectation models and tested; in another two dependent variables were 
~ 
included and probabilities inferred from evaluations were compared with 
those probabilities directly estimated by subjects. In general there 
was little evidence of change in subjective probability, but different 
response measures gave different results and it seemed that what was 
lacked was any clear idea of how subjective probability entered into 
these evaluations, and that expectation models m~ght not be adequate as 
models from which subjective probability could be inferred. 
From these experiments it was concluded that the kind of experiment 
required to investigate the interaction of value and subjective 
probability would be one which would include two dependent variables -
inferred probabilities and direct estimates, in an examination of the 
role that subjective probability played in any one kind of decision 
situation. 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
Decision making under risk. 
Introduction. 
A sizeable literature has, in the last ten years or so, been 
concerned with the study of how people make decisions under certain 
conditions of risk. In a typical experiment, a subject would win 
an amount of money if a certain event occurred, or lose an amount 
of money if another event occurred. The probability of the 
occurrence of each of these events would be explicitly stated. 
Subjects would be asked to make some evaluation of the worth of such 
a gamble to them, or to order a series of gambles in terms of their 
preferences. 
The central problems in the study of these decisions have been: 
(a) the development of procedures for deriving subjective scales of 
the probabilities and amounts of money involved in these gambles, 
usually called subjective probability and utility scales, and 
(b) the investigation of how these subjective probabilities and 
utilities are combined in the making of decisions. 
This paper is concerned with an important but neglected and 
unresolved problem in this field, that of the interaction of utility 
and subjective probability. In this context interaction means that 
these two variables are not independent, in that, for example, the 
utility of some outcome associated with an event would be different 
when the subjective probability of the occurence of that event was 
small and when it was large. 
In this study we shall restrict our attention to interaction in 
the sense of the dependence of subjective probability upon utility • 
. If an event has an outcome of value to the decision maker, does his 
preceived likelihood of the occurrence of that event depend on the 
1 
utility of that outcome, and does this perceived likelihood change 
with changes in utility? 
The remainder of this chapter will introduce briefly the concepts, 
models and experimental situations that-might be said to characterize 
the field of decision making under conditions of risk, and suggest 
three reasons why interaction should be regarded as a central problem 
in this field, namely that 
(1) independence of utility and subjective probability is a fundam-
ental assumption of the expectation models which have dominated the 
study of decision making under risk, 
(2) recent research has emphasised the "information processing" 
aspects of decision making, that is, it has asked how subjects put 
together the information about probabilities and payoffs in a gamble 
to reach some overall assessment of it's worth, 
(3) interaction is a prediction of certain models of human decision 
making other than the expectation models, so it may act as a test 
of the relative merits of different models in predicting behaviour 
in these risk-taking situations. 
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Gambles as a framework for the study of decision making. 
The study of decision making is concerned with the behaviour 
of individuals who are confronted with the problem of choosing 
among various alternative courses of action on the basis of the 
results they expect to follow from these actions and their preferences 
among these results. 
We may look for example at two decision problems;, the first is 
a problem in medical diagnosis (from Luce and Raiffa,1957,p.309), 
and the second a game. 
l. 
A 1. assert 
tubercular 
A 2. assert 
not tubercular 
2. 
A l 
A 2 
State of nature. 
Patient tubercular 
classify tubercular 
correctly 
misclassify a 
tubercular 
State of nature. 
E,l 
win 50p 
lose 50p 
patient not tubercular 
misclassify a non-
tubercular 
classify correctly 
a non-tubercular 
E,2 
lose 50p 
win 50p 
The payoff matrix sets out explicitly and without ambiguity 
the outcomes that the decision maker can expect on the joint 
occurrence of one of his acts and one of the states of nature. The 
payoffs can be seen not only as motivators but also as instructions 
to the subject, i.e. a payoff matrix helps to avoid ambiguous and 
contradictory instructions. For example, in many psychological 
experiments "perfect performance is specified as ideal, but no 
information is provided which would enable the subject to evaluate 
the relative undesirability of various kinds of deviations from 
perfection" (Edwards,l96lb), or in multiple choice tests the 
candidate might not know the consequence of omitting an item. 
In the above payoff matrices the .decision maker has to choose 
between acts A 1 and A 2. E 1 and E 2 might be possible acts of an 
opponent playing against the decision maker, in which case the 
situation would be of the type analysed by·game theory. If E 1 and 
E 2 were states of nature and the decision maker had no information 
about the likelihood of their occurrence or the assignment of 
probabilities to these states was meaningless, the situation would 
be characterised as a game against nature, where nature is assumed 
not to be hostile to the interests of the decision maker. A 
discussion of choi~e·stra~egies available to the latter may be found 
in Hilnor (1954). 
The study of decision making under risk is concerned with the 
case wher~ the decision maker can associate a probability with each 
state of nature. To look back at payoff matrix 2, the subject may 
be seen as choosing between two gambles, A 1 and A 2, of the form: 
A. 1 win 50p with probability P(E 1) or lose 50p with prob.P(E 2) 
A. 2 win 50p with probability P(E 1) or lose 50p with prob.P(E 1) 
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That is, he has a choice between gambles where a gamble 
consists of a set of outcomes, oi,i 1,2, •• n contingent upon a set 
n 
of events ej,j::l,2, •• n. Usually ~p(ej)= 1 and l~p(ej) ,:E 0. 
" j=r 
Most of the empirical work in decision making under risk has 
been concerned with the study of subjects' behaviour in this kind 
of gambling situation. 
Each gamble can be characterized as a probability distribution 
over a set of outcomes and can be described in terms of it's moments. 
A gamble with two outcomes a and b, with associated probabilities p 
and q has as it's first moments:-
Mean or expected v~lue E.V. = p.a.+ q.b, or more generally,~oi.pj 
Variance Var. = p.q.(a-b) 
Descriptive and normative models in risky situations have rested 
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on the fundamental notion of the principle of mathematical expectation, 
that is, that one should choose the gamble with the highest expected 
winnings, where the expected winnings of a gamble is it's expected 
value. Models have differed in whether they considered that the 
objective or presented values and probabilities in the expectation 
equation were sufficient to describe the decision maker's values and 
beliefs, or whether subjective counterparts, or utilities and sub-
jective probabilities, should be introduced. A utility can be 
defined as a number which is assigned to each outcome and which fully 
represents the desirability of that outcome to the decision maker. 
Similarly subjective probability can be interpreted as a measure 
of the decision maker's opinion about the likelihood of an event, 
although the assignment of numbers to probabilities has traditionally 
been made under certain constraints. 
The decision maker is thus seen as making judgements about the 
desirability of outcomes and the likelihood of achieving them. 
The problem that we are concerned with in this thesis is whether 
these judgements are made independently of each other. Does the 
judgement about how valuable or desirable an outcome is depend on the 
likelihood of achieving that outcome? And does the judgement about 
how likely it is that an event will occur depend on the value or 
desirability of outcomes associated with that event? 
This problem has been called in the literature the question of 
the independence of value and subjective probability. When these two 
variables have not been independent of one another they have been said 
to interact. 
More particularly in this thesis we are concerned with the second 
problem, that of the effects of the desirability of outcomes upon 
judgements of the likelihood of events. While the literature on risky 
decision making is large the question of the independence of value and 
subjective probability has not been much studied. Nevertheless it is 
an important question. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
place the question in the context of decision making under risk. 
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Models based on the expectation principle. 
Using the expectation principle there are four possible models; 
the expected value model (EV), the subjectively expected value model 
(SEV), the expected utility model (EU), and the subjectively expected 
utility model (SEU). The equations for these models in two outcome 
gambles with outcome a associated with an event with probability of 
occurrence p, and outcome b associated with an event whose probability 
of occurrence is q take the forms: 
EV = p.a + q.b 
SEV= s(p).a + s(q).b 
EU = u(a).p + u(b).q 
SEU= u(a).s(p) + u(b).s(q). 
The expected value model. 
The expected value of a gamble provides a convenient and user'ul 
description of the stimulus material presented to the subject. It 
has also been used by most authors as either a normative model which 
prescribes an optimal criterion for choosing among gambles or as a 
model descriptive of actual choices. 
As a descriptive model it is uninteresting in the sense that the 
behaviour it was describing would not be very interesting if it were 
an adequate model, since the model uses only the objective parameters 
of the situation and makes no allowance for individual differences. 
Studies of it's descriptive power in experimental situations show that 
it is inadequate in the range of bets which have very small 
probabilities of winning or losing large amounts of money (Pruitt, 
1962), although any discussion of adequacy depends on the predictions 
of other available models. Furthermore it can be seen to make 
erroneous predictions about behaviour outside the laboratory, for 
example in the purchase of insurance or behaviour in many lotteries. 
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It's status as a normative model is not clear; we might want to 
talk in terms of subjectively optimal behaviour or of optimal choices 
given the decision maker's personal values and opinions about the 
likelihood of the occurrence of certain events, and in that sense the 
SEU model might be taken as the normative one. On the other hand, the 
decision maker might himself prefer the EV model, in the sense that,for 
example, he might find the objective probabilities more valuable as 
information than his subjective judgements. 
Interaction and expectation models. 
The other three models, the SEV,EU and SEU models require some 
measurement of the subjective parameters in the equations, i.e. some 
measures of utility and subjective probability. Tversky (1967a) 
writes, "The fundamental assumption of all psychological expectation 
models, which is independent of any particular measurement method, is 
that utility and subjective probability contribute independently to 
the overall 'worth' of a gamble. That is, judgements of desirability 
of outcomes are independent of judgements of likelihoods of events". 
Showing that utility and subjective probability were not independ-
ent in a given range of gambles would be sufficient to reject these 
expectation models in that situation• Thus the question of independ-
ence is a crucial one for those attempts to predict decision making 
behaviour by models which measure the desirability of outcomes and the 
subject's judgement of likelihood of events. 
Interaction and information processing aspects of gambles. 
Experimental studies of gambling situations have shown certain 
features of subjects' behaviour which seem pervasive and which cast 
doubt upon the adequacy of the expectation framework • 
. The most prominent of these features have been 
a) probability preferences - the preference for gambles which contain 
8 
certain probabilities rather than others, even when the less-
preferred gamble is of equal or higher expected value, e.g., in the 
studies of Edwards (1954 a,b) and Coombs and Pruitt (1960) and 
b) variance preferences or the preference for gambles of one variance 
rather than another, even if this means choosing a gamble of lower 
expected value e.g. the study of Royden et al ll959). (Increasing the 
variance of a gamble has generally been seen as equivalent to 
increasing the riskiness of that gamble). 
This variability in behaviour could be accounted for by assuming 
that subjects are following some expectation model but are making 
errors in a task which does require a certain degree of skill with 
numbers, or that maximising the expected worth of a gamble is only one 
of several rules governing decision making behaviour. Clearly both 
these accounts require a shift in attention towards the study of the 
information processing aspects of making decisions. In his general 
discussion of judgements about multi-attribute alternatives, Shepard 
(1964) writes, " the general problem of combining separate factors to 
arrive at an overall decision really consists of two distinct sub-
problems: the subproblem of specifying an appropriate form for the 
9 
rules of combination and the subproblem of assigning appropriate weights 
to the component factors". 
The SEU model asserts that subjects' decisions can be accounted 
for by an additive (i.e. linear and independent) combination of some 
transformations of the objective scales of value and probability. 
Particular interpretations of this general model would suggest the 
form of these transformations without challenging the additive 
combination ru!e. 
The gamble provides four sources of information or "dimensions 
of risk" to the decision-maker : the probabilities of winning and 
losing (PW and PL), and the amounts to be won or lost (AW and AL). 
1 0 
To produce a number such as a selling price or a rating which 
represents the expected value to the subject of a gamble would require 
the operations of addition and multiplication, i.e. EV = (PW.AW)+ 
(PL.AL). 
To study the question of the independence of value and subjective 
probability would be to examine the independence of the risk dimensions 
for the subject, and to ask such questions as 
(a) Do subjects attach more importance to some of the dimensions of a 
gamble rather than to others, and do these differences depend on the 
range of dimensions presented or the response method chosen?1 Shepard 1s 
weighting supproblem, and 
lb) Does the processing of the values on some of the dimensions depend 
on the levels of the values of the other dimensions, i.e. is there an 
interaction between dimensions suggesting a nonadditive combination 
rule? 
Interaction and alternative models. 
So far attention has b~en concentrated on the predictions of 
maximisation and expectation models about behaviour in a particular 
kind of uncertain environment. These models have come to dominate the 
literature, both as descriptions of the actual choice situation, the 
stimuli, and as explanatory models for the observed choices and 
evaluations, the responses. 
It should be noted that other theorists have attempted to account 
for behaviour under conditions of risk without reference to expectat-
ion models. Three such accounts which have considered the independence 
of value and subjective probability will be mentioned here: 
(a) the analysis of level of aspiration behaviour by Lewin, Dembo, 
Festinger, & Sears (1944). 
(b) Rotter's social learning theory,Rotter (1966). 
1 1 
(c) Atkinson's study of motivation and risk-taking behaviour, 
Atkinson (1957). 
The following table summarises the concepts of these accounts 
along with those of the SEU model. 
value & subjective 
theorist concepts resultant probability 
Lewin subjective probab- force(weighted interaction 
ility x valence valence) 
Rotter expectancy x rein- behaviour independent 
forcement value potential 
Atkinson expectancy x(motive resultant interaction 
x incentive value) motivation 
SEU utility x subjective SEU independent 
probability 
(Table adapted from Feather, 1959) 
It should be noted that, apart from the SEU model, these theorists 
are interested in situations where the skill of the subject in bring-
ing about the desirable outcomes or in avoiding undesirable ones is 
involved, rather than in those situations where the outcomes are con-
tingent upon chance factors. The experiments that have been carried 
out have typically examined subjective estimates of success in rather 
ambiguous tasks, where the instructions have encouraged subjects to 
believe that success depended either on their skill or on events out-
side their control. 
While these models have involved different terminologies amd have 
examined different decision making situations these·models might be 
rewritten in such a form that findings about the independence of value 
and subjective probability would provide a test of their predictions. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
Introduction to Subjective Probability. 
Perception of chance in experimental situations. 
Our concern is with decision making uhder conditions of risk, 
where we are attempting to predict the choices and judgements of 
subjects in situations which might be characterised as gambling 
situations. Subjects will win some amount of money, AW if some event 
E, 1 occurs or lose some amount, AL, if an event E,2 occurs. They are 
assumed to make these decisions in terms of the value to them of the 
amounts of money and their perception of the likelihood of the 
occurrence of these events. 
The qualification "under conditions of risk" is meant to refer 
to the nature of the events and to distinguish among certain classes 
of decision which involve alternative descriptions of these events. 
These other classes have usually been called decision making under 
uncertainty and decision making where skill is involved. Edwards 
ll954d) distinguishes between risk and uncertainty by suggesting 
that the former refers to, "a proposition about the future to which 
a number can be attached, a number that represents the likelihood 
that the proposition is true", for example the result of tossing a 
coin, while the latter refers to propositions about the future to which 
no accepted numbers can be attached and where 11it is impossible for 
you or me to find out what these probabilities may be or even to set 
up generally acceptable rules about how to find out •••• (for example) 
•• immediately after finishing this paper you will drink a glass of 
beer".(both examples are from Edwards' paper). 
Ellsberg: (1961) criticises this distinction by pointing out 
that, just as subjects• perception of the likelihood that a coin will 
fall heads when tossed can be inferred from wagers made by them on 
t.mat event, so might probability distributions for the "uncertain" 
events be inferred from wagers. 
Rotter(l966) discusses the distinction between decisions where 
chance and skill determine the occurrence of events by developing 
the concepts of external and internal control of reinforcement; he 
visualises a continuum at one end of which (the internal end) the 
choice is determined by the skill the subject can bring to bear on 
the event, e.g. some particular knowledge, while at the other end 
(external) 3>he event is characterised by "luck, chance, fate, •••• 
under the control of powerful_ others, •••• unpredictable because of 
the great complexity of the forces surrounding him". Littig (1962) 
makes the distinction : 11 skill orientation refers to the instruction-
ally induced belief that one's efforts can measurably influence the 
outcome of an uncertain event and chance orientation to the belief 
that one's efforts cannot influence such an event". 
To describe the kind of decision that we are concerned with in 
this thesis, we may classify the types of experimental situations 
according to the nature of the events in five ways, as follow:-
Class l.(skill). where the outcome of an event is perceived by the 
subject as being under his control. 
Class 2. where the outcome of an event is perceived by the subject 
as being under the experimenter's control. 
Class 3· where the outcome of an event is perceived by the subject 
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as bring jointly determined by his and another subject's response. 
This class would include those situations usually called two-
person experimental games. 
Class 4.(chance). where the outcome of the event is perceived by 
the subject as being under neither his nor the experimenter's 
variation, by linking it up to another variation (cause) or to a 
regularity of variation (order, regular pattern). When the subject 
arrived at the idea of chance he formed a system of expectations on 
the basis of which he examined future events. These events would 
then be seen as chance events when agreement was found between them 
and the system of expectations. This system included,(a) the sample 
must respect the numerical proportions of the system of expectations, 
both in the entire sample and in parts of it, and (b) there must be 
no patterns or cyclical structure in the sample. 
Thus in experiments the instructions and descriptions of the 
agents may not be sufficient to lead the subject to assume that he 
is dealing with chance events. While he may agree with this des-
cription of the situation initially, the sequences of outcomes of 
events may lead him to abandon the chance hypothesis and to consider 
alternative hypotheses, e.g. that the outcomes are being manipulated 
by the experimenter. 
15 
control. 
Class 5.(uncertainty). where the subject is not certain about how 
the outcome of events are controlled. 
We shall be interested in decisions where the events belong to 
Class 4, without implying that these are the only types of event to 
which numbers which represent the subjective likelihood of occurrence 
can be attached. 
Three features of the experimental situation should suggest to 
the subject that winning and losing depend only on chance - the 
instructions, the agents that generate the events, and the sequence 
of outcomes that is generated. 
The instructions and the stimuli. 
The experimenter will explain to the subject that the outcomes 
are under neither his nor the subject's control. He will show to the 
subject or describe to him the agent that will generate the outcomes. 
In many cases, for example the throwing of dice, the tossing of coins, 
the shuffling and drawing of cards, he might merely expect that the 
subject will share his belief that the outcomes of such activities 
depend on "chance". When the "chance" experiment demands the mani-
pulation of outcomes by the experimenter the latter will attempt to 
disguise this fact as well as he can. 
The sequence of outcomes. 
Bilodeau (1952) instructed his subjects to guess which of three 
shells a pea had been concealed under, and found that after a certain 
number of failures to find the pea subjects abandoned the hypothesis 
that the pea had been placed at random under the shells. 
Alberoni (1962a) studied the development of the "chance" h1-po-
thesis in an experimental situation which involved the drawing of 
coloured beads from boxes. He concluded that the subject formulated 
the idea of chance when he could not explain a difference, or a 
14, 
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Definitions of Subjective Probability. 
"Probability" is a word which is widely used both in everyday 
life and as a technical term. Feller (1968) distinguishes between the 
formal logical content and the intuitive background of probability 
theory. The mathematical theory of probability does not refer to 
judgements such as "Paul is probably a happy man" but to possible out-
comes of a conceptual experiment. He writes, "Before we speak of 
probabilities we must agree on an idealised model of a particular 
conceptual experiment such as tossing a coin, sampling kangaroos on 
the moon etc. At the outset we must agree on the possible outcomes 
of this experiment and the probabilities associated with them". The 
sample space is concerned with the possible outcomes of real or con-
ceptual experiments and the point in the sample space represents the 
thinkable outcomes, defines the idealised experiment and may be left 
undefined "in the same way as the terms point and line remain undefined 
in geometry". 
Unfortunately no adequate account can be given here of the attempts 
of philosophers to decide how such agreements on the probabilities 
associated with the outcomes of the experiment can be reached. In the 
psychological literature short summaries of different positions are 
given by Fishburn(l967) and by Cohen and Christensen (1970); more 
detailed accounts appear in Savage (1954), Ellis(l966) and in Kyburg 
and Smokler (1964). 
Essentially there are three types of connection between the math-
ematical theory and it's applications to experiments. The empirical 
view identifies probability with the notion of the limit-of a relative 
frequency; "to say that the probability that an A is a B is P is 
simply to say that the limit of the relative frequency of B's among 
A's (as the number of observed A's is increased without bound) is prr. 
(Kyburg and Smokler,l964,p.4). This type of probability statement is 
making an assertion about the world, and to find out the truth of 
the statement we must carry out an empirical investigation. 
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The logical school denies that probability statements are 
empirical statements and claims, "Given a statement, and given a set 
of statements constituting evidence or a body of knowledge, there is 
one and only one degree of probability which the statement may have, 
relative to the given evidence" (Kyburg and Smokler,p.5). The 
subjective school disputes the logical nature of this, and claims that 
probability merely represents a relation between a statement and a 
body of evidence, so that in any case there is no one correct 
probability that should be assigned. While this probability value is 
not uniquely determined and will depend on the particular individual 
who holds this degree of belief, subjective probability is not a 
psychological theory; only certain combinations of degrees of belief 
in related propositions are admissable. For example, if a person has 
a degree of belief P in a statement S, then he should have a degree of 
belief 1-P in not-S, where S and not-S are complementary events. 
When we refer in this thesis or in the literature on decision 
making in psychology to subjective probability we are not referring 
to this school of thought, but rather to some psychological theory. 
The confusion in terms seems to arise from the fact that both the 
subjective school and psychologists' interests in the behaviour of 
subjects in chance situations come together in work which follows the 
developments of von Neumann and Morgenstern in utility theory which 
showed how utility measures could be derived from preferences among 
gambles, i.e. combinations of prizes and probabilities, and which 
examined the kinds of probabilities that should enter into these 
gambles. 
There are many differences of opinion in psychology as to the 
definitions and descriptions of subjective probability which could be 
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adopted. (Howard(l963) writes, "Psychological probability may be 
defined as perceived mathematical probability", and alternative 
definitions and descriptions are given by Edwards (1962a) " a number 
between zero and one, which describes a person's assessment of the 
likeliness of an event", Luce and Suppes (1965): subjective probability 
applies only when 11 a relative frequency characterisation of probability 
is either not available or meaningful", 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) "a subjective probability •••• can be 
viewed simply as transformations of the scale of stated probabilities 
•••• that are predictive of risk taking decisions. However subjective 
probability is quite commonly' interpreted as a measure of the decision 
maker's opinion about the likelihood of an event". 
Cohen and Christensen (1970) criticise the definitions of Edwards 
and of Luce and Suppes, drawing attention to the 11psychological 
impoverishment of such a point of view", and writing "psychological 
probability is rather a domain of study which embraces a wide range of 
quantitatively different phenomena and which therefore requires a 
variety of different measures. The domain is unified by the fact that 
all the phenomena are characterised by some degree of subjective 
uncertainty". 
Wallsten(l971) writes, "subjective probability is defined only 
within the framework of a theory •••• Without a theory, the construct is 
without operational meaning and measures of it cannot be interpreted". 
The definition of subjective probability which will be found most 
useful will be bound up with the question of what behaviour we are 
trying to predict. In the title and in the previous chapter, our concern 
is with decisions of the form, 'Win amount A with probability P or lose 
amount B with probability Q'. The probabilities in this gamble are 
assu~ed to be known to the experimenter, and the subject is given 
sufficient information to estimate or calculate them. 
This type of gambling situation has been described as a 
minituarisation of risky situations" (Coombs, 1971), and we are 
interested in describing how the subject; integrates this information 
about amounts of money and the likelihood of winning and losing them 
into some overall judgement of the attractiveness to him of the gamble. 
More specifically this thesis asks whether or not the judgement of one 
dimension of this information is independent of the level of another 
dimension. 
Historically, description of this judgement process has involved 
constructs called utility and subjective probability where these have 
referred to some transformations of the presented outcomes and 
probabilities which would best predict subjects' judgements. Since the 
probabilities in the gambles have been displayed to the subjects 
research has been carried out to investigate the relationship between 
these displayed probabilities and subjects' estimates of them. 
Research into subjects' evaluations of and choices among gambles 
does not of course represent the total knowledge about this kind of 
problem in psychology, and any model which would attempt to predict 
behaviour in these situations would need to consider whatever 
psychological knowledge was available and relevant. Examples of such 
knowledge would be the work Qn the integration of information from 
several dimensions into one overall judgement, e.g. Shepard, 1964, 
Anderson, 1970, Hoffman, Slavic & Rorer, 1968, or the work on subjective 
probability outside this gambling framework and using a less narrow 
conception of subjective probability, e.g. Alberoni, 1962b, Cohen,l964, 
Cohen and Hansel, 1956. 
If subjects' behaviour in these gambling experiments could be 
predicted by using only the objective displayed probabilities then 
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theorists in this field would not need to concern themselves with 
subjective probability. This would not imply that subjective 
probability was not an interesting research problem; rather it would 
be making a statement about this class of decision making situation. 
Whatever information about the nature of such subjective probabilities 
as would best predict behaviour in this situation would add to our 
knowledge of subjective probability without replacing it, and would 
need to be evaluated by those researchers working on other situations 
or concerned with predicting other kinds of behaviour. 
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In these gambling experiments there is assumed to be an agreement 
between the experimenter and the subject that the outcomes of an 
experiment are due to chance. The experimenter will calculate the 
probabilities of the different outcomes by the application of math-
ematical probability theory. This situation is different from those 
where the outcomes are brought about by the skill of the subject, by 
some combination of chance and skill, or by the experimenter's 
manipulations. In these cases the experimenter can only calculate the 
probabilities of the different outcomes by examining the subjects• 
responses, and no acceptable method exists to resolve any difference 
between the subjects' and the experimenter's estimates of the 
probabilities. Where the experimenter has recourse to mathematical 
probability theory to calculate the probabilities he does not need to 
assume that the subject is applying or is even familiar with that theory. 
Rather he infers subjective probability from their decisions, judgements 
of frequency, or assignments of numbers to reflect the strength of their 
belief that some outcome will occur, and compares these inferred 
probabilities with his1own calculated ones. 
Experiments reported below will show that the fit between these 
inferred and calculated probabilities is often very good indeed, even 
in problems such as Bayesian probability revision where the calculation 
of probabilities is not simple even when one knows the correct 
formulae to apply. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
Subjects' Estimates in Static Situations. 
Probability Calculus. 
"The mathematical theory of probability should first provide a method 
of defining and identifying the probability of any specified outcome 
or 'event' happening as the result of performing an operation or 
'trial' of the system. Secondly, probability calculus must define how 
probabilities of basic events are combined to give probabilities of 
more complex events". (Gray, 1967, p.l). 
While a later section of this chapter considers the assignment by 
subjects of numbers to events, numbers which reflect their perceived 
likelihood of the occurrence of events or the perceived frequency of 
some event, we shall examine first the extent to which combinations 
of these assigned numbers correspond to the calculus of mathematical 
probability theory. 
The laws of probability theory are well known and need only be 
summarised here. All possible outcomes of a trial or a system may be 
regarded as a set, and the event E is that subset of the set of all 
possible outcomes in which the event E happens. 
1. The scale. The probability, P(E), of the occurrence of event E 
takes on any values between 0 and I, where impossible events will 
have zero probability and certain events will have unit probability. 
2. Mutually exclusive events. 
Addition theorem. If E, 1 and E, 2 are two mutually exclusive 
events the probability that either E, 1 or E, 2 happens is the 
sum of their independent probabilities. 
P(E,I U E,2) = P(E,l) + P(E,2), and in general, 
1"1 
P(E,l lT E,2 ••• U E,i ••• tl En· ) =&P(E,i). 
. ,~, 
Multiplication theorem. If E,l and E,2 are two independent events 
the probability that both E,l and E,2 happen is the product of 
their individual probabilities, P(E,lnE,2)=P(E,~).P(E,2), and in 
general, P(E,lOE,2 ••• t) E,tn) = 7f p(E'I) 
Complementary events. If E,l and E,2 are complementary, i.e.they 
are the only possible outcomes on a trial, then one of them must 
occur and P(E,l) + P(E,2) = 1. Knowing the probability of one 
event we can calculate the probability of the other, i.e. 
P(E,l)=l-P(E,2) 
P(E,2)=1-P(E,l) 
3· General events. When E,l and E,2 are not mutually exclusive, then 
Addition theorem. If E,l and E,2 are two general events the 
probability that at least one of E,l and E,2 happens is the sum 
of their individual probabilities diminished by the joint 
probability that they both happen. 
P(E,lUE,2) = P(E,l) + P(E,2) - P(El E2) 
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Multiplication theorem. If E, 1 and E,2 are general events the joint 
probability that they both happen is the product of the probability 
of E,l and the conditional probability of E,2 when E,l happens, or 
the product of the probability of E,2 and the conditional 
probability of E,l when E,2 happens. 
P(E,l E,2) = P(E,l).P(E2fEl) = P(E.2). P(ElfE2) 
4. Independence. When we refer to independent events over a series 
of trials, we mean that the probability of event E,l on trial 1 will be 
the same as the probability of the same event on trial n. For example, 
if the.probability that a coin should show heads when tossed is 1/2, 
P(H) = 1/2, then no matter how often the coin is tossed the probability 
that it will show heads on any one toss remains 1/2. These results 
refer to the toss of an 11idealised11 coin in a conceptual experiment, 
e.g.the coin is not biased and it will not fall on it's side; in an 
actual experiment the outcome of for example 100 heads in 100 tosses 
might lead one to rejedt the hypothesis that P(H) = 1/2; the coin 
might be biased or the tosser might have some control over the outcomes. 
24 
Subjective Probability and the Laws of Mathematical Probability. 
Complementary events. 
Edwards (1954d) writes, "Intuitively it seems necessary that if we 
know the subjective probability of E we ought to be able to figure out 
the subjective probability of not-E, and the only reasonable rule for 
figuring it out is subtraction of the subjective probability of E from 
that of complete certainty''· He goes on to show that, for more than 
two complementary events, the acceptance of this subtraction theorem, 
with the idea of a subjective probability scale bounded at 0 and I, 
means that the subjective probability scale must be identical with the 
objective probability scale. In the case of two events, the only 
subjective probability scale not identical with objective probability 
must take the form: 
Unfortunately little data is available on this question, since 
most experiments have used response devices which ensure that the 
probabilities sum to unity, and the evidence which does exist in the • 
literature shows no consistency in the results and no systematic 
examination of the problem. 
In probability revision tasks, where Bayes theorem i~ appropriate, 
Phill~ps et~.al.(l966) had subjects revise their estimates of the 
probabilities of four hypotheses. The estimates of one subjec~ summed 
to unity, but those of the other subjects summed to more than unity 
as they tdnded to revise their estimates for the most likely 
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hypothesis upwards without making corresponding decreases in the 
probabilities of the less likely hypotheses. In an experiment with 
two hypotheses, Marks (1968) found that the sum of the two complement-
ary probabilities was greater than one. In addition, subjective 
probabilities corresponding to low objective probabilities were over-
estimated and to high ones underestimated. 
Alberoni (1962b) asked his subjects to estimate various binomial 
sampling distributions for a sample size of four. The sum of the 
estimated probabilities for the different outcomes consistently 
totalled about 0.85. On the other hand, Cohen and Hansel (1956) found 
that subjective probabilities for complementary events summed to unity 
"within the limits of random variation11 in an experiment involving 
lottery tickets. 
When subjective probabilities have been inferred from choices among 
bets they have been shown to sum to approximately unity lLindmann, 
1965, Tversky,l967b), and to less than unity (Liebermann, 1958), 
while Tversky (1967a) found that they only summed to one when certain 
assumptions were made about the utility for gambling. 
The question of the su~ of complementary probabilities has not 
been systematically investigated as a problem in it's own right, and 
no conclusions can be reached on the available evidence. 
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Combinatorial rules. 
Beach and Peterson (1966) found that estimates for unions of 
mutually exclusive events equalled with high reliability the sum of 
estimates for the component events, when probabilities of three 
different classes of events were estimated - a binomial sampling dis-
tribution, seven different events in a probability learning task, and 
the probability of each of seven Republicans obtaining Presidential 
nomination. 
Barclay and Beach (1972) examined four combinatorial rules when 
subjects estimated probabilities like : ''Imagine someone that you know 
will get a car for graduation. What is the probability that it will 
be a Chevrolet? That it will be a Ford? That it will be either a 
Chevrolet or a Ford?" 
The four correct rules were: 
(1) P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B). Union of mutually exclusive events. 
(2) P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(At}B) Union of nonexclusive events. 
(3) P(An B) = P(A)P(B). Intersection of independent events. 
(4) P(A (\ B) = P(A,fB)P(B) = P(B.(A)P(A). Intersection of nonindependent 
events. 
Subjects' estimates of the simple events were combined using 
both the correct rules and incorrect rules (including incorrect addition 
rules in cases 3 and 4 above), and th~se combinations compared with 
subjects' estimates of the compound events. The correct rule fitted 
the responses much better than the incorrect rules, and responses were 
close to the predictions of the correct rule. The discrepancies took 
the directions: in condition 1, "the S's estimates fur the probability 
of the union tended to be proportionally lower than the sum of the 
estimates for the elementary events", and "in conditions 2-4, the: S 's 
estimates for complex events are slishtly overestimated."(p.l83). 
Barclay and Beach compared the multiplication rule with the 
incorrect addition rule in condition 4, and found the latter rule to 
be inferior. These results are in contradiction with those reported 
by Cohen (1972), that the compound estimate greatly overestimates 
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the multiplication of the simple probabilities in a target search task, 
who asks does the subject "fail to appreciate the multiplicative 
reasoning required and assess the chance of gaining a prize by some 
pseudo-additive operation" (p.43.). 
Unfortunately this is another problem where different results 
have been reported by experiments which differ greatly in design. 
Conditional probabilities. 
In a meter reading experiment (Howell and Funaro,l965) subjects 
had to guess which of two meters on a display had the higher reading 
given the reading for only one of them. After several hundred trials, 
subjects were able to judge the conditional probabilities with con-
siderable accuracy. Their median judgements were most accurate for 
probabilities lower than 0.5; higher probabilities were consistently 
underestimated. 
The next chapter considers further subjects' estimates of con-
ditional probabilities in the Bayesian probability revision task. 
When subjects are asked to judge the degree of contingency between 
two binary variables they tend to make their judgments, not on the 
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basis of the conditional probabilities, but on the frequency of some 
events which are consistent with the hypothesis of a contingent relation 
even though these events may be insufficient to confirm this hypothesis. 
Smedslund (1963) had nursing students judge the degree of contingency 
between a symptom and a disease. These judgments were based mainly on 
the frequency of the join~ occurrence of the symptom and the disease, 
ignoring the other three event combinations-the frequency of the symptom 
without the disease, the absence of the symptom both with and without 
the disease. Their judgements were unrelated to the actual degree of 
contingency. 
Ward and Jenkins (1965) presented a task where subjects estimated 
the extent to which they could make a light go on. Their subjects made 
their estimates only on the basis of the frequency of agreements 
between their intention and the occurrence of the light, i.e. they took 
only confirming evidence into account. The authors rejected the hypo-
thesis that demands on the subjects' memory had forced them to attend 
29 
to favourable events only - the subjects made good estimates of all 
the event frequencies, and concluded that "statistically naive subjects 
lack an abstract concept of contingency that is isomorphic with the 
statistical concept"(p.241). 
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The idea of independence. 
Alberoni (1962b) reports some experiments where subjects are shown 
a box containing red and blue beads in certain proportions. Beads are 
sampled with replacement from this box and each subject is asked to 
predict, after seeing a sample of a certain size, which colour the next 
bead drawn will be. vlhen the number of red and blue beads in the sample 
was the same, there was a tendency (93 replies out of 120) to predict 
the colour which had not shown up for longest, e.g. r was predicted 
after the samples bbbrrrb and rrrbbrbb. He quotes one of his subjects 
as saying "it is like tossing a coin - if the coin does not fall tails 
for a time, it is more likely to be tails". 
Further evidence of a failure to see the outcomes of independent 
binary events as independent is presented by Cohen and Hansel(l956). 
When a sequence of three outcomes was shown to the subject and he was 
asked to predict the fourth outcome, there was a marked tendency to 
predict the non-preponderant colour, and the longer it was since the 
non-preponderant colour had appeared the greater this tendency. 
Cohen (1972) summarises research on the development of the idea of 
independence. In children of 6 years old there is both a tendency to 
alternate the response from the previous prediction, particularly when 
that prediction has been successful, and a tendency to predict the 
outcome which had up to then occurred with less frequency. The idea of 
independence emerges only at the age of 12; "But the idea of dependence 
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continues to be held, even by the ·same person, in two forms. In one 
form it favours a continuation of similar outcomes. In another form it 
favours th~ non-preponderant outcome; that is, there is a negative 
recency effect".(Cohen,l972,p.32). 
Another example of seeing an outcome as being related to the 
preceding sequence of outcomes is given by Alberoni (1962b); when the 
beads in a sample have a cyclical arrangement, e.g. brbrbr or bbrrbb, 
subjects tended to respect this arrangement when predicting the next 
outcome (81 replies our of 120). For this experiment the sample size 
needs to be small; when it is larger, subjects see the sample as being 
incompatible with the hypothesis that it has been drawn by chance 
(Alberoni,l962a). 
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A note on Psychological ~robability. 
The preceding sectione have briefly considered relationships 
between subjects' estimates of probabilities and the laws of 
probability theory. The search for what might be called "Subjective 
laws" is a large and interesting field of research. Reviews of 
such research appear in Cohen (1964,1972), Cohen and Christensen 
(1970), and Peterson and Beach (1967). Our interest here is in the 
behaviour of subjects in particular experimental situations and in 
inferences about subjective probability from such behaviour. We 
have only sufficient space to suggest some of the work that is being 
carried out in the field of '£psychological probability' and to make 
a comparison between some of its findings and those of the 
experiments to be discussed in the following section. 
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Judgments of frequency and proportion. 
The probability component in gambles and risky decision situations 
is typically based on the relative frequency of an event or on the 
proportion of a stimulus that has some specified attribute. This 
section will examine the literature on subjects' direct estimates of 
proportion and of relative frequency. 
Two examples of the experimental paradigm may be considered. The 
first,e.g.Philip(l947) involves the presentation to the subject of a 
card or transparency containing red and black dots in an irregular 
pattern. While the total number of dots in the pattern was held 
constant the proportion of red to black dots was varied. The task for 
the subjects was to estimate the proportion of dots of a specified 
colour. The second experimental situation, e.g.the study by Simpson 
and Voss!l96l),involves the subject watching two lights flashing for a 
total frequency of fifty times. The proportion of times that each 
light flashes is the proportion which the subjects are asked to judge. 
It can be seen from these examples that the entire sample of events is 
presented either serially or simultaneously to the subject. Precautions 
are taken to prevent the subjects from simply counting the number of 
dots or the frequency of each light, e.g.by restricting the time allowed 
for examination of the stimulus. 
The results of all the experiments they reviewed led Peterson and 
Beach (1968) to conclude,"the most striking aspect •••• is that the 
relation between mean estimates and sample proportions is described 
well by an identify function. The deviations from this function are 
small". In the experiment by Philip(l947i described above there was a 
linear relationship between presented and estimated relative frequency. 
Robinson (1964) presented a more difficult task to his subjects. They 
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were asked to estimate the mean of a binary distribution of flashing 
lights; this mean was continuously varied during the task, i.e.the 
relative frequencies of the lights were not stationary. He varied the 
rate at which the flashes were presented, the magnitude and sign of 
the change in mean, and the size of the population of flashes from 
which the sample was drawn. His subjects performed very accurately and 
he concluded, ''it seems unlikely that probability estimatio~~is-or~at 
least need be a limiting factor in human binary decision making". 
The deviations from an identity function which do arise seem to 
occur in two consistent and different ways. Either low frequencies 
are overestimated and high frequencies underestimated (Case 1), or low 
frequencies are underestimated and high frequencies overestimated 
(Case 11). 
Case 1 results. Stevens and Galanter (1957) used the same kind of 
stimulus display as Philip, but extended the range of proportions of 
dots displayed. Their results were a further example of Case 1, and a 
plot of judgment against proportion had an inverted S shape. Erlick 
(1964)obtained similar results when the stimuli were presented serially, 
as did Attneave (1953) whose subjects judged the relative frequency 
of letters of the alphabet in a sample. Two experiments on probability 
estimation show a Case 1 relationship; Komorita (1959) asked su~jects 
to estimate the odds against the occurrence of a certain number of 
heads showing when several coins were tossed. Subjects were most 
accurate when less coins were tossed and when the probability to be 
estimated was about 0.5; they overestimated low probabilities and 
underestimated high probabilities. Howard (1963) reports similar 
findings when subjects were asked to solve 33 problems in probability 
theory. Unfortunately he neither states what these problems were n~v 
presentsquantitative results. 
Case 11. Case 11 results have been shown by Nash (1964) and Pitz 
(1965,1966) who both used a design similar to that of Erlick(l964). 
Similar results are reported by Shuford (1961), who presented subjects 
with a matrix containing different proportions of red and blue squares 
on a white ground, and by Simpson and Voss (1961) whose design was 
described earlier. 
It is not clear from comparisons among the experimental designs 
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why subjects' deviations from an identity function should fall into these 
two groups. Further research needs to be carried out into this question, 
since the results are relevant to the interpretation of behaviour in 
decision situations which include probabilistic information. 
Further information concerning the judgement of relative frequency 
and proportion is available in these studies. The accuracy of subjects• 
estimates increases with longer presentation times (Erlick, 1961, 
Robinson, 1964), with the length of the sequence of elements (Erlick, 
1964), and with practice at the task (Simpson and Voss, 1961). If we 
assume that subjects are able to gather larger samples during longer 
presentation times or longer sequences then estimates based on these 
larger samples would be expected to be more accurate and have a smaller 
standard error of estimation. 
Judgments at the extremes, i.e.of very large or very small 
proportions have certain features. Subjects make smaller errors 
(Robinson, 1964), make fewer errors (Stevens and Galanter, 1957) have 
smaller response variance (Shuford, 1961), and have shorter reaction 
time (Johnson, 1955). It seems that discrimination is poorer at the 
middle of the frequency range when the number of dots of the two colours 
or of the relative frequency of lights is similar. 
Erlick (1961,1963a,l963b) investigated the effects of various methods 
of grouping and clustering of the stimuli on the perception of 
relative frequency. Selected letters of the alphabet were flashed 
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at short, regular rates on a small screen, and subjects were asked to 
decide which of the letters had been presented with the higher or 
highest frequency. Erlick found that when two events are of equal 
frequency the event having.the higher degree of clustering is estimated 
as having the higher relative frequency of occurrence. When subjects 
make estimates about the frequency of groups of letters rather than 
of individual letters they are less accurate when the size of the 
groups of letters increases. A further experiment (1963b) considered 
differences in the method of display. In a symbolic display, one of 
four letters would be presented on one screen; in a spatial display 
one symbol appeared on one of four screens, and in a combined display 
one of four symbols appeared on one of four screens. Accuracy of 
decision was higher in the spatial display condition, and adding the 
symbolic cue to the spatial cue did not lead to superior performance. 
It seems to be the distinct physical representation that is the 
important feature of these judgments of relative frequency. 
Discussion. 
"It seems unlikely that probability estimation is, or at least 
need be, a limiting factor in human binary decision making". 
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There seems to be some support for this conclusion of Robinson(l964). 
The relationship between judgment and objective frequency in estimation 
tasks is close to the identity function. There is evidence of deviations 
from this relationship in the estimation of high and low frequencies and 
proportions_, but experimenters have not considered them large. 
Such results are encouraging to those working in the field of 
decision making under risk, since the risky information in gambles 
typically involves the judgment of relative frequency or proportion by 
the subjects. For example, Tversky in his application of conjoint 
measurement techniques to the s~aling of utility and subjective 
probability (Tversky, 1967~,b), and Slovic who has studied information 
processing considerations in the evaluation of gambles (e.g.Slovic and 
Lichtenstein,l968a,b) both employ the area of a spinning wheel to 
represent the probabilities of winning and losing in the gamble.· 
While performance is good in these tasks, which demand the estimation of 
proportions and frequencies, and this knowledge is useful for the study 
of the evaluation of gambles, it can be argued that the subjects' task 
in these experiments is simple, or rather that the use of simple rules, 
such as matching rules, approximates well the required response. In 
such experiments the subject has only to move a pointer alonga ten - or 
one hundred - point scale to show "how much" of the event is "there". 
When accuracy, in the sense of being close to the presented frequencies 
or objective probabilities, is the criterion of good performance, then 
performance is good even when the estimation task is a difficult one, 
as for example in the revision of probabilities in a Bayesian situation, 
where the changes in the sample composition could result in changes in 
the probabilities of as many as six hypotheses las in the study of 
Schum, Goldstein, Howell & Southard, 1967). 
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\fhen however the response is not a simple estimation one, but 
involves reasoning about probabilities or an "intuitive" understanding 
of independence, and the combination of probabilities, then performance 
is less good, where the criterion of good performance is the laws of 
probability theory. The results of experiments which have used these 
laws as criteria have been summarized above. Further evidence of a 
discrepancy between subjects' reasoning about probabilities and the laws 
of probability theory comes from research reported by Alberoni (1962b) 
and Cohen and Hansel (1956). Subjects expect the proportion of balls 
of different colours in a sample to mirror the· proportions in the parent 
population, and seem to have no clear notion of sampling variability. 
When subjects are asked to construct samples they have preferences for 
certain kinds of arrangement in the sample, e.g. for homogenous or 
·symmetrical arrangements. When they are presented with samples which 
show order and pattern they do not believe that the sample has been 
drawn by chance when it is large. 
-· . ·. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) administered a questionnaire 
containing sampling problems to a meeting of American Mathematical 
Psychologists who might not be thought to be naive subjects, and reported 
that these subjects had no clear idea of sampling variability. 
A reading of the literature on decision making would suggest that 
these two kinds of experiment, the one looking at probability estimates 
and the other at subjects' ideas about chance, sampling etc., were 
concerned with different problems, or different aspects of behaviour. 
It seems to this writer however that it is an implicit assumption of 
estimation experiments that ideas and expectations about independence 
and sampling underlie subjects' estimates when making decisions. 
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Subjects are being asked "how likely is it?" rather than "How many 
are there?"· 
The reasons for using judgments of frequency and proportion in 
the study of decision making have been that the objective frequencies 
provide a norm against which subjects' judgments may be compared, and 
that the expected values of gambles may be calculated. Two points with 
regard to these objectives might be considered. There is a distinction 
between the estimation of probabilities in terms of judging relative 
frequency and estimation in the solving of problems in probability 
theory familiar to students in text books such as Feller (1968) or as 
popularized by Huff (1970) in his book, 'How to take a chance'. The 
kind of reasoning involved in these problems might be a closer 
representation of, or a model for, decision making while still yielding 
'objective' probabilities. Secondly, an experiment by Galanter (1962) 
revealed a marked consistency among subjects in their judgments of 
probability statements such as, "You can break a raw egg with a hammer; 
July 4th. will be a hot day; You would survive an aeroplane crash", 
under three different methods of probability estimation: a paired 
comparison design, a 100 point rating scale, and a magnitude estimation 
procedure. Such consistency might provide an alternative framework for 
studying decisio.ns and preferences among gambles. Cohen and his 
associates, e.g. Cohen, 1964, have carried out much research using 
such a framework. 
\·lhile studies in probability estimation have raised many questions 
it is regrettable that there has been no systematic investigation of 
them. Further research needs to be carried out, and some problems may 
be identified here. 
(1) In judgments of frequency, some experimenters have found that high 
. 
frequencies are underestimated ~nd low probabilities overestimated while 
other apparently similar experiments report opposite results; 
(2) the question of whether complementary subjective probabilities 
sum to one; 
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(3) Subjects' notions of sampling, and the relationship of these notions 
to probability estimates. 
We are concerned in this study with the question of the interaction 
of value and subjective probability in the decisions made by subjects in 
certain well defined decision situations; some of these decisions will 
involve the revision of probabilities in the light of new information, 
and these will be discussed in the following chapter. The remainder 
will include the estimation of frequency and proportion, and the results 
reported above suggest that subjects can make such estimates very 
accurately, except, perhaps, when estimates of large and small frequencies 
have to be made. The role that the presented information and subjects' 
estimated play in decisions can be identified by inspection of the 
distributions of decisions. For example subjects' evaluations of the 
worth of gambles, or the distribution of their preferences among 
gambles, may be compared with the expected values of the gambles, which 
summarizes the presented information about the payoffs and the 
probabilities of achieving them. 
Our concern is with the ability of simple models to predict 
behaviour in this simple task, with the problem of inferring subjective 
probability from the decisions that subjects make, and with deciding 
whether or not these inferred probabilities are independent of the 
payoffs included in the decision situations. Our conclusions will be 
about behaviour in these kinds of situation; the generality of the 
results would be a question for further research. 
CHAPTER FOUR. 
Subjective Probability: Revision of Estimates in 
Sequential Situations. 
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An enormous amount of research has in the last ten years been 
concerned with how subjects revise their opinions as to which of two or 
more hypotheses are true in the light of new evidence. If two or more 
populations are well described to the subject, and he is asked to estimate 
the likelihood that a particular sample has been drawn and to revise these 
estimates when the sample is changed, Bayes theorem prescribes what these 
estimates and revisions should be. This theorem might be most clearly 
expressed by considering a typical experimental situation. 
Each of two urns contains N red and blue balls in proportions known 
to the subject. Urn R contains r red balls and (N-r)blue balls, while 
Urn B contains (N-b) red balls and b blue balls. The experimenter .. : chooses 
one of the urns - the subject does not know which - takes a ball from it, 
informs the subject of the colour of the ball, replaces it in the urn, 
shakes the urn and it's contents well~ and takes out another ball. He 
continues in this way, sampling with replacement, until the subject has 
seen a sample of a certain size. The subject is then asked to state how 
likely he feels it is that the s~~ple has been drawn from urn R, and how 
likely from urn B. 
Bayes theorem. 
Let D be the data or the sample seen. 
Let HR be the hypothesis that urn R was chosen for sampling, and HB 
the hypothesis that urn B was chosen. 
Then, given 
(a) the sampling was with replacement, so that the data are conditionally 
independent in the sense that the probability of a ball of a particular 
colour being drawn is independent of the result of the preceding draw 
but dependent on the frequency of balls of that colour in the two urns, 
and (b) that the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, Bayes 
theorem shows that. the probabilities of the two hypotheses under 
consideration, given the data, are 
(1) P(HRjD) = k.P(DfHR).P(HR). 
(2) P(HB.JD) = k.P(DfHB) .P(HB), where P(HR) and P(HB) 
represent the prior probabilities of the hypotheses, or the 
probabilities of the hypotheses before any data have been seen. 
P(HRfD) and P(HB.J'D) are the posterior probabilities, or the probabilities 
of the hypotheses after the data have been seen. 
P(DjHR) and P(D.IHB) represent the likelihood of the data, or the con-
ditional probabilities of the data given the truth of the particular 
hypothesis, and the constant k ensures that P(HR(D) + P(HB/"D) = 1. 
If the subject~ asked to respond by stating the odds in favour of 
one hypothesis, say HR, then these may be compared with the odds as 
g:i,ven by Bayes theorem, which can be computed by dividing equation (1) 
by equation (2) to yield (3)-12.,= L.1lo where.D.o refers to the prior 
odds in favour of the hypothesis, and L is the likelihood ratio of the 
data. 
Most experiments have simplified the situation further by 
(a) making the prior probability of each hypothesis equal so that 
P(HR) = P(HB),J2o= 1, and the posterior odds in favour of a particular 
hypothesis equals the likelihood ratio of that hypothesis, 
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(b) using binomial populations where r= b,i.e. the number of red balls in 
urn R equals the number of blue balls in urn B, so that (4) P(rlHR) = 
P(b]HB) = p 
(5) P(bJHR) = P(riHB) = q, and p + q = 1. 
Under these conditions the likelihood of r red balls in n c1raws.:::is 
L(r,n) r n-r = p q 
qr pn-r 
= ~q~r-(n-r) 
cp) 
Only the difference between the number of red and blue balls in 
the sample is relevant in computing the posterior odds. 
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Bayesian revision and consefvatism in experiments. 
Researchers have typically compared subjects' estimates of their 
posterior odds with the odds as calculated from Bayes theorem. The 
number of experiments reported on this topic is enormous, and this 
chapter can only aim to be an introduction to the more important problems 
I 
raised by this research. Those studies that have been concerned with the 
size of the sample taken by subjects when they·are permitted to look at 
as much data as they wish before making a decision, and those which have 
included payoffs for estimates or decisions are discussed in Chapter Six 
which considers subjective probability as inferred from sequential 
decisions. 
The subject's task. 
The statistician who calculates the posterior odds of each hypo-
thesis given the necessary formula is involved in several operations and 
probability estimates. Values must be assigned to the prior probabilities 
of the hypotheses and to the likelihood of the data given each hypothesis. 
These values must then be entered into an equation and the necessary 
algebraic computations performed. While much research has been carried 
out into the study of subjective posterior odds or probabilities, workers 
have not explicitly stated that they expected their subjects to carry out 
these operations. Their subjects ar~ asked to give ''intuitive 
estimates", and these are then compared with the odds as worked out by 
the research worker using Bayes theorem. To provide independent variables 
for the experiments they have manipulated the components of the Bayesian 
equations, for example the prior probabilities, the amount of data in the 
sample, the number of hypotheses to be considered, and the diagnosticity 
of the data. This review of the literature will discuss these as 
determinants of performance in this probability estimation task. 
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Dependent variables. 
First, attention will be given to the dependent variables, the forffis 
in which subjects give their estima'tes. Bayes theorem permits the 
results of computation to be expressed in terms of posterior probability, 
P(HlD), or in terms of the posterior odds in favour of one hypothesis, 
..{)_ j := L. • ..fl. 0 • 
If, as has beep shown above, certain constraints are placed upon 
the composition of the populations and the prior odds are 1, then~#: 
(q/P}r-b and the likelihood ratio and posterior odds are a function 
of the difference between the number of red and blue balls in the sample. 
If the equation is transformed into logarithmic form and log.Jl, , is 
treated as the dependent variable, the response measure will be a linear 
function of the difference between red and blue balls. 
Peterson, Schneider and Miller (1965) developed a measure of the 
degree to which performance corresponds to Bayesian or optimal perform-
ance, introducing the Accuracy Ratio, A.R. = ILLR/LLR, which is the 
ratio of the log. odds or likelihood ratio inferred from subjects' 
estimates to the log.likelihood ratio derived from Bayes theorem. An 
accuracy ratio of less than unity indicates that the subject's revision 
of opinion in the light of the data is less than the revision calculated 
from Bayes theorem. The accuracy ratio is not defined in the case when 
the difference in the number of red and blue balls in,the sample is 
zero. 
These four measures of performance, 
a) posterior probability estimates, or PPE. 
b) posteriarodds. 
c) log. posterior odds, or log. likelihood ratio, lLLR, 
d) accuracy ratio, A.R. 
are mathematically equivalent. Odds of p:q convert to probabilities with 
the transformation, p/(p + q), for example odds of 2:1,1:1,1:2 are the 
·equivalent of the probabilities 2/3,1/2,2/3• Subjects give their 
estimates in terms of probabilities or odds. It does not of course 
follow that psychologically these measures are equivalent, and con-
sideration of their characteristics suggest that they are not. Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1971) point out, "the amount of change in P(HfD) 
induced by a single datum decreases as the probabilities prior to the 
receipt of that datum become more extreme. Subjects may have 
difficulty coping with this nonlinear relationship between stimuli and 
response". (p.698). This would affect inferences about subjects• 
estimates if these subjects had a tendency to change their judgment 
in equal steps as the data increased. 
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If subjects are also unwilling to use the extremes of the 
probability scale bounded by the experimenter at 0 and 1, they may not 
be properly informed that small changes in their estimates may have 
major consequences when converted to likelihood ratios or posterior odds, 
these not being so constrained. For example the posterior odds of 
9:1,19:1,90:1,& 900:1 convert to the probabilities 0.9,0.95,0.99, & 
0.998 respectively. 
Phillips and Edwards (1966) compared the effects of different 
response modes. The task involved drawing poker-chips from bookbags, 
two hypotheses had equal prior probabilities of 0.5,and fifteen 
sequences each containing twenty draws or items of data were shown to 
the subjects. In addition to changing the bookbag compositions three 
response devices were used. The .first group of subje~s estimated 
ptobabilities by dividing 100 white discs between two troughs, the 
height of the discs in each trough indicating the probability of each 
hypothesis. The second group estimated odds by setting a sliding 
pointer on a scale of posterior odds spaced logarithmically; the odds 
scale extended from 1:1 to 10,000:1. The third group, the continuous 
probability scale group, estimated probabilities by setting a sliding 
pointer on a scale of probabilities, where the spacing of the prob-
abilities on the scale was determined by converting the probabilities 
to odds and scaling the odds logarithmically. The scale extended from 
0.5 to 0.9999. For all three groups the subjects' revisions of opinion 
were smaller than those prescribed by Bayes theorem. When the bag 
composition was close to 50-50 the method of responding made little 
difference. When the proportion was more different from 50-50, and 
therefore the information was more diagnostic and revisions of opinion 
should be larger for each datum, revisions were smallest in the prob-
ability estimation, i.e. the first, group. For the subject, as for the 
statistician, there is more scope for expressing changes in opinion on 
odds scales when more extreme estimates are called for. 
Conservatism. 
When subjects' estimates are compared with the Bayesian posterior 
probabilities the result mentioned above, that they extract less than 
the optimal amount of certainty from data, has proved to be a pervasive 
phenomenon, and was described by Phillips and Edwards as "conservative 
performance''• Much attention has been directed to the study of 
conservatism and the effect upon it of varying prior probability, bag 
composition, and sample size. 
If the subject is asked to revise his estimate after seeing one 
extra datum or a sequence of data, conservatism is defined as either, 
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a) the change in probability estimate is less than the change prescribed 
by Bayes theorem, 
b) by the slope of the line relating ILLR to LLR is less than unity, 
c) the accuracy ratio is less than one. 
Effects upon conservatism. 
1. Prior probabilities. 
Instead of sampling from two bookbags with two hypotheses under 
consideration the subjects may be informed that there are t bookbags, 
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m of which are characterised by one composition of balls and n~t-m 
characterised by another. The prior probability of the hypothesis under 
consideration, m/t, can be varied by changing the value of m. 
Phillips and Edwards (1966) chose ten bookbags, and the prior 
probability that the predominantly red bookbag would be chosen took 
on the values 0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6, and 0.7; subjects gave their posterior 
probability estimates by changing the height of discs in a trough. 
Subjects' estimates were converted to inferred log. likelihood ratios, 
and their revisions were found to be conservative in all prior prob-
ability conditions. 
Peterson and Miller (1965) reported a systematic relationship 
between prior probability and accuracy ratio when they used a wider 
range of prior probabiiities, 0.1,0.2,0.3 •••• 0.9, and their subjects 
expressed their probabilities by moving a sliding pointer along an 
equal interval probability scale. Subjects became less conservative 
and accuracy ratios increased with the more extreme prior probabilities. 
It is not clear whether this relationship between prior probabilities 
and conservatism is due_to the more extreme probabilities or to the 
difference in response mode. Subjects may have ignored the original 
setting of the pointer and moved the pointer by a fixed amount as they 
observed data, a practice which would reveal conservatism when the 
accuracy ratio was computed. 
2. Bag composition. 
When the difference in the number of red and blue balls in the 
bags is greater the observation of one datum is more diagnostic in the 
sense of reducing more uncertainty and allowing a larger revision of 
posterior probabilities. Edwards (1965) has defined a statistic of 
diagnosticity E(z) in te~ms of the expected value of the logarithm of 
the likelihood ratio for one draw. If the proportion of red balls in 
the first urn is p and in the second q where p+ q -:1, then the value of 
this statistic will be for bag 1, E(z,l) = (2q-l)log2q/p and for bag 2, 
E(z,2) = -(2q-l)lcg2q/p. 
Thus diagnosticity can be expressed in terms of bag composition, 
and researchers have varied bag composition to examine it's effect upon 
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conservatism. Typically they have found that more diagnostic data leads 
to greater conservatism (Peterson, duCharme & Edwards, 1968, Peterson & 
}tiller, 1965, Phillips & Edwards, 1966,Pitz, Downing & Reinhold, 1967). 
One of these studies (Peterson & Hiller) also showed that when the 
diagnosticity of the data was very low subjects in fact extracted more 
certainty from the data than Bayes theorem would permit. 
3· Amount of data. 
When the populations are binomial and r b,i.e.the n~~ber of red 
balls in urn R equals the number of blue balls in urn B, so that 
P(r,f.HR):P(b_fHB), and P(B(HR)=p,P(rJHB)=q and p + q = 1, only the 
difference between the number of red and blue balls in the sample is 
relevant when computing posterior probabilities. Experiments have held 
this difference constant and varied the size of the sample, for example 
by presenting 2 red and 4 blue balls or 12 red and 14 blue balls. Pitz 
(1967) and Shanteau (1970) found that larger sample sizes yielded lower 
posterior estimates and provided evidence of greater conservatism. 
Pitz, Downing, & Reinhold (1967) and Peterson, duCharme, & Edwards (1968) 
did not control the difference between red and blue balls but varied the 
sample size so that, as the sample size increased, the diagnosticity 
of the data tended to increase as well. These authors similarly found 
evidence of conservatism increasing with sample size and diagnosticity. 
This effect was confirmed by Peterson, Schneider, & Miller (1965) who 
nresented identical sequences of 48 data items but divided this data 
~ 
into 48 trials of 1 item, 12 of 4,4 of 12, and one of 48 items. 
4. number of hypotheses. 
The preceding sections have looked at conservatism in experiments 
which included samples from two populations with two hypotheses under 
consideration. Bayes theorem can be extended to deal with more complex 
tasks, for example, Schum et al.(l967)presented their subjects with a 
simulated military threat diagnosis situation where "six hypotheses 
so 
generated data from as many as twelve multinomial data classes". In such 
complex multinomial tasks subjects also show conservative revisions of 
opinion, and conservatism which increases with increases in the 
diagnosticity of the information, e.g. Martin and Gettys (1969) Phillips, 
Hayes, & Edwards (1966~ and Schum, Southard, & Wumbolt (1969). 
Hypotheses about conservatism. 
The principal finding of these studies is that subjects process 
information in a conservative manner. Their probability revisions are in 
the direction specified by Bayes theorem but are smaller. This tendency 
is more marked with increases in the diagnosticity of the data and in the 
amount of data seen, and with les~ extreme prior probabilities of the 
hypotheses under consideration. Three explanations have been put forward 
to deal with the phenomenon :- misperception, misaggregation, and response 
bias (Slovic and Lichtenstein,l971). 
The misperception hypothesis suggests that subjects do not cle~~ly 
understand the nature of the data generator and misperceive the like-
lihood of the data under the alternative hypotheses. This would suggest 
that the source of conservatism is the PCD(H) estimates. Peterson, 
duCharme & Edwards (1968) asked their subjects initially for estimates 
t:J£ P(DIH) and P(H.ID), and then gave them information about sampling 
distributions and sho;.orad~ examples of P(D('H) before asking them for 
further estimates of P(HjD), the posterior probabilities. They found 
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that subjects' conservative P(H.ID) estimates could be explained by their 
misperception of P(DJ'H) and that there was some reduction in conservatism 
following the instructions. Pitz & D?wning (1967) gave subjects similar 
instructions and allowed them to refer to histogram displays of the 
theoretical sampling distributions, but found no reduction in conservatism 
following this instruction. 
The misaggregation hypothesis as put forward by Edwards (1968) 
suggests that subjects have difficulty in aggregating various pieces of 
information to produce a single response. This and the misperception 
hypothesis are not mutually exclusive in the sense that evaluation of 
P(~/H) includes the aggregation of several items of data. To contradict 
the misperception hypothesis the misaggregation hypothesis should state 
that subjects perceive P(D/H) correctly but fail to produce accurate 
PC HID). The experiments of Pi tz and Downing (1967) and Peterson et_Jil.l. 
(1968) suggest~ that such an hypothesis would not be sufficient to account 
for conservatism. However, Edwards et al.(l968) found that a machine 
which combined subjects' estimates of PCDJH) made superior posterior 
estimates to the subjects' own estimates. They also report results 
which support both the misperception and the misaggregation hypotheses. 
Subjects misperceived the impact of each datwn and were not consistent 
in that misperception in a subsequent aggregation task. 
Relevant to both these hypotheses in the case where the P(D,H) are 
small. Bayes theorem is concerned with the likelihood ratio, or the 
relative likelihood of one hypothesis when compared with alternative 
hypotheses, so that the likelihood ratio may take on a large value when 
the P(DJH) are all small. Vlek (1965) hypothesised that when the 
P(D/H) are small they are seen by subjects as uninformative, and 
conservative posterior estimates are given. It is not clear which 
hypothesis about conservatism this result would support. Beach (1968) 
constructed decks of cards, each card having a letter written on it in 
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red or green ink. Subjects were asked to estimate the posterior prob-
ability that the letter cards drawn had been sa~pled from the, 
predominantly green rather than the predominantly red deck, given complete 
information about the frequency of each colour of letter in each deck. 
Likelihood ratios were held constant but the relative frequencies of the 
letters were varied. Subjects were more conservative when dealing with 
small P(DfH), suggesting that misperception of small P(OJH) was the 
important factor. 
The response bias explanation was formulated by duCharme (1970). 
He hypothesised that subjects made more optimal responses when giving 
responses in the odds range from 1:10 to 10:1 (a range of probabilities 
from 1/11 to 10/11) but were conservative when judging outside that 
range. In an experiment subjects had to decide whether observed samples 
of heights came from a male or female population. Their responses were 
only optimal within a central range of posterior odds and were con-
servative outside that range. 
It would seem that some combination of these hypotheses is needed 
to account for conservatism in posterior probability estimation. It has 
not been shown that subjective probabilities are revised in any con-
sistent fashion with incoming information, nor are subjects usually aware 
of the form of Bayes theorem or the ~amputations involved in its 
application. While sensitive to the variables in the experiment,subjects 
are behaving in an intuitive rather tha~ in a computional manner. The 
experimental paradigm is a complex·aggregation task involving the ratios 
between hypotheses. It is not clear what subjects in the experiment 
are actually aggregating. The combination of a complex task and simple 
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response measures taken with the question of whether an odds or a 
probability scale is used would seem to favour a response bias 
explanation. To test this, further research should be carried out 
involving large and small P(D/ H), subjects' estimates of these, 
instructions about aggregation, and simple binomial situations. Bayes 
theorem as a descriptive model. 
In probability revision tasks subjects' performance is compared 
wit~ Bayes theorem, which is the model statisticians would use to 
revise their opinions. The theorem may also be considered as a des-
criptive model of subjects' revisions. Their revisions are similar to 
those of the model when the estimates called for are within a certain 
range, and subjects have shown themselves sensitive to changes in the 
parameters of the model. Nevertheless the distinctive feature of 
subjects' performance is the conservatism of their revisions they fail 
to extract all the certainty possible from the data. 
Phillips and Edwards (1966) revised the Bayesian model by 
introducing an "inefficiency" parameter to account for conservatism. 
They replaced the equation for posterior odds,..l21sL...fJ2.o by..12.,:.L.!Jlr» 
where 1 1 is a power function of L,L' = Lc. The authors fitted the 
parameter c to subjects' responses and found that this model described 
well other responses in several experiments. The fitted parameter c 
is a function of p, and the model "holds only for values of p that are 
greater than about 0.6, when p is less than 0.6 c becomes a function 
of both p and r-b. However this model with c as a function of p only 
describes median performance for each group very well"(Phillips and 
Edwards, 1966). 
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This model assumes that subjects 1 likelihood ratios are 
conservative to some fixed extent, it makes no assertions about the 
origins of conservatism, and it has not been tested in a wide variety 
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of situations, e.g. with changes in the diagnosticity of data or with 
data which are not binomial symmetric. It might nevertheless be thought 
that a Bayesian model could describe subjects' revisions with some 
amendments to allow for conservatism and where subjects' responses are 
averaged. However some findings about order effects suggest that Bayes 
model is not the appropriate o~e.-
Effects incompatible with a Bayesian model. 
A.Primacy and recency effects. 
Some studies which have required subjects to make probability 
judgments after each separate datum have reported primacy effects, i.e. 
data early in the sequence are more influential and lead to larger 
revisions, e.g. the studies by Dale (1968), Peterson and Ducharme (1967), 
and Roby (1967). Two investigations have shown recency effects, where 
data later in the sequence are more influential, namely Pitz and 
Reinhold (1968), and Shanteau (1970). Such order effects are common in 
other tasks which involve the integration of serially presented 
information, e.g. studies of impression formation, (Asch, 1946), and 
opinion change (Anderson, 1959). 
B. Inertia effects. 
The concept of inertia was introduced by Anderson (1959) to 
describe that part o£ an opinion which becomes increasingly resistant 
to change as information accumulates. Pitz, Downing, and Reinhold 
(1967) found that subjects revised their P(H,D) estimates much less 
following evidence contradictory to their currently favoured hypothesis 
~-
than they did after confirming evidence. Sometimes these estimates 
moved towards greater certainty after a single disconfirming datum was 
observed. The idea that inertia stems from strong commitment to one 
hypothesis and a consequent unwillingness to consider other hypotheses 
was supported by Pitz(l967) who found no effect if judgment had to be 
made only after seeing the entire sample. Geller and Pitz(l968) found 
that subjects expected disconfirming data to occur when the information 
is probabilistic in nature, and a similar effect was found by this 
author, whose subjects often postponed decision if a run of data of one 
colour was drawn until some disconfirming evidence was obtained 
(Crozier,l969). 
These features of subjects' performance - primacy and recency 
effects, and a tendency for the weight given to each datum to depend on 
the make-up of the preceding sequence of data - run counter to the 
predictions of the Bayesian model, which requires that subjects treat 
each datum in the sequence as being of equal weight. 
Alternative models to Bayes theorem. 
Several models have been proposed to predict subjects' revisions 
without being based on a rigid Bayesian framework. These are briefly 
described below with an evaluation of their success in predicting the 
pervasive features of subjects' behaviour, conservative revisions and 
order effects. 
I. Simple division rule (Harks, 1970). 
Yf"-1. In the binomial symmetric situation -'1~-.: L. Ac ·where I!(p/q) • 
Marks (1970) suggested that subjects used a simple division rule to 
estimate the probability that a sample came from a given population by 
the relative frequency of the coloured chips, i.e. instead of the 
likelihood ratio being a function of the difference r-b,L would be the 
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ratio r/b if red chips predominated in the sample. Audley {1970) 
concluded, "Harks showed that this rule accounted for most of the 
results in the literature, including cases where over-estimation 
replaced conservatism 11 (p.l78). This simple model is only applicable to 
certain decision situations, and makes no predictions about order 
effects. 
2. Linear model (Pitz,l969). 
Pitz presented this model in a paper read to the British 
Psychological Society Mathematical and Statistical section meeting 
in London, December 1969. To the Bayesian model in logarithmic form, 
log.J2,= log.L· + log • ..Q.o , or \1)1 = L + '/tl he added a primacy-recency 
factor o(.and a random error term E to produce the modified model 
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\.V, = ~- 4'o -t-L ..,_ E~ He made the assumption that £.was normally distributed 
and tested the model with an analysis of variance of the normal deviates 
derived from the proportion of decisions following each sequence of 
events. He found that, ''several systematic interactions cast doubts on 
the validity of the model", and that to account for other discrepancies 
in the model it would need to be assumed that the error term t: had a 
large negative correlation with ~0 • While this model is wrong in 
detail~ it is the first attempt to deal with both conservatism and order 
effects within the framework of a formal model. 
3· Additive model {Shanteau, 1970). 
This author discussed behaviour in a task similar to the Bayesian 
one in terms of Integration theory. Subjects were shown sequences_of 
white and red beads which had been sampled with replacement from a box. 
They were presented with two tasks. In the first, Estimation, after 
seeing a sequence they had to estimate the proportion of white beads in 
the box. In the Inference task they had to judge the probability that 
the box contained more white than red beads. Rather less information 
about the populations has been supplied in comparison with the typical 
Bayesian task. 
The Integration theory equation for these tasks was Rn = wi.si, 
where Rn is the response at serial position n, and si and wi are the 
scale and weight values of the stimulus event at serial position i. 
Thus the response at serial position n in the sequence of data is the 
sum of the products of the weight and scale ~alues of each data item 
in the sequence up to that point. In the estimation task, the scale 
value of a sequence is the sample proportion of white beads while the 
weight value depends on the serial position of the sample and the size 
of the sample. In the inference task, the scale value takes on the 
value 0 or I depending on whether the proportion of white beads in the 
sample is greater than 0.5, and the weight value again depends on the 
serial position of the item. In both tasks the scale and weight values 
should be independent. The model is tested by constructing stimulus 
sequences of factorial designs of white and red beads, and using 
analysis of variance techniques to test the additivity of responses and 
to estimate the weight parameter at each serial position. 
Shanteau found that this model fitted the data of a number of 
experiments to the extent that additivity of responses was supported, 
that there were marked differences in weights at different serial 
positions indicating and measuring order effects in the sequences of 
data, and that subjects treated the estimation and inference tasks as 
being similar. This last finding is of particular interest, since the 
typical Bayesian task is, in these terms, an inference task; it may be 
that in fact subjects are treating the Bayesian task as an Estimation 
task. 
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An important advantage of this model is that its test has brought 
out pervasive features of performance in probability revision tasks 
rather different from the normal Bayesian one. A model within this 
framework could usefully be applied to Bayesian tasks. 
4. Belief States model (Roby, 1965). 
Roby (1965,1967) developed and tested a model to deal with changes 
in subjects' belief states in the light of new evidence. A belief 
(B-state) is based on the concept of an assignment of probabilities to 
a specified set of possible states of the world (E-states), and this is 
a personal probability distribution over possible states of the world. 
If an urn contains four chips, either one, two, or three of which 
are red and the remainder white, and if the subject believes these three 
states of the world to be equally likely, his initial B-state may be 
represented by the probability vector BO~l/3(I,I,I). The subject draws 
a chip with replacement and readjusts his B-state in the light of this 
new evidence. Subjects' performance can be compared with Bayesian 
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revision of opinion and can also be analysed in terms of certain functional 
properties of B-states developed by Roby (1965),e.g. 
Resolution (related to conservatism). Does the B-state exhibit more or 
less certainty about the true state of the world than is warranted by 
the evidence, 
Convergence. Does the B-state tend uniformly wwards complete resolution 
as compared with a normative standard. 
Order and inertia effects may be tested, as well as the question of 
whether the set of E-state di~ensions used by a subject is necessary 
and sufficient to account for the evidence he has received. 
Roby's test of the model showed that while subjects' performance 
was close to Bayesian predictions there was evidence of both 
conservatism and the disproportionate weightinG of early evidence. 
Unfortunately this model has been neglected since its introduction, 
perhaps because of its mathematical complexity. 
Discussion. 
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The preceding discussion has emphasised the ability of Bayes theorem 
and certain other models to predict details of subjects' performance 
in probability revision tasks. While features such as the conservatism 
of such revisions and the existence of primacy, recency, and inertia 
effects cast doubt on the ability of these models to predict close 
details, it can nevertheless be maintained that subjects' estimates can 
be approximated by the statistical theorem. Subjects are sensitive to 
changes in the number of hypotheses, the composition of the populations, 
the prior probabilities, and.the amount of data presented, and it must 
be noted that probability revision is a difficult task involving the 
estimation of likelihood ratios, i.e. the ratio of the likelihood of 
one hypothesis to the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. It may be 
of course that subjects do not see their task as difficult as this; 
tney may only be estimating or indicating the proportion of red and 
blue chips or balls in the sample without needing to consider the 
likelihood ratios of the hypotheses or even to look very closely at the 
composition of the populations. There is only indirect evidence that 
they do so, although it should not be surprising that they simplify the 
task especially in those experiments where binomial symmetric populations 
are used and only the difference between red and blue balls in the sample 
is relevant to posterior opinion. Evidence that simple strategies are 
used may be inferred from the findings of Marks (1970), who showed that 
a simple division rule could account for many of the findings in the 
literature, and Shanteau(l970) who found that there was little difference 
in subjects' behaviour in inference and estimation tasks. 
In comparison with the research reported in the previous chapter, 
this field of subjective probability has resulted in the systematic 
investigation of the empirical problems arising out of earlier research. 
~~ere the problem of conservatism is concerned for example, the problem 
was first identified, work was then directed to discovering which 
variables affected it and which did not and the range of responses which 
seemed to be conservative, then hypotheses were formed and tested about 
the causes of such behaviour, and finally formal models of behaviour 
have been considered. 
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Introduction. 
CHAPTER FIVE. 
Subjective Probability Inferred from 
Decisions. 
The previous chapters on subjective probability considered 
experiments which presented subjects with probabilistic material and 
asked them directly for subjective probability judgments, i.e. asked 
them questions of the form, "how likely is it that ••• ?" This method 
is reminiscent of the magnitude estimation task of psychophysics, and 
has the aim of plotting subjects' estimates against the objective 
probabilities. 
An alternative method is to ask subjects to make decisions, 
typically about gambles, and to infer their subjective probabilities 
from some measure of their preferences among these gambles. 
An early experiment whose results are still widely quoted may serve 
as an example of such inference methods. Preston and Baratta (1948) 
presented a series of cards to small groups of subjects. Each card 
offered an opportunity to win a certain number of points with different 
probabilities. Each card was auctioned off to the highest bidder. The 
subject's bid was divided by one hUndred (the n~~ber of points to be 
won) to yield an estimate of subjective probability, and the authors 
inferred by such a method that small probabilities of winning were over-
estimated and larger ones underestimated. 
There are two problems in drawing such conclusions. Firstly it 
must be assumed that the utility of points is linear with the amount 
of points. If subjective probability (s.p.) is inferred from the 
equations Bid = s.p. x Points·, so s.p.= Bid/Points, then there will be a 
different inferred s.p. for each different utility for points. The 
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second problem is that this inference model assumes that Bid = s.p. x 
points and not some other model or combination rule. For example, the 
pleasure of gambling for its own sake or a desire to avoid very risky 
situations may determine bids in addition to the utilities and subjective 
probabilities. 
The first section of this chapter, on inference from utility models, 
will discuss the research on subjective probability inferred from 
gambles where some attempt has been made to measure subjects' utility 
functions. In particular our emphasis will be on tests of the S.E.U. 
model, since we wish to discuss the interaction of value and subjective 
probability with relation to this model. The measurement problems 
involved in the test of the S.E.U. model have proved difficult to solve, 
and only a few experiments have been carried out to yield inferred 
subjective probabilities. An overview of the literature will be presented 
here followed by a brief summary of the details of some of the principal 
experiments. 
The second section of the chapter will discuss determinants of 
subjects' evaluations of gambles with emphasis on the question of 
whether the two constructs of utility and subjective probability are 
sufficient to understand such behaviour. 
Subjective Probability Inferred from Utility models. 
I. An Overview. 
We may see the work on the measurement of utility as starting 
from the work of Von Neumann and Horgenstern (1944) who pro.vided a 
method for measuring utility on an interval scale given that subjects• 
preference orderings among simple gambles satisfied certain conditions. 
Their utility model was essentially normative and concerned with 
describing how decisions out to be made rather than how they are made. 
They assumed that the decision maker could: 
(I) state a preference or indifference between any outcomes, and 
(2) completely order probability combinations of outcomes, e.g. could 
state indifference between obtaining 7p for certain or a 50-50 chance 
of gaining lOp or nothing. 
Since the origin of an interval scale is arbitrary, "nothing" could be 
defined as equal to 0 utiles, and since the unit of measurement is also 
arbitrary lOp may be defined as 10 utiles. Then, in this example, the 
utility of ?p will be 0.5u(IO) + 0.5u(O) =' 5 utiles, where the expected 
utility.of a gamble is the sum of the outcomes weighted by the 
probabilities of obtaining these outcomes. By varying the probabilities 
and using already found utilities it would be possible to discover the 
utility of any other amount of money. 
It is necessary for the application of such a method to behaviour 
that 
(a) risky propositions can be ordered in desirability, 
(b) the concept of expected utility is behaviourally meaningful, 
(c) choices among risky alternatives are made in such a way that they 
maximise expected utility. 
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It has subsequently been thought by psychologists that the 
probabilities by which the utilities are to be multiplied should be 
subjective counterparts of the objective probabilities, i.e. that 
decision makers maximise subjectively expected utility or S.E.U. This 
model has come to dominate the work on the measurement of utility and 
subjective probability. 
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This S.E.U.model of course only suggests that when subjects are 
presented with gambles which include amounts to be won or lost and 
probabilities of winning or losing they behave as if they .are maximising 
their subjectively expected utility. In such a form the S.E.U. model 
may be of such generality as to defy contradiction. For example, 
while utility and subjective probability functions are usually thought 
of as transformations of the objective amounts and probabilities, this 
is not required by the model which only looks for such measurement 
scales as will satisfy the subject's preference orderings. 
In practice the model is seen as including at least three 
assumptions (Tversky, 1967a). 
I. The independence principle. Utility and subjective probability 
contribute independently to the overall worth of a gamble. 
2. The invariance assumption. Utility is risk-invariant and no utility 
for gambling is allowed. 
3. The complementarity notion. Subjective probabilities of complementary 
events add to unity. 
Experimental work. 
In an early experiment Mosteller and Nogee (1951) based a measure-
ment model on the method suggested by Von Neumann and Norgenstern (1944) 
and described above, and derived utility and subjective probability 
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asserts that where there are no restrictions on the sum of complementary 
subjective probabilities, then utility and subjective probability must 
both be measurable on at least ratio scales. 
More recent advances have permitted the testing of the S.E.U. 
model and the derivation of utility and subjective probability scales 
without making the assu.vnptions needed by Hosteller and Nogee and 
Davidson et al. These advances have been the development of conjoint 
measurement theory by Luce and Tukey (1964) and Tversky (1967c), and 
of integration theory by N.H.Anderson (Anderson, 1970 and Anderson and 
Shanteau, 1970). 
Both these measurement methods make use of the assmnption that 
utility and subjective probability contribute independently to the overall 
worth of a gamble, where the notion of independence is related to the 
absence of significant interaction terms in the analysis of variance. 
Additive conjoint measurement involves the ordering of a dependent 
variable under different combinations of two (or more) independent 
variables. 11For sufficiently rich empirical systems of this type, a 
simple axiomatization in terms of the joint effects of two (or more) 
factors yields an interval scale measurement of the additive type", 
(Coombs, Dawes, Tversky, 1970 pp 25-26). The existence of additivity 
demands the transformation of the scale values such that the entries 
in a data matrix cell, e.g. a matrix of bids or preference orders, will 
be an additive combination of the row and column components, e.g. the 
probabilities and amounts of money. 
Tversky (1967a) applied this model to derive utility and subjective 
probability scales in a simple gambling situation, where subjects 
could win an amount of cigarettes or sweets or win nothing. Additive 
scales for their subjects. llowever they did not measure these functions 
independently and their subjective probability scales agaih depend on 
the assumption that the utility of money is linear with the money 
values. 'l'his assumption was also made by Edwards (1955) who assumed 
that the utility of N identical bets was equal to N times the utility 
of one such bet. Davidson, Suppes and Siegel (1957) did not make this 
assumption, but looked for two events whose subjective probabilities 
were equal; their concern was primarily with the measurement of utility 
and their method would make the location of several subjective 
probability points unwieldly and very difficult. 
All these early experiments relied upon making assumptions about 
one of the scales in order to yield measures of the other; these 
assumptions included (a) the linearity of money with the utility of 
money, (b) an identify function relating probability and subjective 
probability, or (c) that utility and subjective probability were 
independent (for example, once Davidson et al found their event with 
subjective probability equal to 0.5, they had to assume that this 
probability did not change throughout the experiment and that it did not 
change when presented with different amount of money or in different 
gambles). 
In an important theoretical paper, Edwards (1962a) pointed out the 
logical difficulties of such assumptions. His Theorem Three asserts 
65 
that if the subjective probabilities of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
events sum to unity, and if the subjective probability scale is bounded 
by 0 and I, then the subjective and the objective probabilities must be 
identical. Theorem One, based on the proofs by Luce (1959) concerning 
the possible relationships between variables measured on various scales 
' 
solutions could be found for inequalities derived from the data matrix 
of subjects' bids, and Tversky used this finding to derive interval 
measurement scales under two different S.E.U. models, one where 
subjective probabilities summed to unity but utility need not be risk 
invariant, and one where the complementary summation rule did not hold, 
but utility must be risk invariant. Neither of these two models is 
compatible with the classical S.E.U. model, but both successfully 
predicted an independent set of responses of the same subjects. 
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In a second experiment, Tversky (1967b) used the finding of 
additivity of bids for gambles where a certain amount of money or nothing 
could be won to measure the utility of money on a power function. In 
both these experiments subjects overbid for gambles of low expected 
value and underbid for those of high expected value, but their 
probability functions were close to the objective probabilities. Wallsten 
(1971) reported si:nilar results.VJhen he applied the additive model to 
judg:nents of indifference between gambles. 
Anderson and Shanteau (1970) applied integration theory to 
evaluations of the worth~ gambles. Integration theory involves showing 
the absence of interaction between row and column components in a 
factorial design of amounts of money and probabilities and using this 
additivity to find subjective scales. Additivity was satisfied for 
simple one-outcome gambles, but there were significant interactions when 
two-outcome gambles were considered. Their scaled utilities and 
subjective probabilities were not close to the objective values. 
Clearly development in the measurement of utility and subjective 
probability functions will be closely related to the development of 
measurement theory in psychology. Of the present theories conjoint 
measurement has the advantage that it is applicable with data on 
ordinal scales and a search is made for transformations of the data 
that will satisfy additivity, but it is as yet difficult to apply, 
and can only be used in the simplest situations. Integration theory 
is relatively easy to apply to more complex gambles, but a numerical 
or continuous response scale is required, and it is not clear how to 
interpret interactions when they occur. In addition, "random error in 
a multiplying model could have a multiplying effect, and that would 
inform the assumption of homogeneity of variance'', Anderson and Shanteau 
(1970 p.445). 
Since the relationships between the models are not known, apart 
from their dependence on analysis of variance techniques, it is not 
clear why their derived utility and subjective probability functions 
should differ. When no assumptions are made about the form of its 
distribution, subjective probability is close to objective probability 
(Tversky 1967b, Wallsten 1971) or else high probabilities are under-
estimated (Anderson and Shanteau 1970). Subjective probabilities of 
complementary events sum to close to one (Tversky,l967a). Both models 
support the hypothesis of the independence of utility and subjective 
probability, and both predict behaviour better than the alternative 
expectation models such as the E.V.model. 
While in general some form of the S.E.U. model and in particular 
the notion of independence are supported, these findings do not rule 
out the possibility that there are other determinants of the worth of 
a gamble, particularly in two-outcome gambles, such as its preceived 
risk or variance preferences. If these could be measured or shown to 
be important, different utility and subjective probability scales would 
be needed to fit the response data. 
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Subjective Probability Inferred from Utility Models. 
2. I·Xethods in Heasurement Experiments. 
(1) Mosteller and Nogee (1951). 
Subjects were faced with the choice of (a) refusing a. bet so that 
69 
no money changed hands or (b) accepting tje bet:to win A with probability 
p or lose 5 cents with probability I-P. When the subject chose to bet 
50% of the time he was assumed to be indifferent between the two options 
(a) and (b), so that P.ulA) + (I-P)u(-5 cents)=u(O). The origin and 
unit of measurement of the utility scale are chosen to be u(O):O and 
u(-5) = -I, so that by selectin~ events with appropriate probabilities and 
varying A until the subject was indifferent between the options it was 
possible to find the amounts of money corresponding to various points 
on the utility scale. 
The authors assumed in their measurement of utility that subjective 
probability equalled objective probability. In a second analysis of their 
data they assumed that utility is linear in money,i.e.that u(X)=aX + b, 
to infer subjective probabilities by a similar method to the above, 
except that the probabilities are the unknowns in the equation. The 
inferred probabilities are presented here for two groups of subjects, 
students and National Guardsmen. The former group tended to underestimate 
all probabilities, while the latter tended to overestimate them. The 
probabilities refer to the likelihood of holding certain hands at poker 
dice. 
p Students. Guardsmen. 
0.667 0.54 0.56 
0.498 0.47 0.50 
0.332 0.30 0.36 
0.167 0.16 0.28 
0.090 0.081 0.18 
0.047 0.038 0.083 
O.OIO o.oo8 0.052 
While their method may be questioned on many points (e.g. by Davidson 
etal 1957), it need only be pointed out here that their measurement of 
subjective probability depends on the questionable assumption of the 
linearity of the utility of money. 
(2) Davidson, Suppes, Siegel(l957). · 
These authors attempted to find two complementary events of 
equal subjective probability, to use this pair of events to determine 
utility functions for money, and then to use these utility functions to 
determine the subjective probabilities of other events. Subjects were 
presented with two options: 
1. 2. 
X A if event E 
Y B if event not-E 
If the subject is indifferent between the two options then 
s(E)u(X)+s(not-E)u(Y)=s(E)u(A)+s(not-E)u(B), where u: is a utility 
function unique up to a linear transformation, and s is a subjective 
probability function which assigns a unique real number between zero 
and one to an event. They hypothesized that there existed a chance 
event E' such that s(E')=s(not-E'), and that its subjective probability 
was independent of any particular outcome. If this is true then the 
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equation can be transformed into u(X)-u(A)=u(B)-u(Y), and this equation 
used to find amounts of money equally spaced in utility and thus to 
obtain interyal scale measurement of utility. Then the subjective 
probabilities of other events could be found subject to the constraint 
that for any event, E,s(E)+s(not~E)~I. 
After rejecting the toss of a coin, the tossing of two coins, and 
the throw of a die (so that either even or odd numbers could turn up), 
they found their complementary chance event in the tossing of a die with 
two nonsense syllables, each on three sides. 
The results of the experiment were 
(a) of utility curves obtained for 15 subjects, 12 had curves which were 
not linear in money, 
(b) for a single chance event with probability of 0.25, 4 out of 5 
subjects had s(P) less than 0.25, and the average was 0.206. 
Subjective probability was independent of the particular outcomes used. 
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Certain points should be made about this experiment, the first to 
attempt to measure subjective probability on the basis of empirically 
determined utilities. The method uses differences in utilities between 
alternatives so that a utility scale cannot be determined for a set of 
alternatives which are chosen in advance, i.e.one must search until one 
finds a set of alternatives with the required characteristics. In 
addition there is the difficulty when basing the analysis on the assumption 
of indifference that the subject will change his mind during the 
experimental session. No attempt was made to use the scaled values to 
predict choices among other gambles, while only one other subjective 
probability point was identified and then only.for a minority of subjects. 
(3) Tversky (1967a). 
Eleven subjects (irunates of a prison) judged the worth to them of 
amounts of cigarettes and sweets using the minimum selling price method. 
Similarly they judged the worth of ga~bles where they could win these 
commodities with certain probabilities given by the proportion of 
black spots on a wheel of fortune. The gambles took the form - win A 
with probability P or win nothing. The interval scale utility of 
winning nothing was defined as zero, and the responses were arranged in 
a data matrix whose D(a,p)entry was the estimate of the worth of the 
gambles (a,p). 
Tversky proved the theorem that for gambles of the form (a,p) the 
s.E.U.model is satisfied if and only if the matrix Dis additive, i.e. 
there exist real valued functions u,f,g defined on D,A,P respectively 
such that (I)u(a,p):f(a)+g(p), and (2) u(a,p)~u(b,q) iff D(a,p~D(b,q) 
for all a,b in the set A and all p,q in P. 
To test the additivity of the matrices he examined the number of 
inversions in each subject's matrix, and found that the S.E.U.model 
was supported. A further test, where a logarithmic transformation was 
applied to the matrix entries and interaction tested in an analysis of 
variance, confirmed strict additivity of the data, so that subjects' 
bids could be expressed as simple additive (or multiplicative) 
combinations of prizes and probabilities of winning. 
To derive unique measurement of utility and subjective probability, 
further constraints had to be imposed on the S.E.U. model to yiel~ two 
versions: 
Model I. Subjective probabilities of complementary events sum to one. 
With this assumption, Tversky constructed utility scales and then used 
these scales to solve for subjective probability functions. 
Model 2 assumed that utility was risk invariant, i.e. that the utility 
of a commodity in a gamble was the same as the utility of the same 
commodity when it was presented alone. By substituting the latter 
utility for the former in the equation, subjective probability scales 
could be constructed without being subject to the constraint of summing 
to one. 
Under model I most subjects overestimated the low probability (0.2), 
and underestimated the high one (0:8). The subjective probabilities 
of the other events coincided with the objective ones (0.4,0.6). Under 
model 2 subjective probabilities exceed the objective ones everywhere 
for all but one subject. The average s~~s of probabilities of 
complementary events for the eleven subjects were lo57,l.06,1.39,1.42, 
1.11,1.07,1.07,1.00,1.26,1.17,1.32,1.22. 
Tversky concluded that "the basic finding of over-bidding for 
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risky offers and underbidding for riskless ones may be explained by 
either (I) a positive utility for gambling, or (2) a general over-
estimation of the objective probabilities. Thus the data are explicable 
by either of two incompatible additive models, each of which contradicts 
the classical S.E.U. model''· Becker and McClintock(l967) point out 
that the utilities obtained under the gambling and riskless conditions 
may have differed only because of the solutions generated by Tversky's 
least squares procedure, since "the least squares solution does not 
guarantee that the additive model functions selected will be chosen from 
among those that are consistent with the predictive model". 
Three additional points may be made about Tversky's design; 
(a) additivity analysis showed that the prizes and probabilities 
contributed independently to the worth of the gamble. 
(b) the form of the subjective scales does not depend on independence 
alone, but on further assumptions about the nature of these scales. 
(c) Tversky used both his models to predict responses to gambles 
other than the ones used to derive the scales. 
4. Wallsten (1971). 
Wallsten's test of the S.E.U. model embodied features of the 
designs of both Tversky and Davidson et al (1957). A test of 
additivity was applied, not to preference orderings of the selling 
price of gambles, but to judgments of indifference between gambles, 
which were varied throughout the experiment until indifference was 
found. Wallsten looked for simultaneous solutions to the set of 
equationswhich embodied additivity and reflected the indifference 
structure. If solutions existed, the additivity principle would be 
supported and the s.E.U.model could not be rejected. 
Subjects had to state preference or indifference between gambles 
of the form(a,p). If the subject is indifferent between the ga~bles 
(a,p) and (b,q) then: 
s(p).u(a)+s(I-p).u(O) = s(q).u(b)+s(I-q).u(O). 
If u(O) is set equal to zero, logarithms are taken, the equation 
rearranged, and if i indices a pair of gambles for which indifference 
has been established, 
log u(a.)+ log s(p.)-log u(b.)-log s(q.)=O (W.I). 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
and by squaring and summing over the m indifferences for a given 
subject, 
~ ~[log u(ai)+log s(pi)-log u(bi)-log s (qi):l 2 = 0 (W2) 
~~ 
For each subject a search was made for that set·of solutions to them 
equations of form (WI) which minimizes the left hand side of (W2) 
subject to two constraints, 
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1. monotonicity. if Pi) Pj 
if ai > aj 
then s(pi)) s(pi) 
then u(a.) > u(a.). 
l. J 
2. u(a)=a'. The unit of measurement for the interval scale was defined 
and unique solutions could then be specified. 
These sets of equations did provide solutions, so that the S.E.U. 
model was not rejected. All relations between the derived subjective 
values and the objective values showed only small deviations from an 
identity function. For three subjects the slopes of least-square best 
fit lines were 1.09,1.02,1.02 (for utility) and for four su~jects, the 
subjective probability lines were 1.11,0.94,0.99,1.02. The product-
moment correlation was above 0.99 in all cases. 
The second part of vlallsten 1 s paper is concerned with the question 
of whether subjects' estimated probabilities differed from their 
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subjective probability functions, as inferred from choices among gambles, 
by only a scale factor. Two approaches were made. The first assumed 
that, since subjective probability functions were linear with the 
objective ones, and since a plot shows that probability estimates were 
linear with objective probability (for four subjects the equations 
E(p)=l.03p-O.OI6, E(p)=p,E(p)=p-O.OI and E(p)=p were obtained), then 
the hypothesis that E(p) and s(p) were linearly related to each other, 
differing at most by a scale factor, could not be rejected. Unfortunately 
these results were in direct contradiction with those from his second 
method based on solving equations derived from the indifference 
analysis. 
5· Anderson and Shanteau (1970). 
These authors applied Anderson's theory of information integration 
to subjects' evaluations of duplex gambles. The subjective values of 
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winning and losing money and their respecti!e probabilities lead to a 
model of the form R=wg.sg + wl.sl, where R is the response or evaluation 
of the gamble, the subjective values of the money dimensions A\v and AL 
are represented by subjective scale values or worths sg and sl and the 
probability dimensions PW and PL are represented by subjective weights 
or likelihoods wg and wl. 
The test of the model is based on the operations of multiplication 
and addition implicit in the equation and assumed to reflect the 
subject's method of integrating the information in the gamble into a 
response. For example in one-outcome gambles R=wg.sg. or log.R=log 
wg + log sg. If a series of AW and ~~ are presented in a factorial 
design the test of the model is that they combine additively in the 
subject's response and may be carried out by examination of interaction 
terms in an analysis of variance of responses (in log.form). If the 
model is verified it may be used to scale the s and w dimensions. For 
two-outcome gambles the win and lose components should combine additively, 
and within each component the s and w should combine multiplicatively. 
The former can be tested by analysis of variance of responses and the 
latter by examination of the bilinear interaction terms in analyses of 
variance (Anderson,l970). 
Additivity was confirmed for the one-outcome gambles and for the 
two-way interactions (i.e. within components) in twQ-outcome gambles; 
some of the three-way interactions were significant, suggesting some 
interaction between win and lose components, e.g. PLxALxPd. This finding 
casts doubt on the additive model and is difficult to explain. Subjective 
scale and weight values derived from the model were not linearly 
related to the objective values of money and probability. 
w~ile this model fits the data fairly well, and is the first 
approach to the analysis of two-outcome gambles, some problems of 
interpretation remain. Rejection of the model depends on significant 
interaction terms in the analysis of variance; it is not clear either 
what the power of rejecting the model is, or with which other model 
the goodness of its fit to the data might be compared. The former 
problem increases as the number of interaction terms to be tested 
increases, and when only some of these terms are significant. 
6. Ratio models of utility. 
The previous models and experimental designs have been concerned 
with obtaining interval scale measurement of utility and subjective 
probability. Many authors, e.g. Stevens (1959) have considered that 
utility might be a power function of money, while Galanter (1962) asked 
subjects directly for their estimates of the utility of money, and 
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found that evaluations of bets involving these amounts of money could be 
predicted by a power function of utility for money. Both these authors 
found the power exponent to be much less than one, giving a negatively 
accelerated curve. 
In a study of response bias in psychophysics, Galanter and Holman 
(1967) made systematic variations in their payoff matrix, and suggested 
that the utility of money was a power function - the ratios of the 
entries in the payoff matrix appeared to be the controlling aspect of 
the matrix. 
Tversky (1967b) fitted a power function of utility for money to 
evaluations of gambles of the form (a,p). 
If.u(a,p)= u(a)s(p)+u(O)s(I-p), and if u(O)=O, then log.u(a,p) = 
log.u(a)+log.s(p). Analysis of variance applied to the logarithms of 
the subjects'bids supported additivity in 41 out of 44 bidding matrices. 
e & 
If log.(a,p) =log.a +log.s(p), then log.(a,p)elog.a+I/Glog.s(p). 
Additivity was held to support the hypothesis that the data could be 
accounted for by a power utility function, since Tversky shows that, if 
the utility function is monotonic and if these equations hold for all 
a and p, then utility must be a power function. An equation to estimate 
Sand then s(p) could be derived with the assumption that the sum of 
complementary subjective probabilities equals one. Different exponents 
needed to be fitted for positive and negative outcomes, since the 
utility functions tended to be linear for gains and convex for losses. 
Subjective probability scales were linear functions of objective 
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probabilities for some subjects, but most overestimated low probabilities, 
and underestimated high ones. The problem with such derived scales is 
that the assumption of additive complementary probabilities needed to 
be made in order to derive them. 
Subjective Probability Inferred from Evaluation of Gambles. 
Examination of the development of interest in human decision making 
in psycholOJY reveals that the attention given to the evaluation of 
gambles followed the interest in the measurement of utility, when von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that utility functions could be 
derived from subjects' preferences among gambles. Little research has 
been concerned with the measurement of subjective probability in 
experiments where utility has not been measured, since the shape of the 
probability functions will depend on the shape of the utility function. 
Nevertheless the study of subjedts behaviour in gambling situations has 
revealed features which are of interest. 
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Utility theorists assume that the evaluation of gambles is determined 
only by the attempt to maximise subjectively expected utility. Experiment-
al results suggest that there may be other determinants, and raise seteral 
questions -
(a) Do subjects prefer gambles with certain probabilities of winning 
and losing, even when grunbles are of equal expected value? 
(b) Are the two constructs of utility and subjective probability 
sufficient to describe behaviour? Might not such features as the 
dispersion of the gambles or their perceived riskiness influence preference? 
(c) Does preference among gambles depend on gambles already played or 
on changes in the gambler's financial position? 
(d) Do changes in the method of presentation of gambles affect 
preferences? 
Probability preferences. 
Edwards (1953,1954a,l954b) examined whether subjects preferred 
gambles containing certain probabilities to gambles containing others. 
In a paired-comparison design, subjects had to choose between two 
gambles each of equal expected value (positive, negative and zero). 
Subjects consistently preferred gambles involving a 4/8 probability of 
winning to all others, and avoided gambles involving a 6/8 probability 
of winning when the gambles had positive expected value, while these 
preferences were reversed in gambles of negative expected value. When 
pairs of gambles which differed from each other in expected value were 
used, the choices seemea to be a compromise between maximising expected 
value and choosing the gamble with the preferred probability. 
Littig (1962) found that subjects preferred high probabilities of 
winning over low ones in gambles of equal expected value; there were 
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no differences in the pattern of preferences between groups under skill 
and chance instructions. Dale (1959) asked his subjects both to estimate 
probabilities directly and to choose among gambles containing these 
probabilities. 
Overall there was a tendency to underestimate the low probability 
(0.2) and to overestimate the high probability (0.8). The sub-group 
who overestimated the low probability tended to bet more often on a 
gamble containing this probability than the subjects who underestimated 
this probability. However this close correspondence between probability 
estimate and probability preference in betting disappears when the 
entire group of subjects is considered, since most choices of this bet 
were made by those who underestimated the probability. 
Coombs and Pruitt (1960) have applied Coombs' Unfolding Theory 
in an attempt to understand probability preferences in terms of the 
decision maker having an 'ideal' probability of winning and preferring 
those gambles with probabilities close to his ideal. 
Some important experiments, which have not received much attention, 
by Cohen and Cooper (Cohen, 1966, Cohen and Cooper, 196la, 196lb), 
showed that, even when objective probabilities are held constant, 
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subjects have preferences for different presentations of the probabilities. 
When the probability of winning is O.I. and is presented as the chance 
of drawing one out of ten lottery tickets or of drawing ten out of one 
hundred tickets, subjects prefer the former gamble, while this.preference 
is reversed when the probability of winning is 0.9. Subjects seem to 
focus their attention on the nu~ber of nonwinning tickets when the 
probability of winning is high and on the number of winning tickets 
when this probability is low. 
Attempts to explain probability preferences have been within the 
frameworks of subjective probability (Edwards, 1955) and of the subject's 
'ideal' probability of winning (Coombs and Pruitt, 1960). The most 
recent attempt to account for these preferences has been that of Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1968a); but since they.include variance preferences 
in their account, and since these have been shown to interact with 
probability preferences, they will first be briefly considered here. 
Fisher (1906) first suggested that individuals based their decisions 
not only on the expectation of a gamble but also on the dispersion of 
the outcomes. If.a gamble is seen as a probability distribution over 
certain outcomes; then it can be described in terms of it's moments, 
such as the mean.or expected value, the variance, the degrees of skewness 
and of kurtosis. vfuile the first experimental study, that of Edwards 
(1954c) found little evidence of variance preferences, other experiments 
have found them to be important determinants of gambling behaviour,e.g. 
Royden, Suppes·and Walsh(l959), Coombs and Pruitt (1960),Littig (1962), 
VanderMeer (1963), Lichtenstein; (1965),and Pollatsek(l965). 
Preference is found for high variance, and a gamble of high variance is 
thought of as a risky gamble. Coombs and Pruitt, Littig, and 
Pollatsek found a significant interaction between probability and 
variance preferences. 
It is difficult to interpret evidence for probability and variance 
82 
·preferences when, as in most of these studies, simple two-outcome 
gambles are presented to the subjects. The expected value, the prob-
abilities, the payoffs and the variance of such gambles are confounded, 
so that it is impossible to vary one of them without introducing changes 
in another. The expected value is Pw·l.AW+PL.AL. The variance is 
p,r. PL. (AW-AL) 2 ~ If the E. V .is held constant, then increases in one 
probability must also bring about decrease in the other probability 
and changes in the payoffs. A preference for a gamble after a change 
in the probabilities may not be revealing a preference for the new 
probabilities but a preference for the new payoffs. vfuen the variance 
of a gamble increases, both payoffs also increase, so that preference 
for a high variance might be a preference for a high amount to win, 
i.e.the subject finds gains more important than losses. As Edwards 
(1961) points out, the assumption of certain non-linear utility of money 
functions could predict results better than the assumption of variance 
and probability preferences. Such confounding can be avoided by 
considering three-outcome gambles, or duplex gambles where the outcomes 
of the gamble d~pend on two independent probability distributions such 
as the throw of two dice. vlhen these gambles are studied the evidence 
for variance preferences is less clear; Lichtenstein (1965) used the 
former to find evidence of the importance of variance preferences, 
while Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968b) the latter to find no such 
support. 
Slavic and Lichtenstein (1968a) attempted to account for 
probability preferences in terms of the importance attached to the 
83 
probabilities and payoffs in gambles by their subjects (this idea of 
relative importance of the dimensions has also, as suggested above, 
been used by them to account for variance preferences). In their 
study, the four risk dimensions o:f a gamble, i.e.PW,PL, the 
probabilities of winning and losing, ·and AW,AL, the amounts of money 
to be won or lost, each took on three values to produce twentyseven 
gambles to be evaluated by their subjects. The responses of each 
subject were correlated with the four risk dimensions, and, since these 
dimensions were themselves uncorrelated, the absolute magnitude of these 
correlations was interpreted as reflecting the relative importance of 
each dimension in determining the responses. This analysis revealed 
very large differences in these correlations both within and among 
subjects. To account for probability preferences, they hypothesized 
that subjects who showed preferences for high probabilities of winning 
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weighted, i.e.,attached importance to, probabilities more than payoffs, 
while subjects with preferences for low probabilities of winning weighted 
payoffs more than probabilities. They found support for these hypotheses 
by comparing choices among standard gambles with ratings of the 
attractiveness of duplex gambles for a large group of subjects. "Persons 
with preferences for high PW, when cho;si~g among the standard bets, 
weighted probabilities more heavily than payoffs when rating the duplex 
gambles. Persons who preferred low PW weighted payoffs more highly than 
probabilities 11 .(Slovic and Lichtenstein,l968a,p.l3). 
While this does not show that probability preferences do not 
exist apart from this weighting phenomenon, and would not account for 
the evidence of Cohen and Cooper, it does provide a simple and 
persuasive account of the kinds of response in gambling situations 
that have been termed probability and variance preferences. 
This evidence for such preferences had threatened the assumption 
that subjects' evaluations of gambles could be accounted for solely 
in terms of the two constructs of utility and subjective probability. 
While the hypothesis of Slovic and Lichtenstein, that the evidence 
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might be understood with'·the notion that a decision maker might attach 
different importance to the probabilities and payoffs, contradicts the 
S.E.U.model, in that the probabilities of winning and losing would be of 
different importance to the subject, it does not imply that additional 
constructs are needed. 
Nevertheless there remains the feeling that the perceived riskiness 
of a gamble needs to be considered by a design to predict decision 
making behaviour. Pruitt(l962) developed a model which included tne 
constructs of pattern and level of risk, where the pattern of risk was 
an index determined by the number of possible outcomes, the probability 
of achieving each outcome and the ratio of one outcome to another, and 
the level of risk was the sum of losing outcomes weighted by their 
respective probabilities of occurrence. While this model provided quite 
a good fit to the data, Luce and Suppes (1965) argue that the model is 
only a special case of the S.E.U.model. 
More recently, Coombs and his associates at the University of 
Michigan (Coombs and Huang,l970; Coombs and Meyer,l969) have been 
examining the perceived risk of gambles in terms of portfolio theory, 
a mathematical model characterized by two parameters, the expeeted value 
of a gamble and it's perceived risk. Rather than make assumptions 
about which aspects of the gambling situation would be perceived as risky, 
they tried to identify perceived risk from subjects' behaviour, and 
found that it seemed to vary with certain transformations of the gambles, 
including increasing both outcomes while leaving their probabilities 
unchanged, and introducing several plays of each gamble rather than one. 
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The emphasis of their approach has been on accounting for choices 
in terms of a model with additional parameters than in the expectation 
models. 
It should however be noted that, apart from the suspicion that 
the riskiness of a gamble should be an important factor in decision 
making, most of the evidence seems to suggest that some expectation model 
can account very well for evaluations and preferences in this kind of 
situation. It may, of course, be that the kind of experimental design 
studied by most of these writers prevents or disguises the appearance 
of perceived risk as a significant determinant of behaviour. For 
e~ample, the typical design includes the presentation of both attractive 
and unattractive gambles over a period of time; subjects might feel 
that these gambles would compensate for each other, and their behaviour 
might be very different if only one gamble was to be played or the same 
gamble was to be played several times. It may also be that the range of 
payoffs included in these experiments is too narrow to cause subjects 
much concern over the risks they are running •. In an important sense 
the level of risk that the experimenter prefers is a variable in these 
experiments, since he will not have unlimited funds and will have to 
'play' with many subjects. 
Thus the question of whether a model which includes a simple 
combination of the probabilities and payoffs is sufficient to account for 
subjects' behaviour in these gambling situations is still an open one. 
An expectation model accounts for most, but not all of the variance of 
responses. Whether some alternative model will do better than this, or 
whether these models would do as well in different situations, are 
questions requiring further research. 
Differences in presentation an~ response designs. 
The evaluation of the worth of a gamble demands the performance 
of different operations upon different dimensions of the information 
presented; for example, the calculation of expected value requires 
multiplication (of amounts to be won and lost by the probabilities of 
winning and losing) and addition (over the outcomes). Some recent 
researcn has examined the effects upon responses of the complexity 
of the gamble, i.e. variations in the method of presenting the gamble 
which might make the performance of these operations more difficult. 
Miller and Meyer (1966) studied the effect on subjects' maximisation 
of expected value of (a) the number of gambles to be decided among, 
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and (b) the way in which the gamble is presented, i.e. either as an 
expected value display or as a modified pattern and level of risk 
display. While neither of these variables had significant effects there 
was a significant interaction between the number of gambles presented 
and the trial of the experiment, suggesting that subjects improved their 
ability to integrate all the information with more experience. 
Herman and Bahrick(l966) varied the method of presentation of a 
gamble in a paired-comparison preference design. One group of subjects 
had to state their preferences between gambles when all four dimensions 
(Pd,PL,AW,AL) were displayed, while a second group had only to deal 
with PW and AL(the other dimensions were held constant). Subjects in 
the second group, with less information to cope with, approximated 
expected value better. 
Meyer (1967) showed that knowledge of the outcomes of gambles 
increased expected value maximisation. He interpreted this as being 
due to a motivational rather than an instructional factor, since the 
effect was apparent in early trials. 
One weakness of all these experiments is that the dependent variable 
has been the extent to which subjects maximise the expected value of 
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the gamble, and this has been equated by experimenters with responding in 
an optimal fashion. The emphasis in decision making has been on the 
'subjectively optimum' (Shepard, 1964), and failure to maximise expected 
value may be a reflection of underlying utilities and subjective 
probabilities rather than evidence of nonoptimal performance. 
~he ldnd of operations that the subject will perform on the 
gambles presented to him depends to some extent on w~at kind of response 
he has been asked to make. \'i'hen aslced to bid, or to name a selling price, 
for a gamble, the subject must produce a number which summarizes for 
him the attractiveness of that gamble; whereas when he is asked to state 
a preference between two gambles he might only have to compare them on 
some relevant dimension(s) and report which one is more attractive. 
Lindmann (1965) and Lichtenstein and Slavic (1968) found reversals 
of preference between bids for gambles and paired-comparison choices. 
Slavic and Lichtenstein (1968a) suggested that an important factor was 
the dependence of bidding responses on the payoff rather than the 
probability dimensions. In their study, subjects' ratings of gambles 
correlated more with Pwl than with any other dimension, while bidding 
responses correlated most highly with AL; their interpretation of these 
results was that: "apparently the requirement that subjects evaluate 
a gamble in monetary units when bidding forces them to attend more to 
the payoff dimensions" (1968, p.ll). 
Tversky (1969) also suggests that the subjects employ various 
approximation methods, which enable them to process more easily the 
information in making a decision, and that the approximation method 
chosen partly depends on the method of presentation. If the alternatives 
to be decided between are presented one at a time, then subjects might 
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process the alternatives (e.g. gambles) by adding the subjective values 
of the components (or dimensions) and using this overall sum to determine 
their choice. If the dimensions are presented one at a time then the 
subjects might mruce intradimensional. evaluations, e.g.by comparing each 
ga~ble on nl, then on PL etc., and making his decision in terms of 
these differences. 
Certainly the notion that subjects use approximation rules is 
persuasive when one considers how quickly subjects may be asked to carry 
out the computations involved in evaluating gambles. Apart from the 
methods of presentation, motivation of the subjects might prove to be 
an important determinant of the seledtion of such rules. Slavic, 
Lichtenstein and Edwards (1965) examined the effects of boredom, and 
found that, when subjects were bored, e.g. in experiments which used long 
sessions, group sessions and imaginary choices, they tended to adopt 
very simple strategies with the result that the data were more orderly, 
preferences were single peaked,i.e. emphasis was on one main dimension, 
and preferences could be accounted for by simpler theories. 
Shepard (1964) conducted one experiment and reported several others, 
e.g. Hoffman (1960), Shepard, Hovland and Jenkins(l961), which together 
suggest that, "in making an evaluative . judgment a subject can take 
account of only a very limited number of factors at any one time. 
It is clear too that such biases and limitations on subjects' 
ability to co~bine factors will influence the subjective probability 
distributions inferred from their evaluations of gambles. 
Effects of previous gambles played. 
All the experiments reported here have assumed that when subjects 
are evaluating the worth of a gamble they are considering only that 
gamble and are not influenced by gambles they have already seen or think 
they will see during the course of an experimental session. Edwards 
(1954d) writes, "Unless the assumption of constancy of tastes over the 
period of experimentation is made, no experiments on choice can ever be 
meaningful, and the whole theory of choice becomes empty". If the goal 
of an experiment is to measure utility and if many gambles must be 
presented to determine utility and subjective probability functions, 
then this assumption is clearly necessary. Not much attention has been 
paid to the test of this assumption, or the examination of the effects 
of previous choices and outcomes upon choices. 
Hiller, Heyer, and Lanzetta (1969) examined the effects on subjects' 
risk preferences of the outcomes of previous gambles, where risk 
preference was equated with preference for higher variance. Groups of 
subjects played ga;·nbles which i·ncluded different probabilities of 
winning so that the group with the higher PW won more often than the 
other group (there were no PL or amounts to lose). By choosing suitable 
amounts to be won, the experimenters could ensure that after several 
trials, although one group had won more often, both groups had won a 
similar &~aunt of money. They found that the group with the higher 
probability of winning had more rapidly increasing preferences for more 
risky gambles. 
Greenberg and Weiner (1966) studied three measures of preference 
for risk :- the variance of the gamble, the probability of winning, and 
the amount to be won that the subject was prepared to accept. They 
found that these preferences were independent of the amount of money 
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subjects had previously won or lost, but were dependent on the ratio 
of winning to losing outco.nes in the previous gambles. "Preferences 
for high-risk gambles were exhibited by individuals who had experienced 
either very high or very low ratios of reinforcement on previous trials, 
while those whose number of wins equalled their number of losses tended 
to select more conservative bets as measured by probability and amount 
to win 11 (p.591). 
Experimenters on measurement in decision making have attempted 
to avoid the difficulties posed by these results by not providing 
subjects with information about the outcomes of the gambles that they 
see. This may not be entirely satisfactory. On the one hand it may 
reduce the subject's involvement in the task; on the other even the 
act of seeing the gambles and the range of payoffs included might 
arouse expectations in the subject,e.g. the wins and losses will even 
out over the experiment or the amounts to lose are not worth worrying 
about. 
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Summary and Conclusion. 
This chapter has examined attempts to make inferences about 
subjective probability from subjects' evaluations of the worth of, or 
preferences among, gambles of the form : win AW with probability PW 
or lose AL with probability PL. 
Such gambles may be described in terms of their moments such as 
their expected value and their variance. It has however long been 
thought in psychology and economics that the same amount of money will 
have different "value" or "exchange value" or "utility" for different 
individuals or for the same individual in different circumstances and 
that subjects' ideas of the likelihood of winning or losing the.amounts 
of money in a gamble may not be identical to the probabilities of 
achieving them. 
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It is assumed that an S.E.U. model describes how subjects evaluate 
gambles, but in practice it has proved difficult to measure the utilities 
and subjective probabilities. The most successful attempts at the time 
of writing have been those of Tversky (1967a) using conjoint measurement 
theory and Anderson and Shanteau (1970) who used information integration 
theory. Both these approaches are based on tests of the independence of 
utility and subjective probability and both look for interval scale 
measurement of these functions. These approaches have their limitations; 
conjoint measurement theory is at present restricted to the analysis 
of very simple one-outcome gambles, and it has proved difficult to 
compare utilities estimated from different experimental conditions. With 
information integration models it is difficult to estimate the power of 
rejecting the model, e.g. Yntema and Torgerson (1961) have shown that 
linear combination rules can yield good approximations to subjects' 
judgments when the underlying combination rule is in fact nonlinear. 
Where the test of the interaction hypotheses is concerned, 
certain of the difficulties of measuring utility by the methods dis-
cussed above makes it seem unlikely that an experiment could be designed 
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to test interaction and include measurement of utility. These difficulties 
include: 
(a) the search for gambles that fulfil some criteria, rather than the 
selection of gambles before the experiment, may mean that the data may 
not be suitable to test the hypothesis, 
(b) the use of some subjects, rather than all, may mean that only those 
subjects who do not show interaction effects will be chosen, 
(c) if the measurement procedure demands additivity, ·then the data of 
those subjects who show interaction effects cannot be analysed further, 
and 
(d) at present, such measurement models are restricted to very simple 
gambling situations. 
If, however, utility is not measured, the experimenter will be faced 
with the inference problems that arise when the gambling situation is 
not completely understood. An example of such a problem is the question 
of whether it may be assumed that it is optimal behaviour for the 
subject to maximise expected value; this would not be the case where his 
utility function differed from the objective ~alues, so that inference 
of the kind s(P) = Bid/money would be unjustified. The need is clearly 
to develop predictions about interaction which do not require the 
measurement of utility, and which will not be invalidated because utility 
has not been measured. 
In addition to these practical problems, there are theoretical 
difficulties with utility models, and with expectation models in 
general. Krantz and Tversky (1965) argued that a subject's choices 
among gambles depends on his present financial position, including 
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gambles that he has already bought, and "It is argued that the difficulties 
in an exact specification of the financial position, together with the 
omnipresent exchange consideration, case serious doubts on the 
applicability of utility theory". 
A second difficulty is the status of the expectation models as 
normative or pres'criptive models. This problem has been discussed by 
Allais(l953) and Ellsberg (1961). It need only be added here that, if 
we follow the distinctions between types of norms of von Wright (1963), 
these models may be described_as giving directives, or technical norms, 
which are concerned with t:1e means to be used to attain certain ends. 
That the "end" of a subject is the maximisation of utility is only an 
assumption; he may be concerned with not gambling, with avoiding 
certain losses, or his behaviour may best be described by a complex model, 
where he has several different goals, or goals which change during the 
experiment. While a high correlation between response and some 
expectation model might dispel doubts, it is not clear how we would 
interpret a low correlation. 
Despite these problems such research has addressed itself to some 
interesting questions, and tentative answers to these questions have 
been appearing in recent years. Research workers have examined the 
meaning of risk in such gambling situations, have emphasised the 
computations which the subject must carry out and the influence on 
these of different methods of display and of response, and have looked 
at some of the sequential effects of gambling. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) have shown that subjects weight PW 
and PL differently in their evaluations of gambles. Most of the other 
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experiments have shown that the subjective probabilities inferred from 
decisions are close to the objective probabilities; what deviations 
there are seem to be in the direction of rather flatter distributions -
high probabilities are underestimated and low price probabilities 
overestimated. Recent research suggests that this may be due to subjects 
attending more to the payoff dimensions when responses are to be made 
in terms of amounts of money. 
H.A.Simon,who has contributed much to the study of management 
decisions has emphasised the computational capacities of the individual 
decision maker and suggests that in fact subjects "satis:f'ice" rather 
than attempt to maximise, i.e. the subject makes decisions by searching 
until he finds an alternative which is satisfactory with respect to 
whatever values are important to him rather than searching for the 
11 best" alternative (Simon 1957). 
While subjects in these g~nbling experiments do seem to be 
maximising, e.g. the correlation between their responses and expected 
value is high, his distinction between heuristic processes and 
algorithms should be considered. A well-structured decision problem 
is defined as a problem which satisfies the following criteria (Simon 
and Newell 1958). 
(I) it can be described in terms of numerical variables, scalar and 
vector quantities. 
(2) the goals to be attained can be specified in terms of a well-
defined objective function, for example the maximisation of profit or 
the minimisation of loss. 
(3) there exist computational routines (algorithms) that permit the 
solution to be found and stated in actual numerical terms. 
Gambles are clearly well-structured problems, and the experimental 
literature examined in this chapter suggest that subjects are competent 
in finding and following these algorithms. 
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There has been little research into ill-structured decision 
problems. One reason is surely that well-structured problems permit 
easier comparison between subjects' behaviour and optimal decision 
behaviour. Research with these classes of decision does not however 
allow much scope to develop and test descriptive models since subjects 
do perform so competently. A change in emphasis towards ill-structured 
problems should prove fruitful, at least for purposes of comparison, 
perhaps using consistency of response as a criterion for optimality and 
applying such models as multiple regression, which is suitably flexible, 
and conjoint measurement, which requires only responses and stimuli 
to be measured on an ordinal scale, to describe behaviour. 
CHAPTER SIX. 
Subjective Probability Inferred from Sequential Decisions. 
Experiments on probability revision (chapter three) required subjects 
to estimate the likelihood of certain hypotheses being true in the light 
of further information about these hypotheses. In the experiments 
discussed here, usually referred to as experiments on "optional 
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stopping", subjects must make a "final" or "terminal" decision as to 
which hypothesis is true rather than make an estimate of likelihoods. 
Typically a pay0ff matrix is presented to the subjects summarising the 
amounts to be won or lost for correct or incorrect decisions. Before 
making such a decision they may buy relevant information to help them 
reduce the risk or probability or error associated with the terminal 
decision. Their performance is compared with optimal performance, usually 
defined as maximising the expected value of the sequence of decisions, 
including the cost of looking at information and the payoffs attached 
to terminal decisions. 
Optional stopping, so called because the subject may make a decision 
at any time including after buying no information, has been investigated 
in many situations. Most commonly investigations have involved frequency 
comparisons \llhere the subject has to decide from which of two (or more) 
distributions he is sampling, for example where the distributions are 
coloured lights flashing in selected proportions - Becker (1958), 
Pruitt(l961), ·marked dice - Pitz and Downing (1967), proportions of dots 
on cards - {Lee,l963), a preponderance of marked or unmarked cards in a 
pack - Horlock (1967) or real or imagined balls in urns-Edwards (1965). 
Howell (1966) required his subjects to make judgments about the slope 
of a line where they could look at extra points on the graph if they 
wished, while Edwards and Slavic (1965) had their subjects search a 
matrix of cells for one that had been specified by the experimenters. 
A number of studies have considered more "realistic" decision 
situations e.g. Festinger (1957), Mills, Aronson and Robinson (1959) 
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and Lanzetta and Kanareff (1962). Scheff (1963)has discussed the 
implications of this field of research for the study of medical diagnosis 
and legal judgments, where delay in making a decision might be dangerous 
or unjust yet there exist many pressures toward making a correct decision. 
Comparison between subjects' and optimal performance shows that 
subjects carry out this task efficiently. Howell (1966) writes, "these 
findings together sug3est that subjects are rather adept at approximat~ng 
optimal decision points regardless of difficulty even though actual 
calculation of such solutions would be extremely unlikely". While 
there exist several models prescribing optimal behaviour since there 
are different experimental arrangements, emphasis will be given here to 
the Bayesian model,where ~e decision is between two binomial populations 
and there is a fixed cost per observation or per sample with replacement 
from these populations. 
The Bayesian model for this task, developed by Edwards (1965), 
prescribes that subjects should make their decision when a criterion 
probability of being correct is reached i.e. the subject should not 
specify in advance ho\-1 much information to look at but should first select 
some probability of being correct. The choice of a criterion probability 
will depend on the payoff matrix, the cost of the information and the 
parameter E(z) which is the expected value of the logarithm of the 
likelihood ratio for one observation and therefore a reflection of the 
distribution characteristics of the populations. The model specifies 
the probabilities of the alternative hypotheses at which one should 
decide, the probability of error that one is then accepting and the 
average sample size that one should need to take. As with the Bayesian 
model for probability revision, when symmetric binomial populations 
are considered, the probability of being correct will be a function 
only of the difference between (for example) red and blue balls in the. 
sample. 
Sample size taken. 
Tversky and Edwards (1966) found that all subjects deviated from 
optimal performance by buying too much information, a result Which 
would be predicted if one assumed that subjects revised probabilities 
in a conservative fashion. Howell (1966) however found that taking 
too little information (undersampling) was more prevalent than over-
sampling. Becker (1958) and Crozier (1969) found that there was an 
interaction between oversampling and decision difficulty, subjects 
taking significantly larger samples as difficulty increased. 
Effects of Payoffs. 
We may discuss the ability of subjects to maximise the expected 
value of their decisions in terms of a concept of 'efficiency' similar 
to the Accuracy Ratio in probability revision experiments or the 
Expected Value Maximisation Index of Meyer (1967)in gambling situations. 
Efficiency has been defined by Howell (1966) as the ratio of subjects' 
earnings to the expected value of the decisions. He and the present 
author (Crozier 1969) found that efficiency was high in all difficulty 
conditions (at least 82%) but that it was highest in the more difficult 
decisions. However such results must be interpreted with caution, since 
Wendt (1969) has shown that the expected value functions in these 
experimental situations are rather flat around their maxima, which 
suggests that the efficiency score may not be a very sensitive measure 
of performance, since subjects may deviate from optimal strategy 
without this making too much difference to their earnings relative to 
expected value. 
Pitz(l968) examined three measures of expected value maximisation-
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the expected value of a decision at the time of decision, the average 
sample size taken before the decision and the difference between the 
number of red and black beads in the sample at time of decision. He 
found that subjects' expected value on all these measures was 
approximately 2/3 of the optimal expected value. 
Some studies have looked at the effedts of payoffs on the amount 
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of information examined prior to decision. Rapoport and Tversky (1966) 
found an interaction between the cost of observing and sample size. 
Subjects observed less than the prescribed amount when the cost of looking 
was low. As this cost increased subjects' sample size approached the 
optimal size. Howell (1966) found that the introduction of a penalty 
for wrong decisions resulted in greater conservatism and lower decision 
efficiency. Irwin and Smith (1957)found that the mean number of cards 
examined in their 'expanded judgement' situation (where sampling is 
without replacement) increased with a larger payoff for being correct 
and with a smaller cost of observation. Similarly subjects take a smaller 
sample when payoffs are lower (Lanzetta and Kanareff,l962). 
Subjects then seem to be sensitive to changes in payoff matrices 
and costs of observation. Pitz and Downing (1967) asked their subjects 
to decide which of two hypotheses was true in the light of a fixed amount 
of information under five different payoff matrix conditions - one matrix 
was unbiased in that each response was rewarded equally when correct and 
penalized equally when incorrect, while the other matrices were biased, 
in the sense that subjects would prefer one response rather than the 
other. The bias was either mild or marked in each direction. Subjects• 
responses to the biased payoff matrices were less than optimal, as were 
their changes in strategy from one matrix to another. 
Wendt (1969) considered how valuable subjects thought each datum 
was at. the time of purchase by asking them to make a Marschak bid for 
each datum (item of information). Nest subjects bid too much for 
information, but varied their bids as a function of the diagnosticity 
of the data, the prior odds of the hypotheses and the form of the 
payoff matrices. 
Results have also been reported of changes in behaviour due to 
what Brody {1965) has called 'commitment' to one hypothesis. Morlock 
(1967), in an expanded judgment situation, showed an interaction 
between the sample size taken and preference for one of the hypotheses 
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' to be true (manipulated by adding a constant to one column of the 
payoff matrix). He interpreted these findings as evidence of an inter-
action between payoffs and subjective probability. Pruitt (1961) 
reported that commitment to a particular decision in advance tended to 
increase the amount of information required to decide that the· 
alternative hypothesis was true, but Brody (1965)in a similar experiment 
found no such effect on the timing of terminal decision, although he 
reported that"the simple act of stating one's expectations about which 
of two alternative decisions will be correct tends to subsequently 
influence confidence in that decision"; The ass~ption that subjects 
specify a criterion probability of success in advance of purch~~ing 
information is of course only an assumption or a p~ription for optimal 
decision making, and has to be verified as a description of performance. 
It seems from these experiments that some irrelevant (from the point of 
view of expected value maximisation) considerations lead to changes in 
criterion during sampling. Such change may he called a reluctance to 
decide in the light of certain information. Alternatively the change 
may be due to a change in the subjective prior odds of the hypotheses 
brought about by preference for one hypothesis, since such a change in 
odds could result in these response patterns. 
Pitz, Downing and Reinhold (1967) reported that subjects• 
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performance "is determined in large part by task characteristics which 
are irrelevant to the normative model", principally sequential effects 
from one decision to the next.While they found a tendency to report the 
previous response, Pitz and Downing (1967) found that this tendency 
was associated only with incorrect responses; if the subject had 
correctly predicted the selected urn there was no obvious tendency to 
change or repeat the prediction on the next trial. These authors found 
such effects a pervasive feature of performance. This may be because 
their subjects did not purchase as much information as they wished prior 
to decision but made their decision on the basis of a fixed amount 
of information, and this may have made the sequence of decisions more 
significant for them. In an optional stopping situation, the present 
author found that such effects did not play such an important role 
(Crozier,1969). 
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Formal predictive models. 
(1) normative Bayesian. The generally high efficiency of subjects' 
performance suggests that the normative model could be treated as 
descriptive of their behaviour on this task. The model makes reasonably 
good predictions of mean sample size, expected payoff, likelihood ratio 
at time of decision and probability of error. These predictions are 
about average responses, whereas, if individual protocols are con-
sidered, predictions are poor. This might be expected since there are 
many parameters in the model, but none reflecting individual differences. 
(2) Bayesian inefficiency model. 
Phillips and Edwards (1966) suggest an inefficiency model based on 
the findings of conservatism in probability revision studies. The 
likelihood ratio in the posterior odds equation,J2,=L.J20 is replaced 
by L', where L' is a power function of L,L=Lc,.05(c(·5· This model 
seems too simple to account for behaviour which is characterised by both 
over and undersampling. Pitz (1968) derived a prediction from this model 
in terms of expected value at time of decision, and found that the model 
did not fit the data. 
(3) .:Hicromatching. 
Lee(l963) suggested that subjects' decisions match likelihood ratios, 
.. 
e.g. for events whose odds are,2-l, subjects will make their d,ecisions in 
the proportion 2-1 rather than always decide in favour of the more 
likely hypothesis. There is no evidence that subjects actually behave 
in this way. Pitz and Downing (1967) found that proportions of choice 
were closer to optimal than Lee's model would predict. 
(4) an examination of decision strategies (1). 
The present author examined the· pro~ocols of twenty subjects, each 
of whom made 120 decisions, for the existence of simple decision rules. 
The choice of such rules was suggested by findings in the literature, 
the axioms of certain mathematical choice models and discussions with 
subjects. Among the rules were: 
(a) make a decision when the difference between the number of red and 
black balls reaches some criterion, 
(b) when a criterion of a run of k balls of the same colour is reached, 
(c) when the proportion of red to black is similar to the proportion in 
one of the urns (populations), 
(d) when a criterion number of k balls of a particular colour is 
reached, 
(e) on a simple majority rule with a fixed sample size, 
(f) by micromatching, and 
(g) if the first k balls are of the same colour; if not, take another 
k balls and decide on a simple majority rule. 
While strategies (a) and (g) seemed to be widely used, subjects 
were flexible in their use of such rules and could best be described 
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as "opportunistic",i.e. they seemed to change strategy to take advantage 
of certain evidence, or when the composition of urns in a decision pair 
changed. 
(5) an ex~~ination of decision strategies (2). 
Pitz, Reinhold and Geller (1969) examined three strategies: 
(a) criterion difference strategy, similar to the one in (a) above 
and the optimal strategy, 
(b) sample size is fixed prior to purchasing information, 
(c) "a 'World Series' strategy, involves the prior specification of a 
fixed sample size with sampling terminated as soon as the number of 
events of one kind grows so large that the eventual decision would not 
be changed."(Pitz,I969). 
Pitz et al.(l969) found that this third strategy came closest to 
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describing behaviour, but that any subject!s sampling would show evidence 
of more than one of the strategies, in particular "the direct tests have 
always suggested that Ss' stopping strategies are a function of the 
(criterion) difference (i.e. of the probability of mrucing a correct 
decision) and of the sample size" (Pitz,l9690,.,557). 
Summary. 
Optional stopping has not attracted the amount of attention that 
probability revision has. The studies that have been carried out sugcest 
that, when the data are averaged over subjects, behaviour in this kind of 
situation is highly efficient and sensitive to changes in experimental 
conditions. Closer inspection of individual protocols, however, shows 
inconsistencies in sampling and sequential effects from decision to 
decision that are incompatible with either the normative Bayesian model 
or simple descriptive models. More research could be directed towards 
the understanding of subjects' strategies in this task, if only because 
so much is known about behaviour in probability revision experiments. 
Questions that suggest themselves include {a) the "clustering" of 
information by subjects,(b) sequential effects both between decisions and 
within samples, and (c) the relative importance to the subject of the 
cost of information and the riskiness of decision, as described by the 
amount to lose or the variance of the decision. 
- ~ttempta have been made to infer changes in subjective probability 
from sample size taken prior to decision. The work reported here shows 
that there is no simple relationship between sample size and decision 
strategy. Subjects do change average sample size with changes in decision 
difficulty, in payoffs and in the cost of observation as predicted by 
the normative model; on the other hand, subjects also seem to be more· 
confident with larger sample sizes, regardless of whether the information 
confirms or disconfirms their present hypothesis (Pitz,l968). 
If the assQ~ption is made that subjects mruce their decision when 
some criterion probability of beine correct is reached, then revisions 
of these probabilities do not seem to be r:lated in any consistent 
fashion to the available information. The same sample may result in 
different decisions, information is ignored, and decisions are made 
with much smaller probabilities of being correct than could have been 
obtained earlier in the sample. If the details of subjects• protocols 
are ignored, then it could be concluded that sample size, and 
presumably decision criterion, is sensitive to changes in the 
experimental situation. 
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~ayoffs dependent on subjective probability. 
In optional stopping experiments subjects are often motivated by 
being presented with a payoff matrix which states explicitly the 
consequences of a correct or incorrect decision. Subjective probabilities 
are inferred from the amount of information that they purchase prior to 
decision. When inferring subjective probability from the evaluation of 
gambles, a model underlying subjects' preferences, such as the SEU 
model or the linearity of money and utility, together with the notion 
that subjects are maximising subjectively expected utility or value, 
needs to be assumed. 
Toda (1963) and van Naerssen (1962) independently devised a 
procedure for inferring subjective probability, where the payoffs are 
contingent upon the subjects' probabilities rather than on the correct-
ness of their decisions. Shuford, Albert and Massengill (1966) 
subsequently gave a method for generating a "virtually inexhaustible" 
n~~ber of such payoff schemes. 
Toda (1963) argues that four properties are necessary for such a 
payoff scheme: 
1. the logical nature of the task should be thoroughly understood by 
the experimenter and hopefully by an intelligent subject. 
2. the task should involve well-defined payoffs for the subject. 
3. it should be disadvantageous for the subject to be inconsistent. 
4. the measurement technique should not be inconsistent with 
decision theory. 
In their scheme, the subject is presented with a list of k bets 
of the form, win xk if he makes a correct decision or lose yk if an 
incorrect decision. Each bet corresponds to a different probability pk 
of being correct, so that the subjectively expected value of each bet 
is SEV = pk.xk + (1-pk).yk. The problem is then to find k values of 
the x ~nd y euoh that, if the subjective probability of being correct 
is pj, then to maximise subjectively expected value the subject must 
choose the gamble with payoffs xj and yj,i.e. pj.xj+(l-pj).yj>pi.xi+ 
(1-pi).yi(ij:j). Van Naerssen (1962) showed that the equations for 
2 
and 2 satisfied these conditions. generating the x and y, x=A-Bq y=A-Bp 
A and B are arbitrary constants, and p=q-1. An example will illustrate 
the form of the payoff scheme. 
p 0.05 .15 .25 -35 .45 ·55 .65 ·75 .85 .95 
X 0 9 17 24 30 35 39 42 44 45 
y 45 44 42 39 35 30 24 17 9 0 
A = 45.125, B = 50. 
Such payoff schemes have been applied in probability revision 
experiments. Phillips and Edwards (1966) compared three schemes: 
~uadratic Payoff: x=l0,000-lO,OOO(l-p) 2 
Logarithmic Payoff: x-10,000+5,000 log•lOP• 
Linear Payoff: x=lO,OOOp. 
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For the linear payoff scheme, strategy is to estimate a probability 
of 1.0 for the more·.probable hypothesis. For the two other schemes,the 
optimal strategy is for the subject to estimate his subjective probability 
rather than any other probabilities. They found that payoffs helped to 
decrease the amount of conservatism but did not eliminate it. There 
were more extreme estimates in the linear payoff group reflecting a 
tendency to approach the optimal strategy. The logarithmic group 
showed less conservatism than either the quadratic or a control group, 
which suggested to the authors that,"subjedts are not maximising SEV, 
but are trying to effect some reasonable trade-off between the aoount 
they would win if Bag G were correct and the amount they would win if Bag 
R were correct". 
Schum, Goldstein, Howell and Southard (1967) found in a complex 
multinomial task that a log.payoff group was conservative, whereas a 
linear payoff group was not, but gave highly variable responses. 
It can be seen that these payoff schemes have not been widely 
applied. The existing evidence does suggest that the nature of the 
task is understood by subjects, who do vary their behaviour to take 
advantage of particular payoff schemes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
The Interaction of Value and Subjective 
Probabiiity. 
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We have been concerned principally with two kinds of decision 
situation. In the first, the subject makes judgments about gambles which 
present to the subject the payoffs associated with so~e outcomes and 
the probabilities of achieving these outcomes; in the second the 
subject must decide from which of two or more populations he is sampling 
and is allowed to choose the size of the sample on which he is to base 
his decision. He is given information about the payoffs associated 
with correct and incorrect decisions, the cost of sampling, and the 
composition of the populations. 
In each case the subject is assumed to evaluate for himself the 
desirability of the possible outcomes to him and the likelihood of 
achieving them. His evaluations may•or m~y_not be equal to the values 
presented by the experimenter. 
The question of the interaction of value and subjective probability, 
in the limited sense of the term 'interaction' introduced in Chapter One, 
refers to changes in the subject's evaluation of the likelihood of 
achieving certain outcomes brought about by changes in the value or 
desirability of those outcomes, even though the value of the presented 
probability has remained the s~~e. 
For example, in two-outcome gambles involving amounts to win and 
lose and probabilities of winning and losing interaction would refer to 
changes in the evaluation of a probability, p, when this is a probability 
of attaining a winning outcome from when it was a probability of 
attaining a losing outcome. Furthermore the evaluation might change 
with changes in the value of winning or losing outcomes. 
Evidence for the interaction of value and subjective probability 
in dynaoic decision mru:ing would be when the same sa~ple led to 
different evaluations of the likelihood that alternative populations 
had been sampled brought about by changes in the payoffs or in···the 
cost of sampling. 
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In this study we shall not be exmining changes in the perceived 
value of an outcome as the chances of attaining it change. Also, care 
must be taken to distinguish changes in probabilities as the values of 
outcome change from other changes in the subjects' approach to the 
task as outcomes change. 
For example there may be changes in attitude to the gambles as 
probabilities and payoffs change as in probability and variance 
preferences, and attitudes to risk such as "Any sound insurance company 
prefers a small premium covering a slight risk to a whopping great 
charge on something that is almost certain to burst into flames or get 
stolen": In any gamble, too, the expected value of the gamble changes 
with each change in probabilities or payoffs, so we are not considering 
any change in response as payoffs change but only those changes in 
response that would indicate some change in the judgement of a 
probability. 
In sequential decisions subjective probabilities are inferred from 
the sample taken by the subject. Changes due to the interaction of 
value and subjective probability must be distinguished from the changes 
in decision criterion which are prescribed by Bayes theorem and to 
which subjects have shown themselves sensitive. 
The experimental literature on the question of the interaction of 
value and subjective probability is not extensive. The accompanying 
table lists those experiments which have been carried out to investigate 
• Advertisement: Sun Alliance & London Insurance Group,Observer,5.9.71. 
the effects of payoffs upon subjective probability and those which 
have examined other aspects of decision making but have something 
to report on the question. The experiments have been catezorised 
according to the kind of dependent variable they have considered. 
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Experiments on Interaction reported in the literature. 
Dependent Variable. 
l.Subject.states 
estimate or makes 
prediction. 
2.Subject states 
estimate; reward 
. for accuracy. 
Author. 
Marke~ (1951) 
Irwin (1953) 
Crandall et al. (1955) 
vlorell (1956) 
Diggory,Riley, 
Bl umenfald -~ { 1960) 
Scheibe (1964) 
Phares (1965) 
Pruitt & Hoge (1965) 
Jessor & Readio (1957) 
Slovic (1966) 
Pruitt & Hoge(l965) : 
Slovic (1966) 
As outcome-value 
increases. 
Expectation increases 
" 
II 
" 
" 
" in skill events 
" 
" 
Equivocal relationship 
Complex relationship with 
expectation. 
Expectation increases but 
reduced effect. 
Complex relationship with 
expectation unchanged. 
3.Subject probability Irwin & Snodgrass(l966) Frequency of bets on that 
inferred from bet. & Irwin & Graae(l968) 
4.Subjective probability Morlock (1967) 
inferred from a~ount of 
information bought prior 
to decision. 
5.Subjective probability Edwards (1965a,b ) 
inferred from preferences Edwards (1955) 
among gambles. l1allsten (1971) 
events increases. 
Amount of information 
required decreases. 
Probability preferences 
" 
No interaction 
Dependent Variable. Author. 
6. Subjective probability Pruitt & Hoge(l965) 
inferred from bids for 
gambles. 
Coombs,Bezembinder, 
Goode,(l967) 
Tversky (1967a) 
Tversky (1967b) 
Slovic & Lichtenstein 
(1968a) 
Anderson & Shanteau(1970) 
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As outcome-value 
increases. 
Interaction 
No interaction 
No. interaction 
No interaction 
Interaction 
No interaction in 
one-outcome gambles; 
some in two-
outcome ones. 
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Subjects' Estimates and Predictions. 
Several experiments have asked subjects directly to make estimates 
of how likely they feel it is that some outcome will occur and examined 
the effect on these statements of changing the value of that outcome, 
or have asked them to predict which of two outcomes will occur and 
exa~ined the effects of increasing the value of an outcome on the 
frequency of predictions about its occurrence. Such experiments avoid 
many of the problems of inferring subjective probability from decisions 
so that their results seem easier to interpret. 
Nearly all such experiments report that changes in the value of 
the outcome did affect the subjects' estimates an,d predictions. Marks 
(195D,Irwin(l953), and Crandall, Solomon, and Kellaway (1955) asked their 
subjects to predict whether a valued or unvalued outcome would occur 
and found that the frequency of predictions was greater for desirable 
than for undesirable outcomes and, in the experiment of Crandall et al., 
that this frequency increased with increases in the desirability of 
outcomes. In one condition of their experiment Pruitt and Hoge(l965) 
had their subjects make estimates of the likelihood that the next light 
in a sequence would be of a certain colour, and found that these estimates 
increased with increases in the value of prizes associated with that 
colour. 
Diggory and his associates (Diggory and Ostroff,l962; Diggory, 
Riley and Blumenfeld; 1960) have designed an experimental situation, a 
card sorting task where the experimenter controlled the results, where 
subjects had to achieve a certain goal within a fixed number of trials. 
Among the variables affecting the subjects' estimated probability of 
success within the remaining trials was the value of a prize for 
achieving the goal (Diggory et al.,l960). 
Some experiments have been concerned with comparing the effects 
of the introduction of a reward for success on estimates of the 
likelihood of success under both chance and skill instructions. Their 
results have not been consistent. Worell (1956) found that in the 
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presence of high goal values there was a decrease in expectancy of 
success when that success was thought to depend on the skill of the 
subject but an increase in that expectancy in a gambling situation with 
outcomes dependent on some chance event. Scheibe (1964) found no effect 
of outcome value upon expectancy in the chance condition. Phares (1965) 
found that the introduction of a reward for success increased the 
estimated probability of success in both chance and skill eituations. 
Some evidence of individual differences has been found by Jesser 
and Readio(l957). There was some evidence of increases in expectancy 
statements of college students but no evidence in those of children. 
Slovic(l966) found a very complex relationship between outco~e value 
and probability estimate in an experiment which asked subjects for the 
revision of probabilities in the light of new evidence. The relationship 
was different for both different subjects and different estimation 
trials. Slavic reported evidence of both increases and decreases in 
estimates with increase in reward, but overall "a slight optimism 
effect ••• Negative values (of outcomes) were underestimated and positive 
values overestimated~ 
Three points may be made about these experiments and their results. 
The first concerns the nature of the relationship between estimates and 
predictions and value. Slavic (1966) has discussed some possible 
relationships. One may distinguish between weak interaction, i.e. an 
interaction between subjective probability and .the sign of the payoff, 
and strong interaction, a dependence of probability on the magnitude 
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of the payoff. Both these relationships between probability and payoff 
may be positive, giving partial or complete optimism, or negative, 
giving partial or complete pessimism. The relationship may also be 
different for very large values of positive and negative payoff. Slovic 
discusses two such hypotheses. 
(a)"It can't happen to me''· This hypothesis might be based on the 
knowledge that events with extremely positive or negative values are 
rare in our everyday experience. "Generalisations from past experience 
might therefore lead persons to underestimate the probabilities of 
events with more extreme values". 
(b)"It can happen to me". Probabilities of such events are overestimated, 
possibly due to a biasing effect of extreme hope or fear. 
With the exception of Slovic's experiment, the results reported 
above show a simple relationship between probability and payoff, where 
subjects' estimates are optimistic, showing an increase with sign, e.g. 
Marks (1951) and Irwin(l953), and magnitude of payoff, e.g. Crandall et 
al.(l955) and Pruitt and Hoge (1965). Examination of statements outside 
the laboratory would reveal a more varied and complex relationship 
between degrees of belief and preferences. 
The second point concerns what might be called the "transparency" 
of the experimental design where the subject is asked to state how 
likely it is that some event will occur. The experimenter manipulates 
both the probability of occurrence of that event and the value of the 
payoff associated with the event. He may in fact be asking directly 
questions of the form: 
"This event is worth X pence if it occurs. How likely do you thi~~ it 
is that this event will occur? 
This event is worth X+Y pence. How likely do you think it is that this 
event will occur?". 
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A problem with asking questions of this form is that subjects 
might realise both the independence of probability and payoff and what 
the experimenter "wants" the subject to do, or the demand characteristics 
of the experiment. 
Finally, as Rotter (1966) and Tversky (1967a) have pointed out, 
there are no pressures on the subject to distinguish between his beliefs 
and his preferences in this type of situation. To overcome this 
limitation Slovic (1966) and Pruitt and Hoge (1965) introduced payoffs 
to their experiments to serve as pressures toward, or rewards for, 
"accuracy". Slovic found that this reward "did not reduce the biasing 
effects of value upon SP estimates"; Pruitt and Hoge concluded that 
pressures for accuracy diminished the increase in stated expectancy as 
outcome value increased. They asked "Do pressures for accuracy affect 
the process through which subjective probability is translated into 
behaviour, causing people to filter out other forces such as values and 
pay closer attention to their subjective probabilities, or ••• are people 
stricter about the sources of their subjective probability?"(p.489). 
It seems to this writer that such "accuracy" conditions are 
unsatisfactory. It is not clear whether it is the objective or subjective 
probabilities that are meant to be reported accurately; if the subjects 
assumed the former then it would not be surprising if the effect were 
reduced, since the goal of subjects would be to make an estimate of the 
"true" probability of the event and this might not be expected to change 
from payoff condition to condition. If, as Edwards (196lb) has argued, 
the costs and payoffs in an experiment act as instructions to the subject, 
the subjects in these experiments faced a rather ambiguous task; if they 
saw their h,sk as that of maximising the money earned (as emphasised in 
the instructions) then to do so by being both accurate in the experimenter's 
sense and simultaneously to consider how likely they thought it was 
that the event would occur and think about the value of its occurrence 
might leave them in some confusion as to what their best course of 
action should be. 
This was recognised by Slovic, who writes: 
"The introduction of accuracy rewards created a complex risk-taking 
task in which the statement of one's SP was a decision in its own 
right, subject to all the different strategic considerations which 
typically govern behaviour in such situations". 
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ii. Probability inferred from decisions. 
We may separate the experiments which have inferred changes in 
subjective probability from changes in decisions into two categories. 
The first group would consist of those experi~ents which have been 
carried out to test hypotheses about interaction, have maintained some 
distinction between Independent and Dependent Outcome, and found some 
evidence of interaction. The second group of experiments were not 
designed specifically to test hypotheses about interaction, examined 
preferences or bids for gambles and, with some exceptions, found no 
evidence for interaction. 
Irwin and his associates ll966,1968) have distinguished between 
Independent Outcome (I~) and Dependent Outcome (~Q). Independent 
Outcome is a payoff which is won or lost by a subject irrespective of 
whatever response he makes and dependent only on the occurrence or non-
occurrence of some event. It has the function of making some outcome 
desirable or undesirable to the subject. The Dependent Outcome is a 
payoff which depends upon the response that the subject makes and is 
considered to be a 'pressure towards accuracy'; instead of asking the 
subject directly for his subjective probability, this is inferred from 
the value of the DQ that he is prepared to win or lose. 
An example of this distinction would be when a person wae willing 
to wager an amount of money (the D~) that it would rain on a particular 
day. The occurrence of rain on that day is assumed to have some value 
' (the IPJ for the subject, e.g. he may have planned an outing. The lP. 
would be contingent upon the occurrence of rain but independent of the 
result of the wager. 
In experiments by Irwin and Snodgrass (1966) and Irwin and Graae 
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(1968) the subject was asked to choose from a range of bets one bet for 
or against drawing a marked card from a deck of marked and unmarked 
I 
cards. In the first experiment an ~O.was associated with drawing a 
marked card, and in the second a different value of l.O.was associated 
with each of the outcomes. Since in most cases subjects chose the bets 
at the extremes of the ranges of bets, the experimenters did not analyse 
tne size of the bet but only the frequency of bets on each outcome. 
They found in the first experiment that the frequency of bets on an 
outcome increased when an I.Q.was associated with that outcome and when 
that I.O.increased; in the second the frequency of bets was higher for 
the more desirable outcome. These results were interpreted as evidence 
for the interaction of value and subjective probability. Neither study 
showed any effect on responses of changes in D.O.or any interaction 
between I.O.and D.O. 
That these results do in fact provide evidence for the interaction 
of value and subjective probability rests on the assumption that subjects' 
bets ought to be a function only of the probabilities in the situation, 
i.e. Bet:f(p), and not a function of both the amounts to be won and 
the probabilities, Bet~f(a,p). There is no evidence for such an 
assumption; indeed we do not have much evidence about the strategies 
which subjects use in placing bets, e.g. subjects might bet "against 
the odds" in order to guarantee some income to themselves. Such changes 
in strategy would be evidence of a change in attitude towards the 
ga~bling situation rather than of a change in subjective probability. 
The results of these experiments also bear an interesting relationship 
to the phenomenon of probability matching. Subjects ought always to bet 
on the more likely alternative irrespective of payoff in order to 
maximise their earnings or minimise their losses. Irwin et al. provide 
results similar to the common finding that maximising increases as 
payoffs increase. 
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Subjective Probability and Optional Stopping. 
Morlock (1967) hypothesised that if the probability that an event 
will occur is correlated with the value of that event and if subjects 
buy ihformation until they believe that one event rather than another 
has occurred then less information would be needed to decide that a 
desirable rather than an undesirable event had occurred. ' The results 
of his experiments led him to accept this hypothesis. Less information 
was needed to decide that a desirable event had occurred, where the 
desirability of an event was manipulated by varying an I.O. associated. 
with that event. 
Interuretation of these results again centres on the question of 
~ 
the validity of inferring subjective probability from the dependent 
variable, in this case the amount of information purchased before reaching 
a decision. Morlock used the 'expanded judgment' procedure of Irwin 
and Smith (1957) which involves sampling without replacement and yeilds 
no evidence about the probability of success that a subject was accepting 
at time of decision. Given this it is difficult to decide if the subject 
has changed his probability of success criterion or has changed decision 
strategy following the introduction of I.O. An experiment by Brody 
(1965), which did not include payoffs, showed that when a subject was 
committed to a decision in advance he either took a larger sample to 
change his mind or took the same sample size but was less confident at 
time of decision if his first guess was incorrect. Further research is 
needed to relate these two experiments which both perhaps involve 
subjects' preferences for certain outcomes and the effects of these 
preferences on their sampling behaviour. We need to distinguish between 
a change in subjective probability and a desire to be more or less 
careful, i.e. accept a different probability of success either because 
of payoff considerations or prior commitment to one hypothesis. 
Subjective Probability and Probability Preferences. 
Edwards (1953,1954a,b,l955) carried out a series of experiments 
where subjects had to state which of two gambles they would prefer to 
play, over a series of pairs of gambles. He found that subjects had 
consistent preferences for gambles containing some probabilities rather 
than others and that 11 The complete pattern of choices changed radically 
from positive E.V. to negative E.V.bets, even though exactly the same 
O.Ps were used •••• These findings suggest that there is a strong inter-
action between utility and S.P."(Edwards, 1962a). 
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It should be noted that these are inferences made about subjective 
probability from subjects' preferences for gambles. In the 1955 
experiment Edwards attempted to measure subjective probability and utility, 
but he later regarded his method as unsatisfactory, e.g.in Edwards(l96la). 
It should be noted too that Edwards considered the same data as evidence 
of both probability preferences, in the sense that subjects preferred 
gambles with certain probabilities, and also of an interaction between 
the sign of the payoff and the shape of the subjective probability 
function. 
While the first inference could not be doubted it is not clear that 
the fact of probability preferences necessarily implies the second 
inference from the data or that the two phenomena are one and the same 
thing. Subjective probability seems quite distinct, in the sense of 
subjects' sense of the likelihood of achieving certain payoffs, from 
preferences among gambles which could be caused by conservatism,utili.ty 
for gambling or any of the subjects' attitudes to risk. In our sense of 
interaction Edwards' evidence is not convincing. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) asked their subjects to make 
evaluations of the worth of gambles by using Marschak bids. They fitted a 
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multiple regression model to subjects' responses to show the relative 
importance that subjects paid to the presented probabilities and payoffs 
when making these evaluations. With this interpretation, their results 
showed that subjects paid different amounts of attention to the 
probabilities of winning and losing, implying, they concluded, a (weak) 
interaction between value and subjective probability. While this 
experiment avoids some of the difficulties of interpretation of those 
of Edwards,e.g. all the dimensions of the ga~ble were presented in a 
factorial design and not confounded, and inferences are not made from 
series of preferences among whole gambles, precise interpretation of it 
and its relation to the experiments discussed below requires further 
work. 
Subjective Probability and Bids for Gambles. 
The remainder of the experiments to be discussed have taken as 
dependent variable subjects' bids for, or ratings of, the worth of 
gambles. One which is different in intention and approach from the 
others is that of Pruitt and Hoge(l965) who maintained a distinction 
between I.O. and D.O.in an investigation of interaction. They 
converted subjects' bids for gambles into subjective probabilities 
using the technique of Preston and Baratta(l948)which assumes that the 
utility for money equals the objective value of money, and found that 
these inferred probabilities increased with increases in I.O. Apart 
from this assumption about utility this experiment shares the 
disadvantages of the I.O.experiments discussed above, i.e. does the 
introduction of I.O.change the attitude of the subject to the gamble. 
Since the independence of value and probability is a fundamental 
assumption of expectation mode~tests of these models can provide 
information about interaction. 
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Tversky (1967a & b) tested independence in one-outcome gambles of 
the form: Win a with probability P or nothing if p does not occur. He 
used factorial designs of values and probabilities to construct these 
gambles and additivity analysis from conjoint measurement theory and 
analysis of variance techniques to test for interaction. From his 
results in both experiments he could conclude that utility and subjective 
probability contributed independently to the evaluations of gambles. 
vlallsten (1971) applied the same theory to judgments of indifference 
between gambles with similar results, while Coombs, Bezembinder and 
Goode(l967) derived predictions from the S.E.U. model similar to those 
of Tversky and again found the model not rejected. 
Anderson and Shanteau(l970) investigated interaction terms in an 
analysis of variance of ratings of the worth of both one- and two-
outcome gambles. These were not significant in one-outcome gambles. 
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Any two-outcome gamble can be seen as consisting of two one-outcome 
gambles - a win component win a with probability p, and a lose component 
lose b with probability q. The payoffs and probabilities within 
components were found to have nonsignificant interaction terms; some 
of the interaction terms between components were significant, e.g. the 
effect of q interacted with the win component (a x p) effect, but these 
effects were not systematic and the authors were not sure how to 
interpret them. 
In general these experiments on tests of expectation models and 
the measurement of utility and subjective probability provide no support 
for the interaction hypothesis. 
Discussion. 
Several general points may be made about these experiments on 
the interaction of value and subjective probability. 
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(a) Those experiments which have shown a relationship between subjective 
probability and outcome value have, with one exception (Slovic,l966), 
found a simple relationship. Probabilities increase with payoff value. 
Only Slavic has found evidence of a more complex relationship and of 
pessimism, or a decrease in probability with increase in payoffs; his 
report is also the only one to include details of individual differences. 
(b) It seems unfortunate that those experiments which have been designed 
with the intention of investigating interaction have found evidence to 
support that hypothesis, whilst those experiments which have been 
concerned with some other preble~, such as the measurement of utility 
and subjective probability or the analysis of probability preferences 
in gambles, have in general not found such evidence. 
(c) It may be relevant to this that the experiments which have maintained 
a distinction between Independent and Dependent outcomes have consistent-
ly shown an interaction effect. This seems to be the only consistent 
finding in the literature on this question. Unfortunately, it does not 
seem possible, on the basis of the published reports, to compare these 
experiments with the ones that have not shown evidence of interaction 
in order to uncover the role that this distinction plays, since we do 
not understand the way in which the probabilities are combined with the 
payoffs to reach a decision in this task. Data are presented only about 
the average responses of groups, and, in general, the role of the 
1.0/D.o. distinction in interaction is confounded with the problem of 
making inferences about changes in subjective probability from changes 
in the subjects' choice of D.O. 
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(d) If these experiments have shown an interaction effect, we are 
no clearer about this phenomena apart from recognising it's existence. 
When does interaction occur and when does it not? Do subjects perceive 
the probabilities differently or do the payoffs cause them to pay more 
or less attention to the information from which they derive their 
probabilities? Could an interaction effect be shown when the evaluation 
of gambles is the dependent variable? Is it possible to design an 
experiment to show a pessimism effect? If interaction is a change in 
subjective probability brought about by the payoffs in the situation, 
how important are the actual values of the payoffs chosen, and is there 
a "threshold" .value of a payoff, below which interaction does not occur? 
We have no answers to these questions, and in many of them it is 
difficult to see how we could answer them. More importantly, researchers 
in .this field seem to carry out only one experiment, or at most two, and 
have not attempted to explore the conditions under which interaction 
occurs. 
(e) We have considered here only those experiments which investigate 
interaction under chance conditions. Experiments in situations where 
the skill of the subject is involved,e.g. vlorell (1956),Phares (1957), 
and Scheibe (1964), suggest a more complex relationship between the 
expectancy of success and the value of success. While we have maintained 
a distinction between chance and skill situations, it may be that, for 
some subjects at least, this distinction might not be so simple cr clear 
cut; that the perception of the situation might be different at different 
times in the same experiment, and that this might be related to inter-
action. In the I.O. experiments of Irwin and his associated (1966,1968) 
and Norlock (1967) the tasks involved the subjects betting that they 
would pick up a winning card or choosing the d~ck of cards to be sampled, 
and this participation in achieving outcomes might have led the subject 
12 9 
to believe that the situation was not one of chan·ce. 
(f). When we try to infer subjective probability from responses other 
than direct statements or estimates of probabilities, and vary the 
payoffs in the decision situations in which we are making our inferences, 
we are faced with problems about the validity of making such inferences. 
Our concern is with showing that subjective probabilities change 
with the value of payoffs associated with them and with distinguishing 
such change in subjective probability from other changes in decision 
making behaviour. The core of the inference problem is ~urely that we 
would not be sure how to define subjective probability outside the 
decision making situations in which it is supposed to play a part. The 
subject is faced with a decision involving chances of winning and losing 
amounts of money or points, and he makes a decision in terms of the 
chances and payoffs as he sees them. The study of decision making is 
concerned with understanding the part that these probabilities and 
payoffs play in this decision. Our particular concern here is with the 
question of whether these chances of winning and losing look different 
when the payoffs to be won and lost are different. 
Independent Outcomes are won or lost independently of whatever 
response actually makes and are intended only to make some outcomes over 
which the subjeat has no control more or less desirable to him. To 
support the hypothesis that attaching I.O. to an outcome changes the 
subjective probability of the occurrence of that outcome it would not 
be sufficient merely to show that the introduction of I.O. brought about 
a change in response; we would have to show that it was a change in 
subjective probability and not one in some other aspect of behaviour, 
and this demands knowledge of how subjective probability enters these 
responses. 
When the subject responds by betting on some event he is agreeing 
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to take part in a gamble of the form, win A with some probability PW 
or lose the same amount with some other probability PL. He either 
names an amount A that he is willing to bet or chooses a value A 
from a list of bets or values of A. The more certain he is of winning, 
and the higher P~J then he should choose a higher value of A to increase 
the expected value of the gamble. But of course it may not be as simple 
as this since in addition to increasing the E.V. it also increases the 
riskiness of the gamble whether in terms of the size of the losing 
outcome or the variance of the gamble. It is clear that introducing 
an additional payoff B which is independent of the gamble that the 
subject chooses is in fact changing the gamble that the subject will 
play, and a change in response may be due to this change in the larger 
gamble rather than a change in subjective probability. For example 
the subject might see the new gamble as, win (B & A) with probability 
PW or lose A with PL, i.e.he might pay less attention to the losin~ 
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outcome, and raise the value of A. This may or may not be the case; 
we must ask if we would want to assume that such a change was evidence 
of change in subjective probability. 
The kinds of strategy that a subject may adopt in an expanded 
judgment or optional stopping task were discussed in Chapter Six, and 
need not be repeated here. The introduction of an I.O.of win 100 
if A is true or lose 100 if A is true can change the payoff matrix 
of the situation as below. We would want to show that changes in 
stopping point were due to change in subjective probability and not to 
a change in decision strategy introduced to cope with the new matrix. 
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A is true B is true A B A B 
decide A 30 -30 130 -30 ~70 :...30 
B- 30 30 70 30 -130 3.0' 
1.0 = 100 1.0= -100 
Similar problems of inference are faced when interaction is 
examined in the processing of gambles, even though the role that 
probabilities play in the evaluations of gambles is rather clearer. If 
the gamble is a simple one of the form, win A with probability P, and 
if the response is a Harschak bid or a rating of the worth of the 
gamble, then the gamble should be without value when P is 0, and have 
maximuo value when P is 1.0; by choosing gambles with different values 
of P we can see how the worth of the gambles to the subject changes, 
and thus isolate the role that the probabilities play in these decisions. 
If we change the value of A and present the subject with another series 
of gambles and see a different pattern of responses then this may not be 
evidence of a change in subjective probability but of a change in the 
utility of the new outcome. Attempts have been made to derive 
measurement scales of the utility of outcomes, but these models are 
at present of little use to us. 
Edwards (1962a) has used the results of Luce (1959) to show that 
where the subjective probabilities of co~plementary events do not sum 
to a constant (which would be the case where subjective probability 
was not independent of outcome value) then, for utility and subjective 
probability to be measured simultaneously, utility must be measured on 
a ratio scale. The problems of attaining such a scale are formidable. 
In any case, the derivation of such scales demands the independence 
of utility and subjective probability. 
Attempts to construct measurement scales have used the payoff 
X probability interaction term in an analysis of variance of responses 
as a test of interaction (in our sense). Such a test is more 
difficult to apply when two-outcome gambles are considered. 
The situation is complicated further by the suggestion of many 
writers that more than a knowledge of the utilities and subjective 
probabilities is necessary to predict subjects' behaviour, at least 
when the gambles are other than one-outcome ones. Other determinants 
of responses might be variance preferences (Edwards, 1962),probability 
preferences (Edwards,l955), utility for gambling (Royden,Suppes & 
Walsh, 1959), and the perceived risk of the gamble (Coombs and Huang, 
1969). While these have been investigated, we might only expect them 
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to be effective when payoffs are large, and that is also when we might 
expect interaction to occur. Instead of inferring subjective probability 
from the equation s.E.U.= U x SP, we could have an inference equation 
like S.E.U.= (U x SP)+VP+PP+D, where VP stands for variance preferences, 
PP for probability preferences, D for the subject's integration of the 
risk dimensions, and there is no implication that the equation is a 
simple additive one. Again, we would need to explore the role that 
probabilities play in the evaluation of gambles, especially ga~bles 
with large payoffs, rather than make too many assumptions of the form 
of the inference model. 
Summary. 
vlhile the question of an interaction between value and subjective 
probability is an important one for the prediction of behaviour in 
decision making situations, not very much attention has been paid to it 
as a problem in it's own right. The work that has been carried out has 
not :·resulted .in any."-~-1,mambiguous evidence about interaction. Subjects • 
direct estimates of probabilities seem to increase when these probab-
ilities are paired with payoffs. Such findings have not been widely 
considered by workers in this field since there are no pressures on the 
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subjects to distinguish between their subjective probabilities that 
the events will occur, and their preference for their occurrence. 
The introduction of pressures for accuracy confuses both the results 
and their interpretation. 
When subjective probability is inferred from decisions rather than 
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direct estimates being given there seems no consistent picture. A 
series of experiments which has shown consistent evidence of changes 
in behaviour which follow the introduction of payoffs associated with 
events, and which are compatible with the interaction hypothesis, is 
difficult to interpret and to relate to the experiments which do not 
show evidence of interaction. That such changes in response are 
evidence of interaction requires certain assumptions about the role 
that subjective probability plays in the experimental situation, and 
it is not clear that we would wish to make these assumptions. 
In general, clearer understanding of the question of interaction 
requires solutions to the problem of inferring subjective probability 
from decisions. 
CHAPTER EIGH'r. 
Introduction to Experiments. 
Objectives. 
This study of the interaction of value and subjective probability 
should be seen as exploratory in nature. That is to say, the question 
being asked is not whether there is any systematic interaction between 
these two variables, but rather, what kinds of experiment might show 
without ambiguity that value and subjective probability are, or are 
not, independent. 
Such a strategy of research would seem to be the most fruitful in 
the light of the published research on the problem. Experiments have 
been carried out in isolation, without further enquiry and without 
relation to the work of others. Different assumptions have been made 
about the nature and measurement of subjective probability and value, 
and different experimental designs have been used. 
It seems to this writer that the number of experiments which would 
be needed to relate this variety of assumptions, designs and conclusions 
would be enormous. It is doubtful on logical and statistical grounds 
that such a study would be valuable. How many times in so many 
experiments would we expect the null hypothesis to be rejected for 
chance reasons? 
An alternative strategy would be to take one example of an 
experimental design in the literature, and systematically explore the 
conditions which might produce an interaction effect; but we would 
want to choose an experiment which could show results which could 
without ambiguity be taken as evidence for or against interaction, and 
which would be flexible enough to allow us to study a large number of 
conditions. The problem involved in the choice of such an experiment 
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will be examined in this study. 
Strategies. 
The previous chapter, which examined the published research on 
the _question of interaction, concluded that one could distinguish 
between those experiments which included a distinction between 
Independent and Dependent Outcomes and consistently found evidence of 
interaction, and those experiments .which were interested in ether 
aspects of behaviour, considered the evaluation of ga~bles as response; 
and found little evidence of interaction. It was also concluded that 
it was difficult to be sure that the inferences about changes in 
subjective probability in the I.O/D.O experiments were valid, since we 
could not be sure that it was not some other aspect~of subjects• 
behaviour which had changed. This problem of inference was seen as 
the central problem in the study of the interaction of value and sub-
jective probability. 
Two approaches were made on this problem. In the first, the 
distinction between Independent and Dependent outcomes is maintained. 
Subjective probability is typically inferred from the value of the D.O. 
selected in some manner by the subjects. Our concern was to investigate 
the role that probabilities played in this selection with the goal of 
distinguishing change in the selection due to change in subjective 
probability and change due to change in decision strategy. In order to 
achieve this, it is necessary both to: 
(a) have an understanding of what the optimal strategy for the subject 
is in both the original situation and in the new situation formed by 
the introduction of the Independent outcome, and 
(b) to record not just change in behaviour but the responses of the 
subject both before and after the introduction of I.O.,i.e. to attempt 
to understand fully the role that subjective probability plays in 
the selection of the D.O. 
The second approach was to consider evidence of interaction in 
the evaluation of gambles; The problem here is again one of making 
valid inferences. When the payoffs in the gamble change, so does the 
expected value, and so should the subject's evaluation whether it be 
a rating of the work of the gamble or a selling price offered for it. 
An attempt was made to arrange the gambles in an experiment so that 
changes in response could, with the least assumptions, be interpreted 
as evidence of change in subjective probability, and not as evidence 
of something else like, for example, the utility of the payoffs. 
Experiments; 
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In the following chapters which described the experiments carried 
out the experiments are considered as falling into three types, 
differing in.the kind of response to the gambling situation that the 
subject is asked to make, and in the kind of inference made about 
subjective probability from these responses. The first two types are 
the experiments which include an I.O./D.O. distinction, and indeed the 
discussion of results only considers two kinds of experiment - the 
I.O./D.O.experiment and the gambling experiment. The further division 
is made here only to draw attention to the fact that experiment I-I 
is rather closer to those experiments in the literature that included 
a "pressures towards accuracy" condition. 
In the experiment of Type I a payoff scheme was utilised where the 
payoff to the subject was dependent upon his subjective probability. 
The subject chose from a list of bets the bet that corresponded to his 
subjective probability, that choice was examined under different 
Independent and Dependent outcome conditions, and subjective probability 
was inferred from his choice of bet. 
In the experiments of Type 2, the payoff to the subject was 
dependent upon the correctness of his decision. In experiment 2-1 
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the subject was as~ed to name the amount of money that he was prepared 
to bet that some event would occur. No direct inference of subjective 
probability was possible, but the bets were examined under different 
probability and Independent outcome conditions. In the others, 2-2 
and 2-3, the subject purchases as much information as he wishes prior 
to making a decision, and the payoff depended both on the correctness 
of the decision and on the cost of purchasing the information. This 
experiment was a replication of that of Morlock (1967), except that 
the task was altered from an expanded judgment one to a Eayesian 
optional stopping one so that the probability of success accepted by the 
subject could be identified. All of these studies included an 
Independent outcome and considered as possible evidence of interaction 
the changes in D~pendent outcome that were under the subject's control. 
In Type 3 the payoff to the subject is dependent upon his evaluation 
of the worth of a gamble. Since the experiments which examined the 
question of interaction included gambles which differed in terms of 
the computational difficulties involved in evaluating them, an 
introductory experiment, 3-I, examined the number of risk dimensions 
as a variable. The pattern of subjects• bids was similar in all 
conditions. Experiment 3-2 looked at two measures of behaviour - the 
regression analysis of duplex gambles introduced by Slavic and 
Lichtenstein (1968) to show the relative weight given to the probabilities 
of winning and losing in evaluations; and a prediction about the 
distribution of responses which would provide evidence about interaction 
with very few assumptions. Difficulties in the interpretation of the 
results of this experiment led to the design of 3-3, where both 
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probability estimates and evaluations of gambles were examined. 
The intention of this study was to look for designs that could 
test for the existence of interaction, and was not to collect evidence 
for or against the hypothesis of interaction. However, the experiments 
were carried out with small groups of subjects, and if the results were 
orderly or consistent and if they seemed to say something about inter-
action, we could ask: 
(1) What differences and similarities exist between these experimental 
results and those in the literature, i.e. what hypotheses about inter-
action might be set up? 
(2) Given these, at least preliminary, hypotheses, what kind of 
experimental design might test these hypotheses? 
This study is addressed to these questions. 
A note on descriptions of experiments. 
In the introductions to the experiments sufficient information is given 
to place each experiment in the context of the related literature, so 
that information which has been given in earlier chapters (particularly 
chapter seven) has been repeated. 
CHAPTER NINE. 
Experiments of Type I. 
Payoff Dependent Upon Subjective Probabilitl· 
Experiment I-I. 
Introduction. 
Irwin and his associates (Irwin and Snodgrass,l966,Irwin and 
Graae,l968) distinguished between Independent Outcome (I.O.) and 
Dependent Outcome (D.O.). I.O. is a payoff won or lost by a subject 
independent of which response he makes and dependent.only on the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of some event. It has the function of 
making some outcome desirable or undesirable to the subject. The D.O. 
is a payoff which depends on the response that the subject makes, and 
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is considered to be a "pressure towards accuracy". 
In their experiments the subject was asked to choose from a range 
of bets either for or against the occurrence of some event. The value 
of the bet they selected was the D.O. Associated with the event was 
an I.O. which made one of the events desirable (Irwin & Snodgrass,l966) 
or one of the events more desirable than the other (Irwin & Graae,l968) 
but which did not depend on the particular bet chosen by the subjects. 
Irwin did not, in the analysis of results, consider the size but only 
the direction of the subjects' bets, i.e. whether the bet was for or 
against the I.o.event and not how much they had been prepared to bet, 
because most subjects chose the bets at the extremes of the D.O.ranges. 
He found that the frequency of such bets on the I.O.event varied with 
I.o. at all D.O. levels and interpreted this result as evidence for the 
interaction of value and subjective probability. 
This interpretation may be criticised, since it may be that other 
features of the gambling situation may be determining the direction of 
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the bet. Another difficulty is that optimal strategy in such a situation 
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would be to always bet on the more likely event irrespective of the 
I.o., so that, in this experiment, changes in I.O. seem to result both 
in nonoptimal behaviour, i.e.allowing payoffs which should be irrelevant 
to influence your .beliefs, and in more optimal behaviour, i.e.approaching 
a tendency to maximise winnings. 
Aim of experiment. 
In this experiment, in place of Irwin's range of bets a range was 
chosen in which optimal strategy is to choose that bet which reflects 
the subject's "true" subjective probability. Suo.h a range is provided 
by the Quadratic Payoff scheme (Van .Naerssen, Shuford et al.,l966). 
This range of bets would serve as D.O.; I.O. would be varied to see if 
subject's responses were affected by such changes and particularly to 
see if subjective probabilities inferred from the payoff scheme increased 
with increased in I.O. The pattern of subjects' responses could also 
be examined from the point of view of the inference question; Are 
changes in subjects' choices of bets due to changes in subjective 
probability or to.some ·other change in the- gambling situation. 
Dependent Outcome. 
The Quadratic Payoff scheme is designed to have the property that 
the subject can maximise his expected score if and orily if "he honestly 
reflects his true degree of belief probabilities" (Van Naerrsen, 1962). 
If the.probability of winning is P and of losing is q=I-p, then one can 
select arbitrary constants A and B and solve the two equations x = A-Bq2 
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and y = A-Bp to generate two columns, x and y. For each value of 
(p and q) there will be a gamble with a value of x and a value of y. The 
subject wins the points in the x column if the event with probability 
P occurs otherwise the points listed in the y column. Subjects should 
choose bets at the extremes of the list only when they feel that one 
event is much more likely to occur than the other, and should choose bets 
from towards the middle of the list when events seem almost equally 
likely to occur. 
Two such series of bets were drawn up as two values of the D.O. 
range and are shown in Table I-I. 
Probabilistic information. 
The subjects' task was to decide whether the presented results of 
four throws of a die had been obtained by throwing die A or die B, 
e~ch of which differed in the number of sides which were coloured red 
or black. The proportions of red and black sides on the dice were: 
DIE A DIE B 
4 red sides and 2 black sides. 2 red sides and 4 black sides. 
All possible results of four throws (4 red sides up, 3 red sides up,l 
black side up, 2 red and 2 black, 1 red 3 black, and 4 black sides)were 
printed on cards and presented to the subject in random order. 
Experimental design. 
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The two values of D.O., high (172 •••• 0) and low (45 ••• 0), were 
presented to each subject in a factorial design with three values of I.O., 
zero, win 100 points and lose 100 points,all contingent upon it being 
die A that had been thro~fn, and the five throw outcomes. This design 
was presented with one replication to twenty undergraduate subjects. 
The payoff scheme was explained to them; the outcome of four throws 
of a die would be shown to them. They were then to select a bet from 
the list of bets. If the outcome had resulted from the throwing of die 
A then they would win the number of points in column X for the chosen bet 
otherwis~ they would win the number in column Y. For example, if a 
subject selected the bet 169 - 35 after examining the outcome of the 
throws then he would win 160 points if die A had been thrown or 35 if 
die B. Irrespective of whichever bet they selected they would be given, 
or lose depending on the value of the Independent Outcome, 100 points 
if die A had in fact been thrown. 
It was explained to subjects that any particular outcome could 
have resulted from either of the two dice, and that the trials of the 
experiment were independent. 
A point score for each subject would be arrived at by totalling 
the number of points won on each trial, and the subjects were advised 
to maximise their points score as a~money prize would be given to the 
subject with the highest total. 
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Table I-I. Values of dependent outcome. 
Series one. Series two. 
Prob (A) X y X y 
0-95 172 0 45 0 
0.90 171 18 45 5 
0.85 169 35 44 9 
o.8o 166 51' 43 13 
0.75 162 66 42 17 
0.70 157 80 41 21 
0.65 151 93 39 24 
o.6o 144 105 37 27 
o.ss 135 116 35 30 
o.so 126 126 33 33 
0.45 116 135 30 35 
o.4o 105 144 27 37 
0·35 93 151 24 39 
0.30 Bo 157 21 41 
0.25 66 162 17 42 
0.20 51 166 13 43 
0.15 35 169 9 44 
o.1o 18 171 5 45 
o.os 0 172 0 45 
Experimental results. 
To test for any change in responses in the different I.O. and 
D.O. conditions, the mean bet of each subject that event A had 
occurred was analysed in an I.O. x D.O. x 
Subjects analysis of variance. Each mean bet was the mean of ten 
responses for that subject. The results of this analysis are given 
in Table I-I-2. From this Table it can be seen that the choice of bet 
has not been affected by any of the payoff changes. 
Table I-I-2. Analysis 
Source. d. f. 
r.o. (A) 2 
D.o. (B) 1 
Subjects (S) 19 
AB 2 
AS 38 
BS 19 
ABS 38 
Total 119 
of variance table; 
M.S. F F(0.05) 
4.153 <.I 
7.254 .(.I 
39.427 
26.338 2.56 (3.23) 
55.473 
7.664 
10.27 
F-raties for significance tests were: 
Main effect A HS Ajr.-IS AS 
Main effect B MS B/!<IS BS 
AB interaction MS AB/MS ABS. 
The results of this experiment have not then replicated those of Irwin 
and his associates. Two further questions may be asked of the data 
from these subjects; the first is the question of inference - what is 
the relationship between subjective probabilities and the choice of bet 
from the Quadratic Payoff scheme? The second concerns the kinds of 
1 4.4 
145 
changes that might be revealed in the protocols of individual subjects 
would such changes support the hypothesis of a change in subjective 
probability or that of a change in decision strategy? Such discussion 
will be helped by the introduction here of the results of a second 
experiment carried out by the same twenty subjects after they had completed 
experiment I-I. The results are not presented as independent evidenee 
for the interaction of value and subjective probability; it should be 
pointed out that there were no effects of Independent Outcome upon choice 
of bet. (Table I-I-3). 
This experiment introduced three changes in experimental design: 
a) there was only one value of D.O.,Series Two with extremes of 
45 and 0 points. 
b) there were five values of I.O.- zero, if A win 100 points, if B 
lose 100 points. The second and third, and the fourth and fifth 
should be equivalent for the subject's choice of bet under the null 
hypothesis. 
c) The proportions of red and black sides of the dice were different, 
yielding new values of P(A) and P(B). 
DIE A 
4 red sides 
2 black sides 
DIE B 
3 red sides 
3 black sides 
With these proportions there is no longer symmetry in the importance of 
throwing a red side and throwing a black side. The appearance of a black 
Side must be given more weight than that of a red side, and the result 2 
red and 2 black sides showing favours the hypothesis that it was die B 
Was thrown. 
Table I-I-3 shows the results of a I.O. x Subjects analysis of 
Variance on the mean bet shown. The main effect·of I.O. was not 
significant. 
_Table I-I-3. Analysis of variance table; Experiment Part Two. 
Source d. f. NS F 
I.o. (A) 4 8538.25 ~I 
AS 76 8945.6 
Subjects (S) 19 5422.58 
Total 99 
F-ratio for significance test: 
Main effect A MS A/MS AS. 
I! we consider these two parts of the experiment we might be able to 
evaluate the design in terms of the inference problem - can we infer 
Without ambiguity subjective probability from choice of bet from a 
quadratric payoff scheme, and can we assume that changes in response 
following the introduction of Independent Outcome are due to changes in 
subjective probability rather than to some other change,e.g.a change in 
decision strategy? 
Table I-I-4 illustrates the mean probabilities (that die A had been 
thrown) inferred from the bets chosen by subjects. The second column 
of the table gives the objective probabilities P(A). The results for 
Part one of the experiment show that these mean probabilities are 
distributed in a similar fashion to the objective ones, and that high 
Probabilities are underestimated and low probabilities overestimated, 
Which is a common result in probability estimation experiments. With 
only the results from this part of the experiment it might be that such 
a distribution is due to subjects choosing bets at the extremes when 
Probabilities were extreme and from the middle of the list when' 
P(A) = 0.5.- Part two of the experiment (Table I-I-4),however, shows 
that with a different distribution of probabilities subjects change 
their choice of bet to yield a distribution close to the objective 
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probabilities. If subjects were choosing bets related to the table 
of bets only, it might be expected that the outcome-2 red, 2 black 
sides, would result in inferred judgements close to P(A), = 0.5; On 
the contrary subjects tended to see this outcome as evidence favouring 
die B, and had mean subjective probabilities more biased towards B 
than the objective probability. Inspection of individual protocols did 
reveal"however that two subjects did choose bets related to position 
in the list rather than to the distribution of probabilities. Never-
theless it seems reasonable to conclude that ior.most of the subjects 
. 
choice of bet is closely related to their subjective probability 
distributions. 
Since each P(A) corresponds to one particular bet in the list, the 
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test for change in subjective probabilities for all subjects has already 
been carried out (analysis of variance on bets, Table I-I-2); If, 
however, we examine individual protocols, we might+ by looking at the 
responses which might have changed from condition to condition without 
achieving significance, decide if such change is due ~o change in 
Probability similar to the changes reported by Irwin and his associates 
in their studies of betting behaviour, or is due to some other change. 
Tables I-I-5 and I-I-6 show the mean inferred probabilities by 
condition of each subject. We can see from these tables that the 
responses of some subjects showed behaviour which differed in different 
Payoff conditions, without any overall trends being established. Table 
l-I-7 shows the protocols of these subjects. 
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Table I-I-4. Mean Subjective Probabilities Inferred From Bets. 
£art one. D.O. 172. D.0.4,5. 
!o.reds P(A) 0 100 -100 0 100 -100 
4 0.94 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.88 
3 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.78 
2 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.51 
1 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21 
0 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.20 
!art two. 
No.reds P(A) 0 A 100 BAlOO B100 A-100 
4 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.76 
3 0.61 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.72 
2 0.44 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.43 o.4o 
1 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.27 
0 0.16 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.19 
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!_able I-I-5. Mean Inferred Probabilities: I I 
·Part one. l 
·I 
' i 
172 45 
s. 
-100. 100. o. -100. 100. o. 
1 o.s7 0.42 0.50 0.65 0.35 o.so 
2 54 55 50 50 54 47 
3 57 49 50 54 41 51 
4 49 51 49 50 49 50 
5 59 40 50 52 48 50 
6 so so. 50 50 50 50 
? so 50 50 so 50 50 
.. 
8 50 50 48 .51 .53 49 
9 50 .50 so .51 49 .53 
10 49 53 51 48 .50 52 
11 42 48 4? .50 50 53 
12 50 so 50 50 50 48 
13 40 50 so 44 50', 50 
14 47 51 .51 47 57 51 
15 
.51 55 54 .53 50 52 
16 43 58 51 48 42 50 
1? 58 62 49 .58 49 48 
18 53 .51 52 59 42 50 
19 23 48 50 23 52 48 
20 so .50 50 50 50 50 
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,!able I-I-6. Mean Inferred Probabilities: 
fart Two. 
s 0 A,100. A,-100. B,100. B,-100. 
1 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.47 0.46 
2 47 52 41 42 52 
3 51 46 53 52 42 
4 41 26 50 44 47 
5 42 34 48 64 42 
6 45 50 50 45 50 
7 56 56 . 56 54 56 
S: 40 40 40 40 40 
.. 
9 51 49 47 49 50 
10 48 45 48 47 48 
11 49 53 53 44 50 
'.12 50 44 44 . 47 54 
13 50 45 43 49 45 
14 49 47 49 54 48 
15 48 56 53 48 54 
16 44 51 53 55 50 
17 43 45 56 52 34 
18 49 12 48 78 50 
19 48 52 09 42 89 
I 20 44 52 52 48 49 
1 5 1 
!able I-I-7. Mean Inferred Probabilities of Selected Subjects. 
il) Lar~e deviations from mean. 
PART ONE : Subjec~t 19. 
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No.reds 
-100 100 o. -100. 100. 0 
4 0.47 0.65 0.65 0.42 0.80 0.77 
3 o.4o 0.60 0.60 0.42 0.72 0.67 
2 0.17 0.50 0.50 0.20 0.52 0.50 
1 0.05 0.37 o.4o 0.05 0.32 0.27 
0 0.05 0.30 0.35 0.05 0.22 0.20 
PART TWO • Subject 19. 
No.reds o. A,100 A,-100 B,100 B,-100. 
4 0.60 0.65 0.10 0-55 0.95 
3 0.60 0.50 0.12 0.50 0.92 
2 0.45 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.90 
1 0.45 0.45 0.05 0.30 0.82 
0 0.32 o.4o 0.10 0.32 0.85 
Subject 18. 
4 0.62 0.15 0.67 0.90 0.65 
3 0.67 0.20 0.62 0.95 0.70 
2 0.45 0.15 o.4o 0.72 0.42 
1 0.32 0.05 0.40 0.85 0.37 
0 0.37 0.05 0.32 0.47 0.35 
152 
!able I-I~7 (contd.) 
Subject 5· 
No.reds. o. A~100. A,-100. B,100. B,-100. 
4 0.82 . 0.47 0.77. 0.95 0.75 
3 0.72 0.50 0.67 0.82 0.67 
2 0.25 o.4o 0.50 0.67 0.32 
1 0.15 0.27 0.40 0.55 0.17 
0 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.17 
... 
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If interaction were to take the form that has been found in the 
'experiments of Irwin and Snodgrass {1966) and Irwin and Graae (1968) 
.. 
then inferred probabilities would increase with positive I.O. and 
decrease with negative I.O. In the second part of the experiment 
inferred P(A) would be expected to increase with I.O. of A,lOO and 
B,-100, ·and decrease with I.O. of A,-100 and B,lOO. This result was not 
in general confirmed. Indeed the selection of protocols in Table I-I-7 
should illustrate the difficulty of assuming that change in response 
following the introduction of I.O. is due to a change in subjective 
Probability. The changes in response are quite marked; the new 
response is often insensitive to ~hanges in probability rather than 
forming a new distribution; the changes are found in only some or the 
I.O.conditions. One subject (number 19) shows different kinds of 
behaviour in each part of the experiment. While he does seem to:cha~ge 
his choice of bet in a manner consistent with the interaction hypothesis, 
in the first part he forms new distributions of inferred probabilities 
and in the second the bets chosen in the A,-100 and B~-100 conditions 
do not form any distribution. 
The simpler hypothesis might be that these subjects are changing 
their betting behaviour in an attempt to take advantage of particular 
Payoff conditions. If this were true then it would be difficult in any 
such experiment to have a rule for deciding which change in response is 
due to such strategy change and which to interaction of value and 
subjective probability. 
That a change in strategy is a possible explanation of changes 
in response received some support from discussion with subjects. Most 
stated that the introduction of the I.O. made no difference to the way 
in which they approached the task, and regarded them as "bonuses" over 
which they could exercise no control. 
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!ummary of experiment I-I. 
Previous experiments on the effects of I.O. on betting behaviour 
have been criticised because they have used D.O.schemes where the 
frequency of bets on an I.O. event has been the only dependent variable 
from which subjective probability has been inferred, and conclusions 
have been based on data averaged over groups of subjects. This 
experiment introduced a D.O. scheme where the relationship between 
probability and bet could be more closely studied for both all and 
individual subjects. Two questions were asked of the data:- was there 
any evidence of interaction of response and I.O. and what was the 
relationship between response and subjective probability? Analysis of 
• 
subjects' bets (or inferred subjective probabilities) showed no change 
due to I.O. Examination of responses in two parts of the experiment 
showed that the optimal strategy of choosing the bet corresponding to 
subjective probability seemed to be followed by nearly all subjects so 
that the relationship between probability and choice of bet is a close 
one. However, this in itself is not sufficient to s9lve the inference 
Problem. We need also to show that change in response due to I.O. is 
due to a change in subjective probability. This question was approached 
by looking at the extreme changes in response of a few subjects; it 
Was concluded that, since in their case it seemed to be a matter of 
change in decision strategy, then for any one subject it might be 
difficult to decide the reason for response change, and that this would 
be a more difficult problem when results were averaged over a large 
number of subjects, since this average could include small and extreme 
response changes. 
CHAPTER TEN. 
Experiments of Type 11. 
PAYOFF DEPENDENT UPON CORRECTNESS OF DECISION. 
Under this type of payoff, the distinction between Independent 
Outcome and Department Outcome is maintained. In the previous 
experiment subjective probability was inferred directly from the bet 
or particular value of D.O. chosen from a list by the subject. In 
this type of experiment whether the subject wins or loses depends 
upon the correctness of his decision and the value of such dependent 
outcomes will to a greater extent be determined by the subject; in 
experiment 2-1 the subject may choose the amount of money he is 
• 
Prepared to bet, and in experiments 2-2 and 2-3 the subject may buy 
as much information as he wishes prior to decision. 
!xperiment 2-1. 
Independent Outcome and Choice of Wager. 
Introduction and Design. 
15S 
In the experiments of Irwin and Snodgrass (1966) and Irwin and Graae 
(1968) the subjects' task was to select some bet that event A or event 
B would occur from a prescribed range of possible bets. Since most 
subjects chose the bets at the extremes of these ranges, the experimenters 
did not analyse the size but only the direction of subjects' bets. 
In this experiment the subjects were not restricted to a range of 
bets but could name the amount of money they were prepared to bet either 
for or against the occurrence of some event. The ma~nitude of their 
bets could then be studied in addition to their direction. 
A small group of subjects (five) was involved, and each bet was 
replicated six times per subject, so that in comparison with Irwin's 
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studies a smaller number of subjects gave a larger sample of their 
behaviour. 
Procedure. 
Either two or three cards were placed in front of the subject. 
One out of two cards, and either one or two of the three cards were 
designated card A and the other card(s) B. The subject was asked to bet 
any sum he cand to that he would pick up a card A or a card B. The 
probabilities of drawing card A were therefore 1/3,1/2, and 2/3. An 
Independent Outcome was associated with the picking up of card A and 
took on the values Win lOOp, Win 50p, and Lose lOOp • 
. 
The probabilities and Independent Outcomes were presented in a 
3 x 3 factorial design with 6 replications to each subject. 
Results. 
As in Irwin's experiments the frequency of bets in favour of the 
I.o. event can be examined for changes in frequency as I.O. changes. 
Table 2-I-I shows the frequency of bets that event A (the I.O. event) 
increased with the probability of A for each reward level and with I.O. 
at each probability level. When P(A):l/2 the frequency of bets on A 
can be seen to be clearly related to the amount of money to be won or 
lost on A. 
!_able 2-I-I. !_requency of bets on event A. 
P(A) 1/3 1/2 2/3 Total 
I.O.(A) -100 2 9 19 30 
50 9 21 28 58 
100 11 24 28 63 
Total 22 54 75 
Frequency of bets in each cell is 30. 
A multiple regression equation, expressing fre4uency of bets 
in terms of probability of event A and Independent Outcome fitted this 
data very well (R yl.2 0.98); the regression weights were: 
For variations in I.O. 0.54 
For variations in P(A) 0.83 
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Since the subjects were asked to state how much they were prepared 
to bet, the magnitude of their bets could be studied in addition to the 
direction of the bets. A two-way analysis of variance was performed on 
the median bet for each probability - I.O. combination, with the five 
subjects treated as replications of the design. The dependent variable 
was the amount bet on event A, with bets on event B being treated as 
negative bets on A. 
Table 2-I-2 gives the median bet for each subject, and Table 2-I-3 
the results of the analysis of variance. 
As can be seen from the variance table (2-I-3) the main effects of 
changes in probability and Independent Outcome were both significant. 
Their interaction was not. Point estimation of variance components 
(Hays, 1963) estimated the proportion of variance accounted for by 
the main effects; these proportions were :Independent Outcome- 7~ , 
Probability- 49~ • 
A similar analysis of variance compared the two positive I.O.,win 
lOOp and 50p, and found that, while the main effect due to changes in 
probability was again significant, there was no significant difference 
between these outcomes. Table 2-I-4 gives the results of this analysis. 
Table 2-I-2. 
Hedian Bets 
SUBJECT 1. I.O. 1/3 
-100 
-5 
50 5 
,100 5 
SUBJECT 2. 
-10 
- 5 
-10 
SUBJECT 3. -40 
-20 
-40 
SUBJECT 4. 
-10 
-20 
-10 
SUBJECT 5. -10 
-20 
-10 
of Subjects. 
1/2 
-5 
5 
10 
-10 
- 5 
0 
0 
-2.5 
-15 
20 
15 
15 
20 
15 
0 
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2/3 
-5 
10 
15 
7·5 
5 
10 
20 
20 
30 
40 
20 
20 
40 
20 
20 
Table 2-I-3. 
Source 
Probability 
r.o. 
Their interaction 
vli thin cells 
Total 
Table 2-I-4. 
Source 
Probability 
r.o. 
Their interaction 
Within cells 
Total 
Variance Table. All r.o. 
d. f. M.S. F. 
2 4237.64 18.71 s 
2 738.50 3.26 s 
4 101.18 F(I n.s. 
36 240.42 
44 
F-test denominator. Pooled HS. 
= 226.49, d.f. = 40. 
F at 0.05 3.23 
F at O.OI 5.18 
Variance Table. Positive I.O. 
d. f. 
2 
1 
2 
24 
29 
H.S. F. 
2613.96· 11.55 s 
16.87 F<"I 
55.63 F<:: I 
240.21 
F-test denominator, Pooled 11S. 
= 226.0, 
F at O.OI 
d.f. = 26. 
5o 53 
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Discussion. 
This experiment shows that both the size and direction of subjects' 
bets on an event increased with both the probability of the event and 
an Independent Outcome associated with the event. Although the two 
measures used, regression weights and point estimation of variance, are 
not directly comparable, they both suggest that changes in probabilities 
are a more important determinant of choice of bet than changes in 
Independent Outcome. It seems too that it is the difference between 
winning and losing outcome that is important for both the size and 
direction of bets; the difference between positive payoffs is small. 
The results of the analysis of the direction of bets replicate: 
those of Irwin and Snodgrass (1966) and Irwin and Graae (1968). It is 
not clear in any.of these experiments that this provides evidence for 
the dependence of subjective probability on Independent Outcomes. The 
suhjects in this experiment commented that they were prepared to risk 
more as both probabilities and I.O. increased. 
One of the difficulties of choosing between hypotheses is the lack 
of any understood relationship between the dependent variables of this 
experiment and subjective probability. Experiment I had such a 
relationship at least in theory and although the results seemed c9n-
sistent with that theory they showed no evidence of change due to chan~e 
0 
in I.o. There are of course differences between these experimental 
designs, both in the structure of the bets and in the amounts of money 
Used directly as I.O. in experiment 2-1. It remains difficult to know 
if betting experiments such as 2-1 and those we have referred to in the 
literature do show consistent evidence of an interaction between prize 
and subjective probability or if we have only shown that prizes as well 
as probabilities are determinants of betting behaviour. 
Experiments 2-2 and 2-3 examine a further relationship between 
dependent variable and subjective~obability. 
Experiment 2-2. 
Independent Outcome and the Acquisition of Information Prior to 
Making a Decision. 
Introduction. 
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The common view of a subject's behaviour in a sequential decision 
making -task is that he purchases information until his confidence in the 
correctness of one of the alternative decisions attains some criterion 
magnitude. This criterion would vary with the cost of information as 
Well as the payoffs for correct and incorrect decisions. 
Horlock (1967) hypothesised that, "given that the strength of an 
expectation for an event was positively related to the desirability of 
that event, the criterion level should be reached with less information 
for desirable than for undesirable alternatives". His results confirmed 
that less information was needed to decide that a desirable event would 
occur, where the desirability of an event was manipulated by variations 
in the value of an Independent Outcome associated with that event. 
Morlock used the 'expanded judgment' situation (sampling without 
replacement) which yields no evidence about the probability of success 
that the subject was accepting at the time of deei~ion. Given this, it 
is difficult to decide if the subject-has changed his criterion level 
because of a change in subjective probability or because of a change in 
decision strategy following the introduction of I.O. 
This experiment was carried out to eXamine subjects' strategies 
in a revised information purchasing task under different I.O. conditions. 
Experimental Design. 
In Narlock's experiment, the subject was not informed of the 
Parameters of the distributions with which he was dealing, or even of 
the form of the distributions. It was not then possible for the subject 
to specify an optimal strategy. Irwin and Smith (1957) write of their 
expanded judgment task: "it is taking some liberty with·the word to 
speak of a subject gaining 'information' from the cards". By making 
the term 'information' more precise through the introduction of a 
Bayesian information purchasing situation, an optimal strategy could be 
described, and subjects' responses could be examined in an attempt to 
distinguish between changes in criterion due to the interaction of I.O. 
and subjective probability and those due to manges in 'acquisition 
strategies' or attitudes which did not involve change in subjective 
probability. 
As is common in Bayesian situations, two urns were described to 
the subject. Each urn contained 10 red and black balls, one (Urn A) 
in the proportions 6 red to 4 black and the other (Urn B) contained 4 
red and 6 black. The subject was permitted to purchase information at 
a fixed cost of one point per item, i.e. a look at one ball from one 
of the urns, and could continue sampling with replacement until he 
Wished to decide from which of the two urns he was sampling. 
Sequences of information were prepared in advance to ensure that 
the same information was seen in each presentation condition and in 
each payoff condition. For example, if 2 red and I black balls from 
Population (Urn)A were presented then 2 black and I red from Population 
B would be presented. This control, which was absent in Morlock's 
experiment, allows us to precisely compare points at which decisions are 
made under all conditions. The prepared sequences also varied in 
composition; some decisions were made more difficult than others in 
order to be able to test for consistency of strategy and for changes 
in strategy. 
!he Payoffs. 
The Dependent Outcome took on the values, win 30 points for a 
correct decision or lose 30 points for an incorrect decision. The I.O. 
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took on the values 0, win 100, and lose 100 points and was associated 
with urn A. These payoffs may also be written in the form of a decision 
matrix as below. 
State of nature. A B A B A B 
decision A 30 -30 130 -30 -70 
-30 
B ~30 30 70 30 -130 ~Q 
(I.O.= 100) (I.O.=~lOO). 
'According to models for optimal behaviour (Chernoff,l954, or Luce 
and Raiffa,l957), these transformations of the payoff matrix should lead 
to no change in behaviour, as the,yinvolve only the addition or subtraction 
of a constant to one of the columns. It was hypothesised that present-
ation in matrix form might emphasise the strategic aspects for the 
subject, so the two methods of presentation were compared in conditions 
M(matrix) and B(bonus points). 
Knowledge of results. 
The second presentation condition in the experiment was the presence 
or absence of information following decisions about the correctness of 
those decisions. This distinction gives rise to two conditions F 
(feedback) and NF (no feedback). It was hypothesised that the presence 
of feedback might serve as a check against an interaction effect of the 
kind reported by Morlock, who does not mention whether such information 
was provided to his subject. 
~bjects. 
The subjects were nineteen undergraduate students of the University 
of Keele. They were divided into four groups - MF,MNF,BF, and BNF. Each 
subject made 24 decisions in each Independent Outcome condition, making 
a total o£ 72 decisions. The points which were won or lost on each trial, 
or decision, were added to make up a total for each subject as was the 
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case in Morlock's experi~ent. Subjects were advised to try to maximise 
their points score and that a money prize would be given to the subject 
with the highest total. 
The Presentation of Information. 
To ensure that the same information was seen by each subject in 
each presentation and payoff condition, the results of sampling from 
the two urns were printed on cards, and the experimenter would read these 
results from the cards at the subject's request. 
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Results. 
The amount of information required to reach a decision was 
compared in the four groups - MF,HNF,BF,and BNF, and in the three I.O. 
conditions. Table 2-2-I which presents these mean sample sizes suggests 
that subjects in the }'latrix conditions tended to take a larger sample 
size before reaching a decision than the Points presentation condition, 
and that subjects in the No Feedback condition took a larger sample 
size than the Feedback groups. Whether the decision to be made included 
a zero, positive, or negative I.O. seemed to make no difference to 
sample size. 
This was confirmed by a Three-way analysis of variance with the 
two presentation differences and I.O. as independent variables and the 
amount of information purchased in a block of 24 decisions as dependent 
Variable. The subjects acted as replications of the design. The Matrix 
and Feedback main effects reached significance level and the I.O. main 
effect and interaction terms did not. The variance table is presented 
in Table 2-2-2. 
Since Matrix and Feedback effects were significant the next step 
in the analysis of results was carried out separately for each of the 
four groups. This.analysis was a replication of that of Norlock (1967). 
The amount of information required before a decision is made when the 
event associated with I.O. was presented was compared with the amount 
of information purchased when the other event was presented. Morlock 
found that as r.o. (associated with Urn A in this experiment) increased 
the sample size before decision decreased when the I.O. event was 
Presented and increased when the non - I.O. event was presented,i.e. 
the criterion level of confidence for making a decision was reached with 
less information for desirable than for undesirable alternatives. 
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Table 2-2-3 shows the average sample size prior to decision for 
the four groups of subjects and the three r.o. conditions. Row A of 
that Table shows the sample size when the r.o. event was presented to 
the subject, and Row B the sample size for the other event (Urn B). 
Figure 2-2-I displays these results in graphical form and compares them 
with Horlock's results (adapted from Horlock, 1967,p.298) for equivalent 
values of r.o. 
The results of this experiment do not show the form which would be 
Predicted by the Interaction hypothesis. As a statistical test of his 
results, Morlock examined the main effect of I.O. and the Event x r.o. 
interaction term in an analysis of variance. Similar analyses of 
variance were carried out for the four groups in this experiment, with 
the amount of information purchased prior to decision for a block of 12 
decisions being the dependent variable. The variance ratio MS AB/MS ABS 
Was taken to test the AB (Urn x I.O.) interaction term; the ratio 
MS B/MS BS tested the main effect of I.O. None of these terms reached 
significance level. Table 2-2-4 gives the variance tables for the four 
groups. 
Table 2-2-I. Mean Sample Size. 
Bonus Points. Hatrix. 
r.o. Feedback. No 
0 3.80 
100 3-55 
-100 4.18 
!able 2-2-2. 
Source d. f. 
Matrix (A) I 
Feedback (B) I 
r.o. (C) 2 
AB l 
AC 2 
BC 2 
ABC 2 
W.Cells 45 
Total 56 
Feedback. Feedback. No Feedback. 
5.66 6.30 6.77 
6.46 5-97 6.16 
5.68 6.10 6.82 
Variance Table. 
H.S. F. 1'0.05. 
2066!.4 10.54 
I4538.II 7.4I 
147.42 
-'1 
',5~1:1.359 1.71 4.08 
446.59 
90.83 
628.3I 
2133-62 
F-test For Main Effects 
Pooled interaction terms and 
W.Cells 1959·345, d.f.= 52. 
F0.01. 
7.08 
7.08 
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!able 2-2-3. 
Gro':IP• 
BF 
BNF 
HF 
MNF 
I.o. 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
Mean Sample Size before Decision. 
o. 
3·73 
3,87 
6.25 
6.35 
6.75 
6.80 
IOO. 
3.48 
3.62 
6.85 
6.06 
6.25 
6.07 
-IOO. 
4.52 
4.00 
6.25 
5·95 
6.82 
7.02 
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Table 2-2-4. Variance table. 
BF MF MNF 
Source d. f. MS F MS F MS F 
Event(A) 1 0.83 0.87 0.53 
I.O. (B) 2 142. 5 3·25 42.45 .(I 234. 1 <.1 
Subjects(5) 4 290.21 3721.39 4923.46 
AB 2 28.03 2.07 20.0I ~1 I3.43 <r 
AS 4 I6.44 24.57 5· 2 
BS 8 43.8 I58.43 352.02 
ABS 8 I3.49 4I.04 20.59 
Total 29 
F 0.05 d.f. 2/8 4.46. 
BNF. 
Source d. f. MS 
Event(A) I 70.05 
I.o. (B) 2 237· 6 
Subjects(5)3 1780.37 
AB 2 97·5 
As 3 44.48 
Bs 6 415.18 
ABs 6 36.66 
Total 23 
Fig. 2-2-I. 
sample size,.I.o.,. and the Interaction hypothesis. 
Under the interac.tion hypothesis we would expect 
the sample size .for A to decrease as: I.O. increases. 
and the sample size forB (dashed line) to increase. 
Fi@lrea (a) and (b) adapted from Morlock( 1967 ,p .298) • 
. !5 
I2 
(a) 
--...,-" 
IO 
-roo 0 
B.F. 
5 
• 
3 
-roo 0 
M.F·. 
t 
--
.. c 
5 
3 
-roo 0 
• 
4 
roo 
roo 
IOO· 
s m.ple size . b 
6 
-..__.__~ ..... t----~ 
5 
-IOU 0 roo r.o. 
B.N.F. 
3 
-roo 0 !00 
~ 
.... ... 
5 
M.N.F. 
3 
-roo 0 !00 
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Morlock's analysis considered differences in amount of information 
purchased brought about by the presentation of the I.O. event to the 
subject. One may also examine the number of A and B de~isions that the 
subject made under the different I.O.conditions. Morlock writes "I.O. 
had no significant effect on the frequency with which the subjects 
decided that the packs had the desired constitution". It seems to this 
Writer that such changes would be expected under the interaction hypo-
thesis. When I.O. is 1...00, points the subject would prefer event A to 
be presented, whereas when r.o. is -100 points the subject would prefer 
the presentati~n of event B. Changes in criterion for decision could 
lead the subject to make one decision rather than another as I.O. changes , 
e.g. he might make more A decisions when I.O. is 100 and more B decisions 
When I.O. is -1QQ. 
Alternatively differences in the number of A and B decisions 
might be evidence of changes in decision strategy brought about by 
changes in I.o., and this might be more evident in the Matrix present-
ation conditions. The three payoff matrices under the three I.O. 
conditions are: 
state of nature 
A 
decision A 30 
B-30 
B 
-30 
30 
A 
A 130 
B 70 
(for r.o. =tOO) 
B 
-30 
30 
A B 
A -70 -30 
' 
B-130 JO 
(for I.O.= -ro:L). 
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Table 2-2-5. 
Mean Number of A decisions per Group. 
Group 0 IOO -IOO 
M.F. 12.6 11.4 12.2 
H.N.F. 12.4 10.8 14.2 
B.F. 12.2. 10.8 11.4 
B.N.F. 11.75 10.75 12.0 
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Table 226. No. of A decisions out of 24. 
r.o. 0 IOO -IOO 
Subject MF 1 13 13 12 
2 12 10 16 
3 13 10 13 
4 13 11 8 
.5 12 13 12 
MNF 1 13 8 12 
2 13 17 13 
3 1~ 7 18 
4 12 12 12 
.5 12 10 16 
BF 1 12 12 12 
2 11 14 12 
3 13 11 11 
4 13 12 14 
.5 12 10 8 
BNF 1 12 12 12 
2 12 9 14 
3 12 10 12 
4 11 12 10 
1 7.4 
Although, in terms of optimal strategy, these transformations of the 
payoff matrix should lead to no change in behaviour, it might be that 
subjects would alter their decision strategies in certain ways, for 
example: 
i. When I.O. IOO, always decide B to avoid possibility of losing. 
ii. When I.O. IOO, always A for chanC,e of large win. 
iii.When I.O. -IOO, always decide B which has a possibility of winning. 
iv. When I.O. -IOO,always decide A to avoid large loss. 
While a change in criterion due to interaction might lead to a tendency 
to make decisibns similar to those made when following strategies ii 
and iii, strategies i and iv should be distinguishable from changes in 
distribution of decisions due to change in criterion. 
Table 2-2-5 shows the mean number of A decisions out of 
a block of 24 decisions in each group of subjects and each I.O. condition. 
The results are not in the form that would be predicted by the change in 
criterion (interaction) hypothesis. Differences in the mean frequency 
0 f A decisions of each of the 19 subjec~s due to different I.O. conditions 
<see Table 2~2-6) were tested by Friedman's Two-way Analysis of Variance 
(Siegel, 1956); there was no significant difference in frequency 
. '2. 
between I.O. conditions CX:1(::::1.5,N=l9,d.f.=2). 
Examination of Table 2-2-6 suggests that several subjects in the 
Matrix conditions might have changed decision strategy (e.g.MFI,MNF 2 & 3). 
Inspection of their protocols shows that except for subject MNF 3, 
SUbjects seem to be making decisions and errors in the light of the 
evidence seen by them. Subject MNF seemed to have ignored the evidence 
in a sample and decided A in the -IOO and B in the IOO I.o:conditions, 
· accepting a smaller loss for certain rather than risking the higher loss 
in the -IOO condition and taking a smaller gain for certain in the 
Ioo condition. 
~iscussion. 
This experiment examined the effects of different values of 
Independent Outcome upon two related dependent variable~ - the amount 
of information required to decide that a desirable event has occurred 
when compared to the amount required to decide that an alternative 
event or undesirable event has occurred, and the relative frequency of 
deciding that one event rather than the other had occurred. Neither of 
these measures provided support for the interaction hypothesis, i.e. 
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that less information would be required to decide about desirable events. 
and that, if the information presented was suitably controlled the 
subject would decide more often that the desirable event had occurred. 
It seems that the Dependent Outcome, the points that would be won 
Or·lost depending on the correctness of decision, was the important 
determinant of subjects' behaviour rather than the I.O. If amount of 
information purchased is regarded as correlating with confidence at 
time of d~cision then subjects were more cautious in the sense of needing 
a higher confidence level or criterion when no information was given 
to them about the correctness of their decisions and when the information 
about the payoffs was presented in the form of a payoff matrix. Trans-
forming the payoff matrix did not affect the amount of information 
PUrchased nor the frequency of decisions on the alternative events (with 
the exception of one subject), i.e. subjects were concerned with the 
correctness of decisions rather than with the desirability of outcomes. 
These results do not confirm those of Morlock (1967) on whose 
experiment this one was based. While there are undoubtedly many 
differences between these experiments, e.g. number and background of 
subjects, length of experiment, motivation of subjects, two might be 
considered more important than others. 
In the first instance, this experiment was designed to obtain more 
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information about subjects' behaviour and in particular to specify 
the point at which decisions were made. To achieve this goal, the 
parameters of the populations were given to the subject~ and the actual 
information seen by them was controlled to be the same when both the 
I.o. event and the non-I.O. event were presented and for all three 
Values of I.O. These controls were absent in Morlock's experiment; 
it may be that this experimenter's emphasis on structuring the situation 
may have changed the situation as perceived by the subjects so that they 
too paid more attention to the structure of the situation - the 
construction of the populations and the payoff scheme - rather than to 
the relative desirability of the alternative events. 
The second pri~cipal difference between the two experiments is in 
the method of presentation of the alternative events or populations. In 
Morlock's experiment the subject had the opportunity to select one of 
the two decks of cards on the understanding (although in fact this was 
not the case) that one deck was composed predominantly of marked cards 
and associated with I.O. and that the other deck was predominantly 
unmarked and without I.O. It might have been that the subject felt that 
he had some opportunity to exercise his skill, so that the situation 
~as not perceived as one of pure chance; alternatively the act of 
choosing might have induced commitment to one hypothesis, similar to 
the phenomenon investigated by Brody (1965). In experiment 2-3 five 
SUbjects carried out another information purchasing task with this choice 
introduced. 
Experiment 2-3. 
The payoff conditions in this experiment replicated condition 
B.N.F. of experiment 2-2 with the change that monetary payoffs were 
introduced in place of payoffs in points. The Dependent Outcome took 
on the values of win or lose 30p, and the three values of Independent 
Outcome were O, win lOOp and lose lOOp. The introduction of monetary 
Payoffs meant that in practice subjects' winnings would not be 
cumulative over trials but would be calculated by selecting one of the 
trials after the completion of the experiment and estimating the 
Winnings. 
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The second major change from experiment 2-2 is in the method of 
Presenting the decision alternatives. In that experiment the information 
from one of the urns was presented to the subject who was required to 
decide which urn he had been sampling from. In this experiment, the 
subject was presented with two cards, and it was explained to him that 
one card contained samples drawn from urn A (these were written on the 
reverse of the card) and the other card,samples drawn from urn B. An 
Independent Outcome was associated with urn A; the subject, who was 
asked to select the card he wished to sample from and to pass it on to 
the experimenter who would read out the information on request, had the 
0 PPortunity to pick up the card which was associated with the I.e. It 
Was hypothesised that the introduction of this opportunity might result 
in less information being required to decide that the desirable rather 
than the less desirable card had been picked up. 
Five undergraduate subjects carried out the experiment. Each made 
eighteen decisions - with each of the three I.O. values associated with 
card A, either card A or card B was presented, and this design was 
repeated three times with different prepared samples. That both A and 
B were presented was ensured by having both cards contain the same 
information on the reverse in each trial. 
~sults. 
Table 231 shows the average sample size before decision in the 
three different I.O. conditions. Row A of the table shows the mean 
sample size when the I.O. event was presented to the subject and row 
B the sample size when the other event was presented. 
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!able 2-3-I. 
,:o. 
Population A 7.00 
B 8.06 
I.O. 
roo. 
8.20 
7.40 
-IOO. 
7.20 
6.53 
1'79 
The results in this Table do not take the form which would be 
Predicted by the Interaction hypothesis. As in Experiment 2-2,Morlock's 
method of analysis was replicated. The main effect of I.O. and the 
Event x I.O. interaction terms in an analysis of variance were tested. 
The dependent variable for this analysis was the sum of the three 
repititions of eac4 decision. Neither of these effects were significant. 
The variance table is given in Table 2-3-2. 
Table 2-2-2. Variance Table. 
Source. d. f. H.S. 
Event(A) I !.2 
I.e. 2 20.8 4.05 4.46 
Subjects (S) 4 300.27 
AB 2 24.4 1.44 4.46 
As 4 3·45 
Bs 8 5·13 
ABs 8 16.90 
Total 29 
F-ratio for main effect HS 'B/MS BS 
F-ratio for AB interaction NS AB/MS ABS 
Similarly, examination of the frequency of A decisions in the different 
I.o. conditions reveals no support for the interaction hypothesis. When 
the frequencies are summed over the five subjects, the A population was 
Presented 15 times in each I.O. condition; the frequency of A decisions 
~hen I.o. was 100 was 15, when I.O.was zero was 14, and when I.O. was 
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-IOO was 15· 
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Discussion. 
The experiments 2-2 and 2-3 reported here have considered two 
dependent variables: 
(a) the amount of information taken by a subject before making a decision, · 
and 
(b) the number of times that one decision rather than another had been 
made. 
Under the conditions of these experiments no change was detected 
in these dependent variables following the introduction of Independent 
Outcomes, which were payoffs making one of the events more desirable 
than the other. Morlock (1967) conducted a similar experiment and 
reported that the amount of information required before reaching a 
decision interacted with I.O., but that the frequency of decisions that 
the I.O. event had occurred was not affected. He interpreted his 
results as being evidence of an interaction of value and subjective 
Probability. Such an interpretation makes certain assumptions about 
sequential decision making: He writes " ••• collect information until 
their expectation or confidence in the correctness of one of the 
alternatives attains some criterion magnitude. Given that the strength 
Of an expectation for an event is positively related to the desirability 
Of that event, this criterion level should be reached with less 
information for desirable than for undesirable alternatives". He assumes 
then that subjects decide with some fixed criterion level, that the less 
information they examine, the sooner that fixed criterion is reached, 
and that changes in sample size reflect changes in subjective probability 
in this way. 
Subjects in such an information acquisition task are faced with a 
dec· · ~s~on problem including information about samples and populations, the 
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payoffs for correct and incorrect decisions, the cost of purchasing 
information and the I.O. Changes in sampling behaviour may reflect 
many changes in subjects' perception of their task, and-only some of 
these may be due to change in subjective probability. To decide if 
interaction with value has taken place, we need to examine these kinds 
of change, and the more difficult question of what would constitute 
evidence for each of them. 
(I) It may be that subjects change their criterion level for decision 
due to a change in decision strategy, e.g. a subject is willing to accept 
a lower probability of success and make a riskier decision because of 
the introduction o~ payoffs which do not depend upon the correctness of 
decision. Alternatively the attractiveness of one of the outcomes 
might make the subject reluctant to decide that the other outcome seems 
to be the likely one, i.e. his sense of the likelihood of that hypothesis 
remains unchanged but his decision criterion changes - he is more 
hesitant. 
{2) It may be that there is a change in.subjective probability, so that 
subjects reach criterion level sooner for the decision that the 
attractive event has been prepared. Such a change might take one.of 
two forms. It could be a change in the prior odds of the hypotheses, 
e.g. before looking at any information the subject felt more certain 
that he had picked up the desirable deck. Alternatively the change is 
not in prior probability but the subject attached more weight to some 
Of the data than to others, e.g. where the I.O. deck contained 
Predominantly marked cards he would assume that a marked card had a 
h' l.gher P(O(I.I) than an unmarked one. 
It does not seem possible to separate these different hypotheses by 
considering sample size alone. If subjects were following at least 
approximately a Bayesian model then such strategy and probability 
changes might be indistinguishable. However if we also consider the 
relative frequency of decisions then we might be able to make some 
Predictions. If the samples from the alternative populations are not 
constrained to be unrepresentative, change in criterion should lead to 
change in the relative frequency of decisions as should changes in the 
prior probabilities and the P(n/H). 
The following four cases may be distinguished. 
Case A. Chan&e in sa11ple size, change in relative decision frequency. 
Case B. No change in sample size, change in frequency. 
Case c. No change'in either measure. 
Case D. Change in sample size, no change in frequency. 
183 
Where the results take the form of Case C, as in experiments 2-2 
and 2-3, then there is clearly no evidence of interaction. Case B is 
more difficult to interpret. If the composition of the samples at time 
ot either decision is roughly the same then it would seem that change 
in the relative frequency of decision was due to some attempt to take 
advantage of the payoff scheme, for exa11ple the case of subject M.N.F.3 
in experiment 2-2. 
Case D resembles the results of Morlock. Subjects take less 
information to decide that a desirable event has been presented, but 
they do not in fact decide more often that the desirable event has been 
Presented. They reach the criterion level sooner for a desirable e~ent. 
In practice this must mean that, where I.O. is associated with the 
Predominantly marked deck, subjects accept some number of marked and 
Unmarked cards as fulfilling the criterion when the sample is predominantly 
marked and a different ;g.umber: when .the .. .sample :is ·p~edonlinantly .unmarked. 
1 8.4 
Such a decision rule accepts a certain probability of error, and on 
average more errors would be made when the sample was predominantly 
marked. We should expect more "marked" decisions. Horlock did not 
find this. He does say· that each successive sample of ten cards 
reflected the overall proportion of the deck, and we might expect this 
to reduce the number of errors or even to allow very simple decision 
rules. His results may then be a function of his experimental design. 
If the s~~ples presented had been more representative results of Case 
D would seem to be evidence of a reluctance to decide. Subjects postpone 
their decision when they suspect that the less desirable event has been 
Presented in the h9pe that more favourable information will appear but 
eventually decide that the less desirable event has occurred. Such a 
conclusion does not favour the interaction hypothesis. 
If the results are an ex~~ple of Case A this would be evidence of 
a change in decision criterion due either to a change in decision 
strategy or to a change in subjective probability and these hypotheses 
are difficult to separate. It might be possible by examination of sample 
Contents at time of decision to separate a tendency towards risky 
decisions from the consistent change in criterion that we would expect 
from a change in subjective probability, especially when sample 
composition is compared from easy and more difficult decisions. 
To summarise, it is likely that with a choice of design similar to 
that of experiments 2-2 and 2-3 it is possible to decide among some 
interpretations of "interaction" behaviour in information acquisitions, 
~ith an emphasis on including more representative samples from the 
alternative populations. Such designs would avoid some of the difficulties 
Of interpretation posed by Morlock's results and would permit experiments 
185 
on interaction to be compared with studies of probability revision 
and optional stopping. 
Choosing among different interpretations of subjects' behaviour, 
deciding which changes are instances of the interaction of value and 
subjective probability and which of the interaction of value and decision 
strategy will depend on a more detailed understanding of the kinds of 
decision rule which subjects employ in these situations. For example 
some of the distinctions introduced here will depend on subjects 
approximating Bayesian rules to the extent that their decisions are 
~ 
consistent in terms of sample composition and that their behaviour 
varies with changes in prior probabilities and in the diagnosticity of 
~ 
data. It should be emphasised that a Bayesian situation could provide 
' 
the kind of structure for making decisions about interaction, especially 
in comparison with expanded judgment situations, rather than that such 
decisions could be made easily in the light of our present knowledge 
about subjective probability in decision making. 
CHAPTER ELEiEN. 
Experiments of Type 111. 
Payoff Dependent Upon The Evaluation of Gambles. 
The two previous chapters have examined variations of designs 
Which have been reported in the literature to yield evidence for the 
interaction of value and subjective probability. 
Host of the research in Psychology on decision making under risk 
has been concerned with the evaluation of gambles of the form win 
~mount A with the probability P or lose amount B with probability 
t~P. Experiments have asked subjects to name buying or selling prices 
for these gambles, or to choose between them in paired-comparison 
designs in an atte~pt to answer some 'traditional' questions-
to measure utility and subjective probability, 
to explore the possible role of variance and probability preferences 
in evaluation, 
to set up definitions of the term "risk", 
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and to examine consistency of choice and the transitivity of preferences. 
No research has been concerned explicitly with the interaction of 
Value or utility and subjective probability, although some authors 
have collected evidence, e.g. Anderson and Shanteau (1970) and Tversky 
(1967 a,b) found no support for the interaction hypothesis in factorial 
designs of evaluations, while Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) considered 
that a multiple regression analysis of evaluation showed support for 
the hypothesis. 
The experiments reported here have considered related problems. 
The first is that of showing an interaction effect in the evaluation of 
gambles without the measurement of utility and at the same time without 
having the relationship of the results to the question of interaction 
d' lsputed for that reason. The second problem is our central one of 
designing an experiment which might test the hypothesis about inter-
action from all three sections of this thesis. 
Experiment 3-2 approached these problems by considering certain 
features of subjects' evaluations of gambles which might show the 
independence o£ utility and subjective probability, namely 
(a) that the probability o£ winning should be given equal weight 
in evaluation as the probability of losing, and 
(b) that i£ a two-outcome gamble is considered as consisting of 
a win component {PW x AW) coupled with a lose component (PL x AL) then 
~ 
changes in one component should be independent of changes in the other. 
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By suitably holdin~ some of the variables constant, one can test whether 
changes in probabilities are independent o£ changes in payoffs. 
Experiment 3-3 considers the attention that subjects pay to the 
Probabilities of winning and losing under different payoff and present-
ation conditions. With a suitable choice of gambles and presentation 
orders one may test several hypotheses about the independence of payoffs 
and probability estimates. Subjects ar·e further asked to evaluate the 
Worth of these gambles to test if there are differences between their 
stated probabilities and the probabilities which they actually use when 
they are asked to risk money on them. 
Experiment 3-1 introduces the dependent variable, Marschak bids, 
Which is used in these experiments, and examines subjects' evaluations 
Of gambles which differ in the number of risk dimensions to be processed. 
This experiment will then serve as a standard for comparing the 
e~aluations of two-outcome gambles in experiment 3-2 and the three-
outcome gambles of experiment 3-3· 
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Experiment 3-1. 
This experiment was designed to study the effect on the evaluation 
of the worth of gambles of changes in the number of risk dimensions 
to be processed. Some understanding of these effects and of the methods 
of processing used by subjects was felt to be necessary before 
examination of how value and subjective probability might interact in 
the processing of similar gambles. 
Some recent experiments have studied gambling behaviour with the 
emphasis on the decision maker's ability to integrate several sources 
of information in reaching a single choice of judgment. Typically the 
independent variable has been some measure of the complexity of the 
stimuli, for example, the number of gambles to be decided among (Miller 
& Meyer,l966), the method of displaying the gamble (Hermann & Bahrick, 
1966), or knowledge of the outcomes of previous gambles (Meyer,l967). 
The dependent variable has been some measure of the extent to which 
SUbjects maximise expected value in their choices or evaluations. 
Their results show that processing con~iderations cannot be neglected 
in the study of risk-taking behaviour. 
This experiment takes as it's independent variable the number of 
risk dimensions to be processed in order to reach an evaluation of the 
OVerall worth of a gamble. 
There were five conditions with seven gambles in each condition; 
~ithin each condition the gam~les differed in their expected value. 
The seven expected values were : 0,6,12,18,24,30,and 36 (old) pence. 
The five conditions were-
!. G~bles with two outcomes; differences in expected value in this 
series were obtained by changing the payoffs while holding the 
Probabilities constant, e.g. 
(a) win 16 with probability o.6,lose 24 with probability 0.4 
(b) win 22 with probability o.6,lose 18 with probability 0.4 
2. Two-outcome gambles. Differences among gambles due -to changing 
Probabilities, e.g. 
(a) win 48 with probability 0.2, lose 12 with probability 0.8 
(b) win 48 with probability 0.3, lose 12 with probability 0.7. 
3. Three outcome gambles. Two winning outcomes and one losing outcome. 
Differences ~nong gambles due to change in probabilities. 
4. Three outcome gambles. Two winning outcomes and one losing • 
• 
Differences among gambles due to changes in payoffs. 
5. Three outcome g'mbles. One winning and two losing outcomes. 
Differences due to changing payoffs, with probabilities constant. 
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In conditions 4 and 5 the total probabilities of winning and losing 
are 0.6 and 0.4 respectively. 
Dependent variable. 
The subjects evaluated the worth to them of the gambles using the 
Marschruc bidding procedure introduced by Becker et al.(l964). Subjects 
are instructed to state the smallest amount of money for which they 
Would be willing to sell their right to play each of the gambles. 
Independently of the subjects' stated selling price(S), the experimenter 
chooses a buying price (B). If this B is larger than, or the same as s, 
the subject has sold his right to play the gamble and receives the 
bu~ing price, B. If B is smaller than S, the subject has not sold the 
gamble, and plays it to determine his win or his loss. , It is optimal 
for the subject to state only his "true worth" of the gamble as his 
Selling price. If, for example, he suggests a higher price than he 
1 ~nows it is worth then he reduces his chance of getting a good price for 
it·.;"' '~he offers it for less than it is worth he may sell the gamble for 
less than it's worth. The gamble would not be worth more than the 
amount to win or less than the amount to lose, so the subjects were 
instructed to keep their selling prices between these values. The 
experimenter explained that he had selected a ga~ble to be played in 
advance of knowing the prices, and that this gamble would be bought or 
sold at the end of the experiment. 
' The experimenter presented the thirty-five gambles to each of 
ten subjects who were asked to name their minimum sellin6 price for 
each gamble ~nd, at the end of the experiment, to discuss how they 
approached this task. 
Results. 
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If we take as our measure of subjects' ability to estimate selling 
Prices for the gambles the correlation between their responses and the 
expected values of the gambles, then their behaviour was accurate and 
there was little difference in accuracy due to the number of risk 
dimensions to be processed. Table 3II shows the correlations for the 
five groups of gambles, each correlation involving 70 gambles. 
Table 3II. Correlations between bids and expected value. 
Group. 
1. 2 outcome, fixed probabilities. 0.837 
2. 2 outcome, fixed payoffs. 0.721 
3. 3 outcome, 2 winning, fixed payoffs. 0.724 
4. 3 outcome, 2 winning, fixed probabilities. 0.770 
5. 3 outcome, 2 losins, fixed probabilities. 0.864. 
In addition, for eacl1 subject's selling prices, Kendall's 
Coefficient of Concordance (Siegel,l956) was computed to yield a measure 
Of the internal consistency of bids in the five conditions. These 
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coefficients were high, respectively 0.75, 0.9I,0.85,0.93,0.85,0.94, 
0.98,0.86,0.99 and 0.77 for the ten subjects, sucgesting that subjects' 
orderings of the gambles in attractiveness was very similar in all 
conditions. 
Subjedts' bids (selling prices) were characterised by overbidding, 
i.e. a tendency ±or the selling price named to be higher than the 
expected value of the gamble; the mean bids for conditions I to 5 
respectively were 22.43,22.67,23.56.26,73, and 19.3, while the mean 
expected value was 18.0 
• 
Tversky (1967a) has reported similar results over the range of 
expected values, but Coombs et al.(l967) found a tendency towards under-
~ 
bidding except for gambles of low expected value which were overestimated. 
Examination of median bids at each expected value level (Table 312 and 
Figure 3II) suggest that in this experiment subjects tended to over-
estimate low expected value and to be more accurate (in the sense of 
being closer to expected value) in gambles of higher value. Categorising 
the responses according to whether they show overbidding, underbidding, 
or are equal to expected value shows further that there was a tendency 
towards overbidding in low E.V.gambles but that overbidding and under-
bidding were equally prevalent in gambles of higher E.V.(Table 313). 
Although this effect was reproduced in all conditions (Table 314), 
responses in condition 5, the condition with gambles of 3 outcomes, 2 
Of Which were losing, seem to be lower than the responses in other 
conditions (see Table 312 and the overall mean bids). Analysis of 
Variance of responses shows a significant effect due to differences in 
conditions and a significant interaction between conditions and level 
Of expected value. Table 315 gives the variance table of this analysis. 
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The finding that bids for· gambles with two losing outco~es were 
. lower than those for the other 3-outcome gambles, together with the 
finding that correlations of bids with E.V. were higher. when probabilities 
were fixed and changes in value were due to changes in payoffs,suggests 
an emphasis by subjects on the payoffs in the ga~bles, a result 
reported by Dale (1959), Lindman (1965), and Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968a). 
Table 3I2. Hedian Bids of Subjects. 
E.v. Groups I and 2 • 3 and 4. 5{2 losing outcomes) 
• 
0 6.5 6.5 5 
6 10 10 8 
l2 14.5 16 14 
18 20 21 18 
24 24 24 22 
30 30 34 27 
36 35 37·5 35 
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Table 313. 
Over-and underbidding by E.V. for all conditions. 
E.v. 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 
No.overbid 48 38 31 32 29 22 25 
No.eval EV 2 4 10 6 1 8 0 
No.underbid 8 9 12 20 20 25 
Table 314. 
Over- and underbidding by condition. 
1 2 3 4 5 
overbid 41 47 47 54 35 
e.val. 8 ~5 3 5 10 
Underbid 21 18 20 11 25 
Table 315. 
Variance Table. Subjects' bids. 
Source. d. f. l1S F Fo.o1. 
E.V.(A) 6 7116.55 
Conditions(8) 4 503.41 4.85 3·89 
Subjects (S) 9 1232.71 
AB 24 85.09 3.02 1.88 
As 54 75·38 
Bs 36 104.29 
ABs 216 28.21 
Total 349 
F-ratio for B = H.S.B/M.S. BS 
AB = H.S.AB/M.S.ABS 
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~~en they had completed the experiment, subjects were asked to 
describe how they had reached their selling price figure and what 
difference, if any, they had found between dealing with two- and three-
outcome gambles. 
Eight out of ten subjects described their behaviour in ter:ns of 
"averaging", reducing the amounts to be won and lose, A1il and AL, by 
some amount depending on the relative sizes of the probabilities. While 
this seems similar to the kind of calculation involved in working out the 
expected value (PWxAW-PLxAL), subjects did not claim to work out the 
Price in detail, e.g. 11 I tried to work out the average ••• Used the 
range of payoffs ~to reach a figure ••• the amount to win plus the amount 
to lose ••• some figure obtained by weighting numbers by their probabilities. 
Not very much influenced by absolute size of payoffs, only with range 
of bet". 
The remaining two subjects' responses were characterised by over-
b~dding and in several instances they quoted as their minimum selling 
Price the winning payoff. They said,·. 
''they looked good bets ••• I did not want to sell them.~-. the amount to 
lose negligible except when chances of winning small.", and 
"A loss of 6 not very much ••• I am a bit reckless- a loss of 12, would 
make me thiruc ••• perhaps if I was playing the gambles as I went along it 
Would look worse ••• take a chance on worse looking bets ••• (v!hen 48, 
Which was the winning payoff, was offered for a series of gambles). 
For these bets I would be disappointed to sell for any less". Both 
these subjects' responses could be considered as evidence of utility for 
gambling. 
Most of the subjects (seven out o! ten) thought the three-outcome. 
gambles no more difficult to evaluate than two-outcome ones, and all 
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said that they processed the three-outcome gamble by reducing it to a 
two-outcome one by combining two similar outcomes, e.g. combining the two 
winning outcomes and then evaluating the resulting two-outcome gamble. 
Conclusions. 
Subjects seem able to use }larschak bids in a consistent way. 
Increasing the number of dimensions in the gamble to be processed does 
not lead to any changes in the distribution of responses. This finding 
is contrary to that of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) who concluded, 
"Another related finding is that the degree to which a person maximises 
EV when choosing among gambles decreases as the number of risk dimensions 
that need to be pr6cessed increases (Herman and Bahrick,l966). Apparently 
the greater complexity resulting from the need to integrate a larger 
number of risk dimensions into a decision leads persons to employ models 
of processing that are incompatible with the EV model 11 (p.l6). Our 
finding would suggest too that the interaction of value and subjective 
Probability' in the evaluation of two-outcome gambles is not necessarily 
due to an inability to integrate the available information correctly. 
The distribution of subjects' responses in all conditions is 
similar to a pattern reported in the literature; Ga~bles of low EV 
are overestimated, and this tendency decreases with higher EV. 
Subjedts' responses are consistent with an expectation model which 
Would involve the division of each payoff by it's associated probability 
and the addition of these over the outcomes. Subjects' co~~ents about 
averaging, using the range of the payoffs, and ignoring the losing payoff 
together with the seeming dependence of their selling prices on the payoff 
d' ~mensions suggest that another model descriptive of their evaluations 
Would be the ''starting point and adjustment procedure" of Slovic and 
196 
Lichtenstein (l968a), where the subject considers first the winning 
payoff and then reduces this by some figure based on an estimate of the 
Probabilities and the amount to lose, co~bined in some way. 
If some expectation model is a better descriptive model, then 
interaction of value and subjective probability might take the form that 
the fractions in the division operation would vary not only with the 
size of the probability but also with the size of the payoff to be 
divided. If a complex model like the "starting point and adjustment 
Procedure" is needed then the interaction of value and subjective 
Probability might involve a quite complex relationship between 
Probabilities and ~ayoffs. 
Experiment 3-2 will consider a test of the interaction hypothesis 
based on the simpler assumption that subjects, in the evaluation of 
gambles, follow some model close to an expectation one. This assumption 
has not been contradicted by this study. 
Fig •. 3-I-I. 
Median. s_elling prices and expected value. 
selling price 
~0 
2.0 
20 
expected value. 
3o2n 
3o2p 
2o 
l·>---)(.---·-
·--
40 
3o2n. uambles with three outcomes,two negative. 
302p n. , two positive. 
2 o Tw o-ou to ome gambles. 
19 7 
198 
!xperiment 3-2. 
We can view two-outcome gambles as consisting of four risk 
dimensions - the amount to win (AW), the chances of wi~ning (Fw), the 
amount to lose (AL), and the chances of losing (PL). The subject's 
task is to integrate these sources of information into an overall 
judgment of the worth of the gamble, such as a minimum selling price. 
The expected value model would predict integration of the form (AW X PW) 
(AL X PL), where the subject would weight the payoffs by the probabilities 
and sum these judgments over the :: outcomes of the gamble. 
This experiment examines two forms that the interaction of value 
and subjective probability in the gamble might take : 
~ 
i. That the subjective probability of winning differs from the subjective 
Probability of losing when the objective probability in the gamble is 
Constant, i.e. weruc interaction between value and subjective probability. 
ii. That the subjective probability of winning is dependent on the 
amount to be lost in the gamble; or that the subjective probability of 
losing is dependent on the amount to be won in the gamble, i.e. a form 
Of strong interaction between value and subjective probability. 
llypothesis One. 
Several authors have used regression models to describe the 
behaviour of subjects whose task is to make some evaluation of stimuli 
~hich vary along several dimensions, e.g., Hoffman (1960) and Huber et al. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) applied a linear regression model 
Of the form 
Judgment = u + w!PW + w2All + w3PL + w4AL 
to subjects' evaluations of the attractiveness of gambles. Two of 
their findings are of particular interest here. 
(a) "the enormous differences in. weights, both within and between 
subjects ••• these data indicate that the responses of many subjects 
were overwhelmingly determined by one or two of the risk dimensions 
and were remarkably unresponsive to large changes in the values of the 
less important factors",(pp.8&9), 
(b) the responses of two-thirds of the subjects were influenced more 
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by PW than PL. "This finding even violates the axiomatic {uninterpreted) 
S.E.U. model because it indicates an interaction between subjective 
Probability and utility" (P.9). 
This experiment will attempt to fit a linear regression model to 
subjects' evaluations of the attractiveness of selected gambles to 
examine 
i. if there is a difference in the weights attached to Fw and PL, 
and 
ii. subjects' statements about the relative importance of ~i and PL 
in making their evaluations, and to compare these stated "weights" 
With the regression weights. 
Hypothesis Two. 
The problem facing the experimenter was one of devising some 
method of testing for interaction in the evaluation of gambles without 
measuring utility or subjective probability and without having the 
conclusions invalidated for that reason. 
For simple one-outcome gambles, the interaction term in a two-way 
analysis of variance of bids {in logarithmic form) has been tested, 
With the significance of that term taken as evidence of interaction, 
by Tversky (1967a,b) and Anders~n and Shanteau (1970). There are 
certain problems in making inferences from the significance of the 
interaction term in an analysis of variance, e.g. interactions may arise 
merely from the measurement scale of the response or may be due to floor, 
200 
ceiling and anchor effects (Anderson,l969). 
When the analysis is of two-outcome gambles, e.g. the significance 
of the Bilinear interaction term in the Functional Measurement model of 
Anderson and Shanteau (1970), there are also problems of interpretation 
When several interactions are tested and only some are significant. 
For these reasons, existing tests of interaction of y,alue and 
subjective probability in the evaluation of two-outcome gambles seem 
Unsatisfactory, and we might look elsewhere for a solution to the 
Problem concerning us. 
" 
A partial solution. 
Let us consiqer firstly the effect upon changes in the worth or 
expected value of a gamble of changes in the probability of winning. 
The expected value of a gamble is E.V.= (AW x PW) + (AL x PL). If we 
hold AW constant then changes in the value of the bet with changes in 
Pw should be independent of the value of the lose component of the bet. 
Thus we may hold AW and PL constant and, without attempting to measure 
Utility, test the dependence of ~~ on AL. In an identical fashion we 
may study the dependence of PL on AW. 
For example, AW may be held constant at 30 units. The following 
distributions of E.V. may be obtained. 
l. PL = 1/2, AL = 20 
1/5 
2/5 
3/5 
4/5 
EV 
-4 
2 
8 
14 
difference 
6 
6 
6 
l-'L = 1/2, AL = 10. 
P.'l EV 
1/5 1 
2/5 7 
3/5 13 
4/5 19 
difference 
6 
6 
6 
Unfortunately the same method cannot be applied to study the 
dependence of PW on transformations in AW without making assumptions 
about the form of the subject's utility function. To ·take another 
Value of AW would change the factor by which the ga~bles differ in 
E.V.,e.g.to take AW of 20 in the example would make the difference 
equal four. We could change AW so that the factors changed in some 
constant proportion to each other, and assume or try to fit a ratio 
scale of utility of the form u=kA () , but this does not solve our 
Problems, e.g. 
I. \'ihich val~e of ()are we to assume? Tversky (1967b) found that the 
Utility of the winning outcome was practically linear (0.9~ ~:= 
~ 
I.I) for all bu~ one subject(&= 0.77). The utility of the losing 
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outcomes was practically linear for four subjects and concave (1.2~~) 
!or all the rest. Stevens and Galanter (1962) however found that their 
Values of~ were compatible with theories of decreasing marginal utility 
and were around 0.50. 
2. It is difficult to estimate the value of ~ without making assumptions 
~bout the invariance of the subjective probabilit~ function,e.g. 
Tversky (1967b) assu~ed that s(p)+ s(not p) =1. 
3. We would have to make the unsupported assumptions that .G · was·; ccmstant 
over different ranges of the amount of money used and that we could use 
the same exponent for the amount to win and lose. 
The E.V.of a gamble is (AW x PW)-(AL x PL). This gamble may be 
rewritten EV.I-EV.2. In this way it can be seen that the subject's 
evaluation. of (AW x PW) should be independent of the 'lose component• 
or EV.2 of the gamble. If, in addition, one held the value of AW 
constant, then PW should be independent of EV.2 and be unaffected by 
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changes in the value of AL and PL. It should be noted that the subject 
is not asked to give separate estimates of.these components but only 
an evaluation of the overall worth of the gamble. 
Design. 
To examine if PW was independent of EV.2 (and PL of EV.l) it was 
decided to keep AW(or AL) constant, and vary PW(or PL) over a range of 
Values. Changes in the evaluation of different gambles should then be 
constant; this may be examined by looking at the slope of the regression 
line relating subjects' evaluations to the probability of winning 
(or PL). The. slope of such lines depends only on the values of AW and 
PW selected (see Figs. 3-2-I and 2). Such an analysis makes no assumptions 
about the utility of AW, only that it remains constant. Analysis of 
the dependence of ~~ on AW or of PL on AL would demand certain assumptions 
about the measurement of utility. 
Duplex gambles were prepared, where the outcome of the gamble is 
decided by the simultaneous throwing of two dice, one determining the 
SUbject's winnings and the other his lQsses. This form of gamble, 
introduced by Slavic and Lichtenstein (1968a), was chosen so that the 
Probability of winning could take on all values in a selected range, 
~hile the probability of losing could be held constant. Such a choice 
also means that the four risk dimensions for the regression analysis 
~OUld be independent. 
Two t se s of gambles were prepared: 
Set 1. 
Set 2. 
AW 48p. PL 3/6 (three sides of loss dice). 
PW takes the values, 1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6. 
AL 5,15,32,64,84,90p. 
AL 48p. PW 3/6. 
PL takes the values, 1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6. 
AW 5,15,32,64,84,90p. 
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There were this 60 gambles in all, 30 in each set. 
The particular values of AW and AL were chosen so that one would 
have groups of gambles where, 
i. all had positive expected value, 
ii.somehad positive and some had negative expected value, 
iii.all had negative expected value. 
Response Measures. 
Subjects were asked to make a Harschak bid for the gamble. Rather 
than state the amount of money they were prepared to bid, they moved 
a pointer along the covered side of a ruler. The experimenter could 
then read off the value chosen by the subject on the reverse of the 
~ 
ruler. The only markings on the subject's side of the ruler were 
90,45,0,-45, and-90p. 
Such a response measure was selected, 
(a) to provide a continuous response scale, 
{b) to avoid 'residual number preferences', and 
(c) because, since the experiment was ·.concerned with changes in the 
evaluations of gambles, it was felt that this procedure might be more 
sensitive to such changes. 
After the experiment the subject was asked to rate on a ten-point 
scale the importance to him of the four risk dimensions. Eckenrode 
(1965) and Hoepfl and Huber (1970) have discussed and applied such 
rating scales. 
Seven undergraduates from the University of Keele acted as subjects. 
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Results. 
Table 3-2-I presents the results relating to the first hypothesis 
that the probabilities of winning and losing would be-assigned different 
Weights by the subjects. 
The table includes the results of twelve subjects; after this 
experiment had been conducted with seven subjects as reported above, 
the results of the analysis of the slope data relevant to Hypothesis 2 
suggested the presentation of a further series of similar gambles to 
another five subjects. Since the correlations between expected value 
and the four~risk dimensions, and the mean and standard deviation of 
the expected values were the same in both series of gambles, the results 
for all the twelve subjects are presented here together. 
As the four risk dimensions, AW,~l,AL and PL, are themselves 
uncorrelated, the simple correlations between these risk dimensions 
and subjects' bids will equal the weights in a linear regression 
equation, .and may be interpreted as providing information about the 
relative importance of each dimension,in determining the bids. These 
correlations are presented in the table, together with the correlations 
between expected value and the risk dimensions and with the statistic 
lOOR2 , the coefficient of determination, which is 100 times the square 
Of the multiple correlation coefficient and indicates the percentage 
of the variation of the dependent variable (the bids) due to regression 
(Smillie,l966). 
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!able .2-2-I. Correlations of risk dimensions and bid.s. 
Subject AW FVI AL J?L IOOR2 
1 0.324 403 -354 -332 50.39 
2 449 336 -49I -520 .82.66 
3 502 394 -436 -453 80.39 
4 388 324 -639 -277 74.23 
5 355 533 .-284 -558 80.34 
6 525 348 -539 -324 79.29 
7 643 358 -539 -326 93·93 
8 " 442 382 -542 -375 77.55 
9 424 453 -373 -523 79.9I 
10 499 348 -44I -467 78.3! 
11 527 236 -532 -384 76.4! 
~ .. 12 342 459 -476 -452 75.90 
E.v. 400 -400 
Exa~ination of the table suggests two results relevant to the hypothesis: 
(a) Except for the·first subject*, the linear regression model provides 
a good fit to the subjects' responses, with from 74.23% to 93.93% of 
the variation of bids due to regression. Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968a) reported tne average multiple correlation for their subjects to 
be 0.86, which would yield a coefficient of determination of 73.96%. 
(b) Inspection of the correlations of J?W and PL with response does not 
reveal any large or systematic differences. There are some differences 
between subjects in the size of correlations, but none diverge greatly 
from 0.4 and -0.4, the correlations of the expected value model. It is 
• 
! Even with this subject, analysis of variance showed the F ratio 
bor regression to be 13.97 with .d.f. 4 and 55, which is significant 
eyond the o.oi level. 
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difficult to evaluate the size of differences in isolation, but only 
two subjects (2 and 11) had differences larger than O.IO. These results 
do not replicate those of Slovic. and Lichtenstein (1~68a) who report 
Very large differences in the subjects they select as extreme cases, 
e.g.PW and PL resped.tively, 0.76, -O.I9; 0.82, ... 0.33; 0.42, -0.69; 
0.8r, -0.27; 0.38 and -O.II. They write, "These S's were chosen to 
emphasize these differences, but even for the entire group, an S's 
highest correlation with a dimension was, on the average, twice the size 
of his lowest correlation. These inequalities of weighting across 
dimensions have been replicated several times using real play conditions 
and as many as 8I gambles instead of 27. "The authors have then 
. 
replicated their principal findings in different experimental situations; 
these results have not been replicated here in an experiment which seems 
similar in all respects to at least some of their experiments. This 
experiment was carried out with a small number of subjects; the results 
are similar to the group average results of large numbers of subjects 
in Slovic and Lichtenstein's study (~heir averages for AW,PW,AL and PL 
are 0.36, 0.48, -0.40 and -0.39 for a rating response group, and 0.38, 
o.~o, -0.50 and -0.33 for a bidding response group); this suggests 
that large discrepan~ies in the weights assigned to Rf and PL may be 
characteristic of only some subjects, and might only .. be evident in studies 
of large numbers of subjects. Further research could explore this 
Possibility and the relationship of such behaviour to other character-
istics of such subjects e.g. through the use of personality tests. 
The second kind of evidence for the interaction of value and subjective 
Probability i.e. apart from differences in Rv and PL of individual 
SUbjects is the finding of Slovic and Lichtenstein that ''the responses 
Of approximately 2/3 of the S's were influenced more by PW than PL". 
They did not seem to consider how much bigger one was than the other, 
but only the distribution of differences over all subjects. Out of 
twelve possible scores in this experiment, six subjects had Pw greater 
than PL, and six smaller; there are not enough scores to confirm or 
reject the hyp9thesis. 
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Table 3-2-2 compares the correlations of Hl and PL with responses and 
the subjects' own rating of the importance of these dimensions in his 
evaluations of the gambles. Six subjects said that these dimensions 
were of equal importance; of the remaining six, five of the suggested 
differences were not in the same direction as differences in correlations. 
Either the subjects did not know how to answer the question, understand 
how to use the rating scale or have much insight into their approach to 
the task. It seems from conversations with them that the questions did 
not seem related to how they carried out the task, which involved 
averaging and estimating numbers, each of which had equal weight (or 
rather, they did not seem to have considered that they might not have 
had equal weight). In any case, such .. a rating scale or "self-explicated 
Processing model" seems of limited use for these subjects in this 
context. 
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!able 3-2-2. Subjects' weighting of Pil and PL, stated and inferred. 
Correlations Ratings 
Subject. P.V . PL Ft.v PL 
1 0.403 -0.332 0.600 0.600 
2 336 520 500 500 
3 394 453 800 500 
4 324 277 530 470 
5 533 558 800 650 
6 348 324 500 500 
7 358 326 500 500 
8 382 375 500 500 
9 453 523 700 620 
10 348 467 800 Boo 
. 11 236 384 730 280 
12 459 452 690 850 
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The second hypothesis of this experiment considers the independenee 
of PW and AL; and the independence of PL and AW. The test of this 
hypothesis will best be illustrated by considering t~e former case. 
Interaction is said to occur if the magnitude of changes in the perceived 
worth of gambles due to changes in PW is dependent upon the value of AL 
in the gambles. 
This hypothesis was tested by examining the slope, m, of the 
regression line, y+mx+k, of Y upon X, where Y is the subject's response 
and X is the number of winning sides on the dice. The slope of this 
line should•be the same no matter what the value of AL, although of 
course the value of k, the Y-intercept, will change as AL changes. 
~ 
Analysis was carried out on the grouped data of all subjects at each AL 
level. At each level the regression line of Y upon X was fitted by 
least-squares method. A similar analysis was carried out for the gambles 
Which examined the independence of PL and AW. 
Table 3-2-3 presents for each payoff group the slope and intercept 
Of the regression lines with the squ~re of the correlation coefficient, 
an estimate of the strength of the linear relationship in the data 
(Hays, 1963). 
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!able 3-2-3. 
Slopes and Intercepts of Regression Lines. 
I. AVl 48. 
AL. M K v R R2 
5 5.049 13.877 5168.217 0.507 0.257 
15 11.674 -21.309 4428.597 0.826 0.682 
32 9.823 -19.526 5598.329 0.739 0.546 
64 14.366 -45.326 10635.449 0.759 0.576 
84 11.811 -62.657 12479.493 0.663 0.439 
90 13-371 -56.486. 16486.354 0.657 0.432 
2. AL 48. 
AW M K v R R2 
5 
- 8.323 3·780 3976.699 -0.741 0.549 
15 
- 8.09I 6.394 6234.151 -0.65I 0.424 
32 
- 9."486 21.623 5I97·525 -0.740 0.548 
64 
-11.723 49.59I 6262.125 ·-o. 778 0.605 
84 
-14.674 66.206 13747.083 -0.723 0.523 
90 
-15.411 67.49! !2448.677 -0.756 0.57I 
2 11 
The interaction hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that the slopes 
of the regression lines are different, may be tested by an F-test for 
differences in slopes. Guest (1966)shows that the ratio of the weighted 
sum of the squared deviations of slopes from their mean slope to the 
sum of squared residuals is distributed as F with (r-I,n-2r) degrees 
of freedom, where r is the number of different slopes and n is the total 
number of paired observations. Table 3-2-4 shows the results of this 
analysis for the two groups of gambles. The differences in both sets 
of slopes were significant at the 0.05 level, thus permitting the null 
hypothesis to be rejected. 
~ble 3-2-4. F- test of slopes; Experiment Part I. 
1. Dependence of PW on AL. 
Mean m = 11.0I6. d. f. 
W (m 2 
- m) = 384o.48 5 
v2 
=54796.439 198 
2. Dependence of PL on AW. 
Mean m = 
- 11.283 d. f. 
W(m )2= 3563.876 5 
- m 
v2 
=47886.26 198 
d.f. 5/od p = 0.05, F = 2.214 
p = o.or, F = 3.02 
MS 
768.096 
276.749 
MS 
712.775 
241.748 
F 
2.77 
F 
2.94 
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Interpretation of these results will be facilitated by examining 
Figs.3-2-I,2,3 and 4 which compare the regression lines for the expected 
Value model and the line of best fit to subjects' responses. The slope 
of the expected value line is 8 or -8, although we do not expect that 
the slopes of subjects' lines will necessarily be close to 8. Never-
theless the slopes should not be different from each other in the 
different payoff groups. A small slope would mean that changes in the 
perceived value of the gamble due to changes in probabilities was small, 
that is the gamble is not seen to change much in value when PW is 1/6 
and when ~is 5/6. Similarly a large slope shows that the gamble 
changes greatly in value with increases in the probability of winning. 
This reasoning also applies to the gambles testing the dependence of PL 
on At.Y. It seems from these results that, instead of remaining constant, 
the slope of the line seems to correlate with the other component of 
the gamble, a nonparametric test of correlation, Spearman's Rank 
Correlation Coefficient gives correlations of 0.772 and 0.943 for the 
two sets of slopes, N=6 and r at sig~ificance levels of .05 and .OI 
being 0.829 and 0.943. 
The particular values of payoffs had been chosen so that, of the 
six sets of gambles, two sets would have gambles with positive expected 
Value, two would all have negative expectation, and two sets would both 
cross· the E.V.:O point (see Fig.3-2-I and 2). It might be thought, that 
if there were evidence of interaction, the slopes would be largest in the 
two "crossover" sets, with a large difference in value as the E.V. 
changed in sign, and the slopes would be smallest when all gambles in 
the set:had E.V. of the same sign and differences between gambles might 
not be so important. Examination of the slopes in the two sets shows no 
support for this hypothesis, and the dependence seems to be on the 
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absolute value of the payoffs, which would have implications for the 
way in which subjects process gambles - the wider the range of payoffs 
in the gambles, the larger the difference between them as probabilities 
change. 
Since there was a large difference between the slopes when the 
payoff in the other component was 5 and when it was 90, it was decided 
to construct another series of gambles with the emphasis on these 
payoffs, and present it to another group of subjedts. 
Again, there were two groups of gambles, one group to exa~ine the 
dependence 6f PW on the lose component, and one to examine the 
dependence of PL on the win compodent. The lose component took on the 
four values - AL = 5 with PL of 1/6 and 5/6, and AL 90 with PL of 
1/6 and 5/6. For the win component replace AL by PW and PL by PW. 
The Gambles. 
I. AW 48p. Pd takes on the values 1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6. The lose 
component was a factorial design PL x AL,AL taking the values 5p and 90p, 
and PLcthe values 1/6 and 5/6. 
2. AL 48p. PL 1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6. 
Win component 5p and 90p, paired with 1/6 and 5/6. 
There were forty gambles in all, and five undergraduates acted as 
SUbjects. Table 3-2-5 presents the lines of best fit for the different 
groups of gambles, and Table 3-2-6 the results of analysis of the slope 
data. 
Table 3-2-5. Slopes and Intercepts of Regression Lines. 
I. AW 48. 
AL PL M K v 
5 1/6 3.828 23.820 3343.0IO 
5 5/6 5-856 7.464 4600.858 
90 1/6 10.164 -16.140 6043.558 
90 5/6 7-524 -76.044 2867.782 
2. AL 48. 
AW PVi M K v 
5 1/6 
-2.78!+ -24.912 3467.405 
5 5/6 
-8.436 5-916 1866.694 
90 1/6 
-13.080 32.616 ?433.626 
90 5/6 
-8.904 ?3.896 2751.293 
~b1e 3-2-6. 
1. Dependence of PW on ALxPL. 
mean m = 6.843. d. f. 
W(m-m)2 = I076.859 3 
v2 I6855.208 92 
2. Dependence of PL on AW x PW. 
mean m • -8.30I d. f. 
W(m -H)2 = 2693·74 3 
v2 15519.018 92 
d.f. = 3/120 P = 0.05, F=2.68 
P = o.or, F=3·95 
R 
o.424 
0.52I 
0.679 
0.705 
R 
-0.317 
-8.810 
-0.?31 
-Or. 768.· 
M_S. 
358.953 
183.208 
H S. 
897.913 
168.684 
21.4 
R2 
O.I79 
0.27I 
o.46I 
0.497 
R2 
0.100 
0.656 
0.534 
0.589 
F. 
1.95 
F. 
5·32 
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The results of the F-test show that the difference between slopes in 
the P~ group did not reach significance at the 0.05 level, while the 
difference in the PL group was significant beyond the 0.01 level. While 
the results are not as clear as the results of the previous set of 
gambles, it does seem that the trend of the results is similar,i.e. 
there is some dependence' of probability on the other component of the 
gamble, and the dependence seems to be on the absolute value of the 
Payoff. In the ~v group, while the difference between slopes is not 
significant, the two low payoff groups are below the mean and the two 
high payoffs above. 
Taken together, the data relevant to the second hypothesis suggest 
that there is evidence of interaction of value and subjective-probability 
in this experiment. While the analysis has been on the grouped responses 
of different subjects, it makes an interesting comparison with the 
results of individual subjects' regression weights of the first hypo-
thesis, and the results of Anderson and Shanteau (1970). In their 
analysis of subjects' ratings of the,worth of gambles, using Integration 
theory, they found that : 
"T est of fit. -The adding model may be tested with standard analysis of 
variance. Only the group analyses are reported since the single-S 
I 
analyses gave the same general picture •••• with one exception, the two-way 
interaction tests •• support the model. The three-way interactions, in 
contrast, cast some doubt on the adding model •••• The adding model predicts 
that all three-way interactions should be nonsignificant; that five of 
eight are significant raises a serious question about the model. ••• In 
summary, no regularity was found in the data to account for the observed 
three-way interactions 11 (pp.447-8). The results of experiment 3-2 are 
Si ·1 ( ) m~ ar to those of Anderson and Shanteau 1970 , although regression 
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procedures were used in~tead of analysis of variance techniques. In 
their model the three-way interactions would correspond to the "dependence 
on the other component" considered here,e.g. such an_interaction would be 
PWxALxPL. Of their two-way interactions, four concern us here -
PWxAL and PLxAW (each appear in two analyses). On both occasions the 
former had F-ratio less than one, but the latter had F-raties of 
3·55(2.96) and 2.50(2.60), the Fat 0.05 significance level appearing 
in parentheses. These results suggest that the exploration of such 
interactions should give much information about the processing of gambles. 
The results of the slope analysis of subjects' responses show that 
there is evidence of an interaction effect, and consideration of the 
results of Anderson and Shanteau (1970) suggests a similar interaction 
in their data. It is necessary then to investigate the results further 
in an attempt to discover what this interaction means in terms of the 
Processing of gambles. The task facing the subject was not to make a 
judgement concerning the difference between gambles, but to look at one 
and evaluate it's attractiveness to ~im, before seeking and evaluating 
the next one. 
In terms of evaluating a series of gambles, we may consider, in 
this experiment, that a small slope means that changes in the perceived 
Value of the gambles as probabilities changed was small, and that 
similarly a large slope is a result of large changes in the perceived 
Value as probabilities changed. The gambles had been so arranged that 
these changes should be uniform, i.e. a constant slope, but it seems from 
the results of the first part of the experiment, and also though perhaps 
to a lesser extent of the second part, that these changes in perceived 
Value were not uniform, but depended on the size of the payoff in the 
other component of the gamble. 
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To discover why this should be the case, it was decided to look 
more closely at the relationship between the evaluations and the 
expected values of the gambles, to see why, relative.to the E.V. model, 
Whose slope is eight, subjects seem in some cases to neglect information, 
e.g. slopes of 5.049 and 3.828, and in other cases to overemphasize 
the information with slopes of 13.37I and IO.I64. 
It can be seen from Figs. 1,2,3 & 4 that the large number of data 
points and lines which overlap make it difficult to examine the relation-
ship between fitted lines and expected value. In order to clarify the 
situation the following discussion considers only a sa~ple of the 
subjects' responses. From the first part of the experiment, only the 
lines where AL=5 and 90 and AW=5 and 90 are considered, since these are 
the extreme values of these payoffs and we are interested in a correlation 
between change in probabilities and payoff size. From the second part 
Of the experiment the lines examined were PL 1/6, AL 5 and 90, PW 1/6, 
AW 5 and 90, as these sets of data showed the greatest difference in 
slopes. In addition, it was decided,to look at the mean bids of the 
SUbjects rather than the points derived from the least-square line. 
Table 3-2-7 presents the mean bids of the subjects for these 
gambles, and Figures 3-2-5 & 6 compare the mean bids with the expected 
Values of the gambles. 
Our concern is to examine the distribution of these mean bids with 
regard to the expected values. These distributions are presented here 
in tabular form. 
~~00. 
(A) when AL is small, all gambles 
overestimated, and little 
d' ~fference seen between them 
PART TWO. 
when AL is small, all gambles 
overestimated, little difference 
between them; a smaller PW than 
in part I, and smaller slope. 
PART ONE. 
(B) when AL large, overestimate 
When chance of winning high, and 
underestimate when chance of 
winning low. 
(C) when AW small, overestimate 
when chances of losing low, and 
similar to E.V.when chances of 
losing higher. 
(D) when AW large, overestimate 
When chances of ~osing low,under-
estimate when chances of losing 
high. 
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PART TVlO. 
when AL large, all gambles 
overestimated,(PL is low), but this 
overestimation_tends to increase 
with the probability of winning. 
w~en AW small, consistent 
underestimation of gambles. 
when AW is large, overestimate 
until the chances of losing are 
large, then under-estimate. 
This Table suggests then that when the payoff in the other component 
Of the gamble is small, the subject overestimates or underestimates the 
Value of the gamble consistently and,pays little attention to the 
Probability in the measured component, e.g. if AL is _5, the gamble is 
overestimated and is not seen to change much in value with PW. When the 
Payoff in the other component is large, however, the subject pays more 
attention to this probability dimension, for example the gamble might 
seem poor when this probability is low and good when it is high, e.g.in 
Part I, case (B) above. 
The implication of this is surely that subjects do not pay some 
Uniform amount of attention to each of the risk dimensions, as is 
suggested by the use of the beta weights in a regression analysis of the 
set of gambles, as in the first hypothesis of this experiment and in 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a). The amount of attention that he will 
Pay to any probability dimension will depend in some sense on the overall 
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appearance of the gamble. The subject seems to concentrate his attention 
on those aspects of a particular gamble, and in this sense we have 
demonstrated an interaction effect in his evaluations of the gambles. 
vlliile we may not be happy with beta weights as summarisers of 
subjects' responses, these findings would seem to support the notion of 
a two-stage process in the evaluation of gambles. Slovic and Lichtenstein 
Write: "The bidding and rating tasks can be conceptualized as involving 
a two-stage process. In stage I S decides whether the bet is one he 
Would or would not like to play. In Stage 2 he quantifies his first 
bipolar judgment by indicating the degree to which he likes or dislikes 
the bet".(l968,p.ll). Again, it would seem that the payoffs play a 
significant role~in determining whether the gamble will be seen as 
attractive. 
The form that these results take suggest the author that some 
distinction should be made between interaction in the evaluation process 
and interaction in the perception of the probabilities. With the 
assumption that the utility of the payoffs was not dependent on the 
Probabilities, we could infer from these arrangements of gambles subjective 
Probability distributions under the different payoff values. In some 
cases, there could not properly be said to be any subjective probability 
distribution at all, unless it were a totally flat one, while in other 
cases the distributions would be very steep. Such large differences 
have not been claimed by other experimenters who have presented evidence 
for the interaction of value and subjective probability. It would be 
better to claim that we h~ve not shown that the subjects' perceptions of 
the probabilities have been alter~d by changes in the payoffs, but that 
we have cast doubt on the model that subjective probabilities are often 
interred from. 
Table 3-2-7. Mean bids in selected payoff conditions. 
Experiment Part One. 
AW 48. PW. 1/6 2/6 
AL 5 20.74 21.6 
90 -45.5 -30.77 
AL 48. PL. 1/6 2/6 
Aiv 5 3·5 -14.3 
90 . lt9.37 35·3 
<I 
Experiment Part F• 
AW 48. :tw 1/6 2/6 
AL 5 PL 1/6 27.24 32.04 
AL90 PL It 
-9.6 13.2 
AL 48 . PL. 1/6 2/6 
AW 5 PW 1/6 -29.88 -29.64 
AW9o ~~ 1/6 20.28 4.44 
3/6 
29.73 
.;;.9.77 
3/6 
-20.3 
33.08 
3/6 
35·52 
9.2 
3/6 
-30.36· 
-4.56 
4/6 
32.48 
-3·5 
4/6 
-31.03 
-2.9 
4/6 
38.64 
22.68 
4/6 
-35.64 
-20.76 
.. 5/6 
40.54 
7.85 
5/6 
-36.77 
-7.I 
5/6 
43.08 
36.48 
5/6 
-40.8 
-32.52 
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~Q~mary and Conclusion. 
Subjects were asked to mark on a scale their Harschak bids for 
a series of two-outcome duplex gambles. A multiple :egression model 
of the form Y = b,AW + b2 ,~v + ~,AL + b4PL was fitted to these responses. I. . 
While this model provided a good fit to the responses, there was no 
difference in the beta weights of the probability terms, and this was 
interpreted as a failure to show evidence of interaction. 
A second analysis of the data, in terms of the distributions of 
differences between bids did show evidence of interaction, in that 
changes in the perceived values of gambles as probabilities in one 
component of the gamble changes were dependent of the value of the payoff 
in the other component. These results seem similar to the significant 
three-way interaction terms in analyses of variance of two-outcome duplex 
gambles reported by Anderson and Shanteau (1970), and suggest that the 
SUbjects might not be making their evaluations by the simple addition of 
the win and lose components that expectation models would predict. 
At first sight, the results of the two analyses of responses seem 
in contradiction. A comparison of subjects' mean evaluations with the 
expected value of the gambles showed a consistent pattern of over- and 
Under-estimation of the expected values; when the amount to lose was 
small, subjects consistently overestimated the gambles no matter what 
the probability of winning, i.e. they seemed to ignore that probability. 
\1'h 
' en the amount to lose was larger, subjects underestimated when the 
Probability of winning was low and overestimated when that probability 
\-ias higher, i.e. they paid a good deal of attention to the probability 
Of winning. A similar pattern occurred with changes in the probability 
Of losing and the amounts to win. It is clear that such differences in 
the weight of probabilities would, or might, disappear when the weights 
assigned to them were averaged over the whole set of gambles, i.e. the 
first analysis was not sensitive enough to show up this trend in the 
data. Such a pattern would also not necessarily appear in comparisons 
of responses with E.V. over the set of gambles, as in experiment 3-1, 
since gambles of low E.V., for example, can have either large or small 
amounts to win and lose. 
The results of this experiment suggest that to test hypotheses 
like interaction, several measures of subjects' behaviour should be 
recorded. 
The gambles included in this experiment were selected and arranged 
in order th~t probability distributions could be inferred from the 
distribution of responses. The large differences in the forms of these 
distributions, including some flat. distributions, suggest that our 
assumptions about the inference model are inadequate, and that we need 
to carry out further tests to decide just how subjective probabilities 
enter into the evaluations of (two-outcome) gambles. 
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Figs .. 3-2-I and 3-2-2. Expec,ted value of gamb~es 
and probability changes; mean bids; and probability 
changes. Expt. 3-2,Part I, se.ts I and 2. 
set r. 
E.V. Bids 
proos. 
set 2. 
E.V.. Bids 
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Figs •. 3-2-3 and 3-2-4·. Expected value of gambles and 
probability cbanges;mean bids and probability changes. 
Expt. 3-2,_Part 2,sets I and 2. 
se.t I. E~Vo Bids. 
sat 2. E.V. BidS• 
-
~z 2.4 
-Fig. 3-2-5• Mean_ bids and expected -val.ue in 
sel.ec.ted payoff' groups. E:x:pt. 3-2 ,Part I. 
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Fig. 3-2-th 
Mean._ bids: and expected value in selected payoff 
groups. EXpt. 3-2,Part 2. 
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~xperiment 3-3· 
The most co~~on experimental design in the study of the effect of 
Independent Outcome upon probability estimate has taken the form:- the 
subject is presented with some information about the likelihood of the 
Occurrence of two events. He is informed of the value to him of the 
I 
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occurrence of one of the events, and is then asked either (a) how likely 
he feels it is that the event will occur, or (b) to make sone response 
from which his subjective probability is inferred by the experimenter, 
as in experiments 1 and 2-1. 
Published experiments have shown that subjective probability (stated 
or inferred) increases with the value of the event. Several points 
~ 
about such experiments may be noted. Such a relationship between value 
and subjective probability seems rather simple in comparison with 
similar judgments outside the laboratory. Also, we have little information 
about the psychological processes which underlie interaction. We do not 
know whether it is perception of probabilities that is being distorted, 
that subjects are paying less attention to the information, or that their 
responses become biased as Independent Outcome changes. 
The relationship between stated and inferred subjective probabilities 
has not been studied. To what extent are the stated probabilities the 
Probabilities that enter into actual decisions. When asked to make 
decisions do subjedts' probability distributions show the same dependence 
on Payoffs. 
Experimenters have imposed additivity upon probability estimates, 
1
•e. they have ensured that P(A)+ P(not A)= I. If an outcome is attached 
to event A and est.P(A) thereby increases, we have no information about 
the subjective probability of not A. Does it decrease to maintain some 
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'subjective additivity', or does it remain unchanged? 
Aims of experiment 3-3· 
This experiment is designed to test certain hypotheses formed 
from these questions. Subjects are asked to look at some probabilistic 
information, to give a direct estimate of probabilities, and then to 
Use Marschak bids to evaluate the worth of gambles which included those 
Probabilities. It was hoped that a choice of two dependent variables 
would both provide more information about the relationship between stated 
and inferred probabilities and also disguise the fact that the behaviour 
Under scrutiny included the influence of payoffs upon statements about 
Probabilities. ~ 
Probabilities information. 
In the practice condition the subjects began by drawing a letter, 
a, b, or c from an urn containing thirty letters in all. When he was 
familiar with this procedure a switch was made to the presentation of 
information on cards,Le. a card containing thirty letters, a, b, and c, 
in different proportions was displayed to the subject, who was asked to 
Write down how likely he thought it was that an a, a b, or a c would 
be drawn. After making these statements the subject made Marschak bids 
for gambles which had an amount A to win if an a was drawn, an amount 
B to lose if b, and zero outcome if c occurred. Such a gamble has 
e~pected value A.a + B.b + O.c, or Aa-Bb. By the choice of such three-
outcome gambles one does not impose additivity upon the probabilities 
associated with the payoffs A and B. 
'rhe Gambles. 
Five objective probabilities, O.I,0.2,0.4,0.5, and 0.6 were used 
' 
and appeared together as in Table 331. 
··. 
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!able 331. 
P(a) P(b) P(c) 
1. 0.6 0.2 0.2 
2. 0.2 0.6 0.2 
3· 0.2 0.2 0.6 
4. O.I 0.4 0.5 
5· 0.5 O.I 0.4 
6. 0.4 0.5 O.I 
Each of the five probabilities appeared as a probability of winning (PVl), 
a probability of losing (PL), and a probability of neither winning nor 
losing (PO). PW was associated with three values of payoff or amount to 
Win (AW), and each PL with two amounts to lose (AL); AW took on the 
'~~alues·, IOp,20p, and 4op. AL the values, IOp and 20p. 
Thirty six gambles involving these probabilities and payoffs could 
be constructed in a factorial design of the six probability distributions 
Of Table'33I, three values of AW, and two values of AL. Table 332 lists 
these thirty six gambles with their expected values. The number attached 
to each gamble in that table is for identification purposes only. The 
order of presentation of the gambles was varied for each subject, the 
Orders being determined by drawing the numbers I to 36 from a box for 
each subject. 
First hypothesis. 
It can be seen that the use of this design permits us to test three 
hypotheses about the nature of interaction between payoffs and 
Probability estimates. 
Hypothesis One. 
Hypothesis Two. 
Hypothesis Three. 
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Weak Interaction. Subjective probability is 
different for positive, negative, and zero payoffs 
in that: PVl greater than PO greater than PL. 
To be tested by analysis of variance, Subjects x 
Probabilities (6) x Sign of Payoff (3), with 6 
replications per.cell. 
Strong Interaction(I). Subjective probability 
increases with size of positive payoff. PW,4o, 
greater than Fw, 20 greater than Fd,IO. 
To be tested by analysis of variance, Subjects x 
Probabilities (6) x Value of Payoff(3), with 2 
replications per.cell. 
Strong Interaction (2). Subjective probability 
decreases with increases in the amount to lose, 
PL,IO greater than PL,20. 
To be tested by analysis of variance, Subjects x 
Probabilities'.(6) x Value of Payoff (2), with 3 
replications per.cell. 
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N.B. Only five probabilities were presented to subjects. But because 
the probability 0.2 was presented twice as often as the other probabilities 
and in order to have analyses of variance with equal numbers of 
replications in each cell, two categories of 0.2 were distinguished 
in each analysis, so that the six values of probability referred to are 
o.r,o.2,0.2,o.4,o.5,0.6. 
Order of Presentation. 
The task facing the subject may be described as follows: 
He is given a short time to make his estimates of the probabilities, 
he sees the payoff associated with each probability, he writes down 
the estimates he has made of the probabilities in the gamble, and finally 
he writes down his estimate of the value of the gamble. 
By introducing variations in the order in which these four 
'activities' should be carried out by the subject, we can arrange 
conditions in which we might expect interaction to appear and in which 
we should not expect it to appear; if interaction did occur, we might 
also be able to separate the kinds of bias which would be affecting 
subjects' judgments under the different payoff conditions. 
The three following orders may be considered. 
1. a) Present the probabilistic information. 
b) Withdraw. 
c) Present payoff information. 
d) Subject estimates PVI, PL, PO and value of gamble. 
2. a) Present the probabilistic information. 
b) Withdraw. 
c) Subjec~ estimates probabilities Pa,Pb,Pc. 
d) Present payoff information. 
e) Subject estimates value of gamble. 
3. a) Present payoff information. 
b) Present probabilistic information. 
c) vli thdraw. 
d) Subject estimates probabilities Pl.l, PL, PO ~ value of gamble. 
These three presentation orders were labelled respectively 
(1) Interaction· condition (I) 
(2) No Interaction condition (NI) 
(3) Attention - Interaction (AI). 
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In N.I.condition, changes in the value of the payoffs should not 
affect probability estimates, since at the time of making these 
. 
estimates the subject does not know which payoffs will be attached to 
which probabilities. 
In A.I. condition, it was hypothesised that, since he was aware 
of the payoffs associated with the probabilities, the subject might 
focus his attention on some probabilistic information rather than other 
probabilistic information. 
In !.condition, it was hypothesised that the subject's recall of 
the information might be distorted by his more recently acquired 
knowledge of the~valu~of the payoffs associated with the probabilities. 
If either or both of the A.I. and I. conditions were to show 
evidence for changes in estimates as payoffs changed, we might be 
cl~arer about the sources of such interaction. Subjects' evaluations 
of the gambles could then be compared across presentation conditions 
to examine the relationships between stated and inferred subjective 
Probability. 
These three presentation conditions were examined in the ex~eriment, 
leading to the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Four : Presentation Order~ 
Any interaction between subjective probability and payoff that 
Would take place would be evident in conditions A.I. or I., but not 
in condition N.I. 
Experimental Procedure. 
Fifteen undergraduate students of the University of Keele acted 
as subjects in this experiment, and five were assigned at random to 
each of the three Presentation conditions, I.,A.I.,_and N.I. Each 
SUbject was presented with the same 36 gambles and was given in addition 
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a series of practice judgments prior to the recorded experimental 
judgments. 
The duration of exposure of the probabilistic information was 
constant (at 9 seconds) for each subject in all three conditions. To 
ensure this, the cards containing the information about probabilities 
Were photographed and the slides (transparencies) projected on to a 
screen. Time was controlled by stop watch and press-button slide changer. 
Blanl~ slides were presented while subjects were making their estimates. 
The subject marked their probability estimate by drawing a line 
., 
on an unmarked probability scale bounded at 0 and I for each of the 
three probabilities in the gamble. By using such scales additivity of 
~ 
estimates was not imposed. The probabilities were called P(A),P(B), 
and P(C), and not Pd,PL,and PO because of the differences in presentation 
Orders. 
The gambles were formed by presenting the payoffs in the form: 
If A win lOp, if C lose 20p, if B neither win nor lose. Whether A,B, 
or C had win, lose, or zero payoffs a~tached was again varied over the 
36 gambles. The 'subjective expected value' of the gamble was indicated 
by the subject drawing a line on a scale which ranged from -40p to 40p, 
marked off in lOp intervals. Subjects were informed that one of the 
gambles presented would be selected and played at the end of the 
e~:periment. 
RESULTS. 
1. Probability Estimates. 
Each subject, on each trial of the experiment, was presented with a 
gamble of the form: win amount X with probability P or lose amount Y 
with probability Q or neither win nor lose with probability I~P-Q. 
235 
In addition to oru~ing an evaluation of the worth of the complete gamble, 
he was asked to make estimates of the three probabilities, P,Q, and 
I-P-Q(although these estimates were not required to sum to any constant). 
A test of the interaction hypothesis may be carried out on these 
estimates, and support for that hypothesis would be that the estimates 
changed with the amounts to be won or lost that were paired in the 
gamble with thes~ probabilities. As such, the experiment is similar in 
design to the 'Independent Outcome' experiments, where the direct effect 
of I.O. on some response is measured; and is an example of those I.o. 
experiments which have probability estimates as dependent variable. 
The gambles included five different probabilities - O.I,0.2,0.4,0.5,0.6. 
Each of these was paired with each of the six outcomes - win 10p,20~, 
40p; zero; lose 10p,20p. Fig.3-3-l presents, for each of the three 
Presentation groups (A.I.,I and N.I.), the mean estimates of the five 
Probabilities under the different outcome values. 
Hypothesis One. Weak Interaction. 
We may consider the responses of any subject. In the experiment he 
Will have estimated each of the six probabilities (as mentioned above, 
0.2.is being considered as two probability values, to keep the number of 
replications equal) 18 times. On six of these occasions that probability 
Will have been paired with a winning outcome, on six occasions with a 
losing one, and on six occasions with a zero outcome. The test of weak 
interaction is that the estimates are different in these three cases. 
This was tested, for each Presentation group separately, by analysis 
of variance - A probability by outcome factorial design with six 
replications in each cell, and five subjects as random replications 
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of the design (Lindquist,l953); Table 3-3-3 gives the results of this 
analysis. 
!able 3-3-3· 
Wruli\ INTERACTION HYPOTHESIS 
A. I. 
Source d.f MS. F. 
Subjects 4 5129.70 
Probs. (A) 5 12089.2 
Payoffs(B 2 791.48 12.2 
AB 10 423.52 2.3 
AS 20 1542.52 
BS 8 64.38 
., 
ABS 
.40 194.88 
Error 1450 177.59 
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VARIANCE TABLE. 
I. N.I. 
-MS. F. r.~s. F. 
1660.99 1410.81 
18744.2 14860.5 
155·791 4.37 43.93 6(1 
69.15 ~l 4.17 <1 
911.89 231.95 
35.61 69.88 
116.55 62.53 
119.13 51.29 
The test for significance of the main effect of payoffs was M.S.gll1.S.BS 
With degrees of freedom 2/8. F at the 0.05 level is 4.46. 
The test for significance of AB interaction was H.S. AB/}l.S. ABS with 
degrees or' freedom 10/40. Significant F at the 0.05 level is 2.08. 
Inspection of the F ratios for the three conditions shows that 
the main effect of payoffs was significant only in the A.I.group (beyond 
the O.OI level). The interaction with probabilities· was also significant. 
In the I.group, the main effect of payoffs did not quite reach the 
significance level. 
Inspection of the mean estimates of the three groups under the three 
Payoff conditions is of interest, since it shows quite different trends 
in the data. The mean estimates in each group (not converted to 
Probabilities) are shown in Table 3-3-4. 
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,!able 2-3-4. 
(a) Mean estimates. Win. Zero. Lose. Outco:ne. 
Group A. I. 35.96 31.82 34.48'" 
I. 40.55 40.58 38.96 
N.I. 30.46 29.68 29.54 
(b) Nean estimates of individual subjects in groups. 
Group A. I. 1 36.78 32.67 36.75 
2 47.08 39·53 45.05 
3 37.22 33·75 36.28 
~4 27.67 23·92 25.58 
5 31.05 29.25 28.72 
Group I. 1 37.97 37.11 34.67 
2 42.50 42.05 . 39.25 
3 36.75 36.58 35.42 
4 40.30 41.30 39.00 
5 45.22 45.86 46.44 
Group N.I. 1 29.67 28.44 25.22 
2 28.33 26.47 29.55 
3 35.67 35.69 36.47 
4 27.94 26.64 26.80 
5 30.69 31.17 29.67 
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In the A.I. group, the mean estimates for the Win and Lose payoffs 
are both higher than the estimate which was associated with zero 
outcome, which is not in the direction predicted by a_weak interaction 
hypothesis. In the I.group, the estimates in the Lose condition are 
lower than in the other two conditions. An interaction hypothesis would 
predict estimates in the direction, Win greater than Zero greater than 
Lose. It may be that these differences in trend reflect differences in 
the way probabilistic information is perceived in the different 
presentation groups. In the A.I.condition, the outcome values were 
Presented first to the subject. When the probabilistic information was 
Presented, he may have directed his attention to the winning and losing 
elements, since these would determine the value of the gamble, and under-
estimate the number of elements associated with zero outcome. The I. 
condition is essentially a "recall" situation; the probabilistic 
information is presented and withdrawn, and the outcome values seen 
before_the subject has to make his estimates. His preferences for some 
elements rather than others might bia~ his recall of the relative 
nu~ber of elements that he has seen. 
The evidence for such hypotheses, however, is slight; further 
research into these questions should prove valuable for an understanding 
Of the interaction phenomenon. 
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Hypothesis Two. Strong Interaction (I). 
A subject estimates each of the probabilities six times when 
it is paired with a winning outc~me. On two of those occasions it is 
paired with lOp, on two with 20p, and on two with 40p. The test of 
strong interaction is that estimates change with changes in these 
payoff values. This was tested by analysis of variance - A 
probability by outcome value factorial design with two replications 
in each cell, and five subjects as random replications of the design. 
~ 
It should be noted that the tests for weak and strong interaction, 
although using the same data, are independent in the sense that the 
~ 
significance, or non-significance, of one hypothesis has no 
implications for the significance of the other hypothesis. The test 
Of weak interaction, for example, considers th~ mean of all the winning 
outcomes taken together; strong interaction tests consider differences 
in means of subgroups of this data. 
The results of the test of hypothesis two are presented in table 
3-3-5. 
241 
Table 3-3-5· 
STRONG INTERACTION HYPOTHESIS (I) - VARIANCE TABLE. 
A. I. I. N.I. 
Source d. f. MS. F MS F HS F. 
Subjects 4 1969.41 420.99 347.8' 
Probability 
(A, 5 4517.22 6366.90 4661.71 
Payoff (B, 2 209.09 3·55 81.05 4(1 66.07 1.63 
AB 10 206.18 <:"1 205.70 2.37 73·59 1.33 
~-
AS 20 768.49 401.93 93.17 
BS 8 58.85 183.67 40.45 
~ 
ABS 40 263.99 86.69 0.725 54-96 
Error 90 128.65 119.51 55.88 
-
The tests of significance are similar to those of we~~ interaction. 
The main significant F ratio at the 0.05 level for main effects of 
Payoffs is 4.46(d.f.2/8), and for the interaction term AB is 2.08(d.f. 
10/40). Only the AB interaction term'in the I. presentation group 
reached significance. 
There semrdto be little evidence of strong inte'raction between 
estimates anu winning payof:fs. 
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Hypothesis Three. Strong Interaction (2). 
A subject estimates each of the probabilities six times when it 
is paired with a losing outcome, and on three occasiQns it is paired 
with an amount to lose of lOp, and on the remainder with 20p. An 
hypothesis of strong interaction for losing outcome would predict that 
the estimates would be different for these two outcome values, and 
usually that the estimate would be lower for 20p than for lOp. The 
test of this hypothesis is similar to the preceding tests, and the 
results are presented in Table 3-3-6. 
Table 3-3-6. 
STRONG INTERACTION. HYPOTHESIS (2) - VARIANCE TABLE; 
A. I. I. N.I. 
Source d.f HS F MS F MS F 
Subjects 4 2112.99 783.81 667.79 
Probability(A) 5 4117.10 6604.02 5235.24 
Payoffs (B) 1 254.42 16.08, 0.355 <1 186.05 2.8 
AB 5 210.27 <1 273.94 1.79 . 91.48 1.7 
AS 20 613.77 310.86 84.05 
BS 4 15.82 82.45 64.92 
ABS 20 318.31 152.36 53.68 
Error 120 172.19 107.12 50.96 
The significant F ratio at the 0.05 level for main effect of payoffs is 
7.7I(d.f.l/4), and for the interaction term is 2.7l(d.f.5/20). Only 
the main effect of payoff in the A.I. group reached significance. 
Several points were considered about this result:- (a) the overall 
mean estimate for 'lose 20p' (35.77) was higher than the mean for 'lose 
lOp' (33.4), contrary to what is usually expected under the interaction 
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hipothesis, (b) the mean square for the BS interaction term was much 
smaller than the mean squares for the other interaction terms including 
the triple interaction term. The BS term is the error term in the 
test of main effect. 
(c) examination of the means of the AS and ABS data shows that one 
subject (subject two) had a pattern of responses very different from 
the remaining subjects, with the highest responses being given to the 
lowest probabilities. Examination of his protocol revealed that he had 
made many errors of identification,i.e. he had estimated the proportions 
accurately gut had assigned the wrong letters of identification to these 
proportions on his response sheet. When this subject was omitteq 
from analysis a ~econd analysis of variance showed no significant main 
.effect of payoffs (F ratio was 9.08, with a 0.05 significant F of 10.13, 
d.f. 1/3). It should be noted that the omission of this subject does 
not affect the results of the weak interaction test, where a second 
analysis of variance with the remaining four subjects shows the same 
result (F-ratio was 11.19, with a O.OI significant F of 6.99, d.f. 3/9). 
Hypothesis Four. Presentation order. 
This hypothesis suggested that any evidence for interaction would 
be apparent in conditions A.I. and I., but not in condition N.I. There 
is very little evidence of any interaction effects in this experiment. 
In the test of weak interaction, estimates were lowest when there were 
no payoffs associated with them in the A.I. presentation group. The 
mean estimates in two other analyses, the I.weak interaction and the 
A.I. lose strong interaction showed a trend for all subjects, but the 
differences were not significant at the 0.05 level. If we accept too 
the traditional interaction hypothesis (e.g. those of Irwin (1953) and 
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Xarks (1951) that estimates should be highest for winning outcomes 
and lowest for losing ones, then we have here no evidence for inter-
action. Apart from the suggestion of different trends in the A.I. and 
I.tests of weak interaction, there is insufficient evidence for a test 
of hypothesis four. 
Since it is as much our intention to explore tests of interaction 
as to provide evidence of it, a further test may be introduced here. 
The sum of subjects' probability estimates was not constrained to sum 
to a constant. Figure 3-3-I shows that subjective probabilities tended 
to be highe~ than the objective ones, and Table 3-3-7 1 which shows the 
mean sums of probability estimates, that these sums were higher than 
~ . 
the sum of objective probabilities (these estimates have not been converted 
·to probabilities; for comparison purposes, the sum of objective 
probabilities would be 80). The expected value of a gamble summarises 
the information presented to the subject; the subjects' rating of the 
worth of the g~~ble reflects the impression made upon him of that gamble. 
The correlation between the sum of p~obability estimates and either the 
response or the expected value for each gamble would be a further test 
of an interaction effect. Table 3-3-8 shows these correlation coefficients 
for the 15 subjects. A correlation of 0.325 would be significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 level, with a two tailed test and 36 
pairs of observations. 
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Table 3-3-7• Mean Sums of Probability Estimates. 
Group. Subject No. Hean. Standard Deviation. 
A. I. I I05.05 20-.02 
2 131.83 13.61 
3 107.80 14.08 
4 77.22 6.22 
5 88.30 8.o5 
I 6 109.75 10.61 
7 124.33 15.51 
8 109.53 13.23 
9 120.64 18.43 
10 137-55 19.09 
N.I. 1 84.75 5.22 
2 .84.,36 8.09 
3 107.44 9·53 
4 81.11 6.43 
5 92.11 8.84 
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Table 3-3-8. 
Correlations between Estimates, Expected Value and Evaluation of Gambles. 
Group. Subject No. r with E.V. r with Evaluation. 
A. I. 1 -0.169 0.054 
2 0.017 
-0.045 
3 -0.056 0.151 
4 -0.149 -0.202 
5 0.179 -0.005 
I 6 0.044 0.196 
7 -0.069 o.o46 
~8 
-0.295 
-0.154 
9 -0.156 -0.323 
10 0.055 0.038 
N.I. 11 -0.132 
-0.038 
12 -0.012 
-0.119 
13 0.063 -0.109 
14.'. 
-0.051 
-0.558 
15 0.112 -0.268 
247 
There seems to be no consistent relationship between estimates 
and expected value and evaluations of gambles. The only subject to 
show a high correlation, subject 14, was in the N.I. ~resentation 
condition and his protocol shows no other unusual features or evidence 
of interaction. 
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RESULTS. 
2. Evaluations of gambles. 
The analysis of subjects'behaviour has so far been concerned with 
their estimates of the probabilities involved in the gambles. In addition 
to such estimates, each subject made an evaluation of the worth to him 
of the gamble, this evaluation being assumed to have been based on a 
consideration of the payoffs and probabilities in the gamble. 
We may now consider the relationship of the estimated probabilities 
to inferences which might be made about subjective probability from the 
evaluations~of the gambles, and the light that this relationship would 
throw on the question of interaction. 
Such inferehces about subjective probability (without the 
measurement of it) have included (a) the use of regression procedures 
to estimate the "relative importance" of P'oi'l and PL in gambling, e.g. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a), (b) 
the use of the interaction term in a probability by p~yoff analysis 
of variance, e.g. Tversky (1967a) and Anderson and Shanteau (1970), 
and (c) the analysis of slopes of experiment 3-2. 
To compare such inferences with direct estimates of the probabilities 
requires certain assumptions about the way in which subjects process 
gambles, e.g. "The formal axiomatized SEU model (e.g.,Savage,l954) does 
not require that the subjective probability and utility functions be 
interpreted in any particular way. They can be viewed simply as 
transformations of the scale of stated probabilities and payoffs-trans-
formations that are predictive of risk-taking decisions. However, 
subjective probability is quite commonly interpreted as a measure of 
the decision maker's opinion about the likelihood of an event, and 
utility is usually thought of as the subjective worth of an outcome", 
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Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968). 
Such an interpretation is made here, with the assumption that the 
subject's evaluation includes, in some form, his per~eptions of Fd,PO, 
and PL. It is not necessary to assume that his evaluation follows 
some expectation principle, since the fit of an expectation model may 
be tested. 
Three such models were considered, and the correlation between 
these models and subjects' responses calculated. 
The three models are 
(I) the expected value model, EV=P.v .A1tl- PL.AL. 
(2) the subjectively expected model, where subjects' estimates replace 
the objective pr~babilities in the above equation. 
(3) in this model, model three, instead of using subjects' estimates of 
probabilities, their three estimates in each trial p(A),~(B) andP(C) 
Were each calculated as proportions of the sum of probability estimates 
for that trial, P(A)+P(B)+P(C). If we let T equal to that sum, then 
the equation for the model is: SEV(2) = AW.estPW/T-AL.estPL/T. 
The correlations of these models and the responses of each of the 15 
subjects are presented in Table 3-3-9. 
Table 3-3-9· 
Correlations of subjects' responses and: 
EV Hodel. SEV Hodel I. SEV Hodel 2. 
Subject 1 0.569 0.544 0.574 
2 0.061 0.788 0.749 
3 0.167 0.320 0.268 
4 0.682 0.591 0.644 
5 0.647 0.660 0.694 
6 0.827 0.667 0.671 
7 ~ 0.899 0.933 0.933 
8 o.8o8 0.725 0.760 
9 o~. 653 0.681 0.694 
10 0.719 0.768 0.776 
11 0.784 0.876 0.881 
12 0.782 0.930 0.903 
13 0.912 0.936 0.929 
14 0.734 0.820 'o. 772 
15 0.641 0.707 0.765 
Several points may be made about these correlations between responses 
and the three expectation models: 
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(I) Although no attempt had been made to measure utility, these models 
provide a good fit to the responses, 
(2) Subject Two nas a low correlation between his response and the 
expected value model, but this correlation increases markedly when his 
estimates of the probabilities are substituted for the objective ones 
in the expectation equation; as we have noted above, this subject made 
many identification errors in the estimation task, so that his responses 
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are consistent with an expectation model, is an erroneous one in terms 
of the presented probabilities. 
(3) Subject Three does not appear to be making evalu~tions which are 
consistent with any of the expectation models. 
(4) Hodel 2, which includes the estimates ex:presseci as proportions 
of the sum of estimates, does not provide a better fit to responses 
than the simpler model I, which included only the estimates as written 
down by the subjects. The correlations between these two models were, 
in all cases, very high, ranging from 0.866 to 0.995. 
Our principal concern with these data is in investigating the 
relationship between the :probabilities which are estimated directly by 
the subject and the probabilities which enter into his evaluations of 
the worth of gambles. The results reported here suggest that this 
relationship is a close one, and we may draw upon several observations 
to support this. 
(I) the correlation between response and expectation models is a high 
one, suggesting that some multiplicative model involving payoffs and 
probabilities would provide a useful description of subjects• behaviour. 
(2) A model which includes probabilities estimated in one part of the 
experiment correlated highly for fourteen of the fifteen with the 
responses in a separate part of the experiment, when gambles were 
evaluated. 
(3) That the evaluations of the gambles correlated highly with the 
expected value model for nearly all subjects suggests a close relationship 
between subjective and objective probabilities in these evaluations. 
Examination of_the relationship between estimated and objective 
Probabilities in the estimation part of the experiment shows a similar 
relationship. These relationships are shown in Fig.3-3-2. Subject Two, 
Who has a low correlation between bid and E.V., has a low correlation 
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between response and objective probability. The only exception is 
subject Three, whose high correlation in the estimation task and low 
one in the evaluation task with all the expectation m9dels suggests 
that he was not following such a model. 
(4) While estimated probabilities are close to the objective ones, 
there is a tendency to overestimate all probabilities, as may be seen 
in Fig.3-3-2 and in Table 3-3-7 which shows the mean sums of estimates. 
We might then expect that this tendency might be revealed in evaluations 
with gambles of positive E.V. being overvalued and those of negative E.V. 
being undervalued. Fig.3-3-3 plots mean bids against E.V. and shows the 
predicted relationship in groups I and N.I. Since the graph for group 
. 
A.I. includes subjects Two and Three the relationship between bid and 
E.V.will not be a close one, and no such trend can be seen. 
It seems to the author that there is a consistency in subjects' 
behaviour in both parts of the experiment,suggesting that, although the 
task was a difficult one requiring close attention over a long period of 
time, it was not too difficult for the subjects. The correlation with 
the E.V.model, which summarizes the information presented to the subjects, 
was as high as in experiments 3-I and 3-2 which were not so demanding. 
For most subjects the expectation models provided a very good fit to 
bidding responses despite the fact that no attempt had been made to 
measure utility. 
If, in addition, we may conclude that the probabilities estimated 
directly by the subjects were similar to those that entered into their 
evaluations of the gambles, so that we could say that there was some 
subjective probability scale underlying behaviour in both parts of the 
experiment, then two further questions interest us: 
(I) where interaction with value can be seen to occur in the estimates, 
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can evidence of such interaction be ~found in the evaluations of gambles, 
and 
(2) what is the relationship between the estimated probabilities and 
the weights of the probabilities in a regression analysis of bidding 
responses, interpreted as the relative importance attached to these 
d.imensions b.f t.i:J.e subJects and by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) 
as evidence for interaction. 
No answer can be made to the first question on the basis of the 
data collected here; significant interaction occurred only in the A.I • 
. ., 
group, and the lower correlations with the expectation models make it 
difficult to examine more closely their bidding behaviour. In general, 
the gambles presented in this experiment are too complex for close 
examination of this question, e.g. by using the interaction term in a 
factorial analysis of variance. 
This complexity also presents some problems in the answer to the 
second question. The fact that the probability dimensions are themselves 
intercorrelated means that the simpl~ correlations between dimensions 
and the dependent variable in the regression analysis cannot be inter-
preted as measurss of 'relative importance'. In their study, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1968) used the Relative Weight index of Hoffman (1960) 
i.e. where R2 = r 10:p, +· •• rioPC:+· •• 1"'~ 0 Pn then 1Gof3,; is a measure of 
. I . 
the relative importance of the i-th predictor variable etc. (the term 
risk dimension is usually used to refer to predictor variable when the 
regression analysis is applied to the evaluation of gambles). Darlington 
(1968) argues that such an index does not provide a measure of the 
importance of a predictor variable when these variables are inter-
correlated, and when importance refers to, as is usual, the independent 
contribution of that variable to the total variance. 
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Darlington also suggests that the beta weight(when the data have 
been adjusted to unit variance) is a measure of the "importance" of 
a variable, when the relationship between variables is a casual one. 
While we would not wish to speak of the risk dimensions "causing" a 
response, our situation seems to the author similar to the one described 
by Darlington (1968,p.l67) "a situation in which (a) a given dependent 
variable is affected only by a specified set of measurable variables, 
(b) the effect of each of these variables on the dependent variable is 
linear, and (c) the dependent variable has no effect, either directly or 
indirectly, ..on any of the independent variables". A regression analysis 
was carried out on the bidding responses of each of the subjects, and 
~ 
the expected value model was similarly analysed for comparison purposes. 
The fit of the regression model to the responses of subjects Two and 
Three was so poor that the regression weights are not included in Table 
3-3-10. The final column of that table shows the F-ratio for regression 
as an index of the goodness of fit of the model. 
Table 3-3-10. 
Beta weights of the probability variables in regression analysis 
of expected value model and of subjects' bidding responses. 
E.v. 
Subject. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
~-~. 
0.471 
0.269 
., 
0.274 
0.358~ 
0.411 
0.370 
0.498 
0.269 
0.412 
0.293 
0.320. 
0.308 
0.279 
0.321 
PL. 
-0.394 
-0.275 
-0.289 
-0.175 
-0.351 
-0.359 
-0.298 
-0.114 
-0.448 
-0.259 
-0.331 
-0.407 
-0.278 
-0.153" 
F regression 
57.89 
0.097 3·29: 
0.99 
1.27 
-0.059 6.26 
0.101 5-25 
-0.003 8.80 
-0.048 24.20 
-0.069 9.23 
0.118 5.28 
0.019 9.64 
-0.105 20.77 
-0.008 6.61 
-0.024 46.34 
0.093 10.56 
0.196 8.69 
F (d.f.5/30) 0.05 = 2-53 
0.01 = 3-70 
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bid/ev. 
r 
0.57 
0.06 
0.167 
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The regression model included the bidding response as dependent variable 
and five predictor variables - the probabilities of winning, losing and 
achieving a zero outcome (P~,PL,PO), and the amounts to win and lose 
(AW,AL). AO was omitted since it always takes on the value zero and 
therefore is uncorrelated with the dependent and the predictor variables. 
Only the beta weights for the probability variables are presented and 
discussed here. 
Examination of the table shows that there are marked differences 
between the beta weights for the E.V.model and for the responses, in 
particular a~ tendency for the subjects to attach less weight to the 
probability dimensions than the E.V.model. There are, too, large 
differences in weights among subjects; for example, one may compare the 
weights of subjects 4,5,10 and 13. It is of interest to note that·the 
four subjects who markedly overestimated probabilities in the estimation 
task (see Fig.3-3-2) had the largest beta weights for probabilities in 
the bidding task. 
Relative to the E.V.model there seems no overall tendency to attach 
more weight either to PVl or to PL, but there are individual differences 
and for some subjects there seem to be marked tendencies in either 
direction. Subjects 10 and 13 emphasise PL while subjects 5,8, 9 and 
15 attach relatively more weight to PJ. This picture is complicated by 
the fact that subjects 9 and 15 also attach more weight to PO than to 
PL which is difficult to interpret because of tne inter~orrelation of 
probability dimensions. We may compare the probability estimates of 
these subjects to ascertain if these differences in weights are reflected 
there. Fig.3-3-4 shows the mean estimates of these six subjects and it 
can be seen from this figure that no clear pattern or difference in 
patterns is discernable. While the complexity of the ga~bles makes 
such inferences difficult to make with confidence, it seems that the 
differences in weights reflect differences in processing strategies 
rather than differences in perception of the probabilities. 
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It is difficult to use these data to investigate differences in 
weights of the subjects in the A.I. group which showed evidence of 
interaction in the estimation task, since the regression model provided 
such a poor fit to the responses of two of the five subjects in the 
group. The remaining subjects show no differences in weights to the 
subjects in other groups. It might be thought that the responses of 
subject 2, which had a high correlation with the model including 
estimated probabilities, could be fitted to a regression model with the 
estimated probabilities as predictor variables. However, apart from the 
overall strategy of including the presented probabilities as such 
variables, there would be no E.V. model weights for co~parison purposes 
and no knowledge of how to relate the weights to an interaction 
hypothesis. 
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Fig~ 3-3-2• 
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Experiment 3-3· Summary and Discussion. 
Subjects were asked to estimate the probability that each of three 
events might occur, and to make a Marschak bid for a_gamble includins 
these events and associated monetary payoffs. The order in which the 
probabilistic information and the values of the payoffs were presented, 
and the two responses recorded, was varied so that different predictions 
could be made about the dependence of the probability estimates on the 
Values of the payoffs. 
Hypotheses about weak and strong interaction were tested for three 
groups of subjects, each mrucing their responses after different present-
ation orders - an A.I. group, where the payoffs were seen before the 
. 
Probabilities were presented and the estimates made, an I.group, where 
the probabilistic information preceded first the payoffs and then the 
estimates, and a N.I. group, where the probabilities were estimated prior 
to any knowledge of the payoffs. 
In no group was there evidence of strong interaction, and only one 
group,.the A.I. group, showed weak i~teraction, i.e.their probability 
estimates were not independent of the associated winning, zero, or losing 
Payoffs. In this group, too, the change in estimates was not the one 
that would be predicted by the usual interaction hypothesis, but both 
the winning and losing estimates were higher than the estimate associated 
With zero outcome. It might be that such an order was due to the 
relative attention that subjects paid to the probabilistic information. 
For example, the subject might first notice that A and B were the winning 
and losing letters, while a zero outcome was associated with c. ~Aen 
he was then presented with the frequencies of A,B and C, he would pay 
more attention to(and overestimate the frequency of) A and B, and neglect 
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{and underestimate) C. In condition I., the subject saw the payoff 
information between looking at the frequencies and recording his 
estimate, and it was thought that, if interaction wa~ evident, it would 
be due to some bias in his recall of the probabilities. The evidence 
from this experiment would thus suggest that interaction was due to 
distortion in the amount of attention paid to the information as payoffs 
changes rather than in the recall of information seen. The number of 
subjects who took part in this experiment was small, and further research 
would need to be carried out into this question, since the results are 
not simila~ to those reported by other studies into the effects of 
payoffs upon probability estimates. Two questions are suggested. If 
interaction is ~an "attention phenomenon", why has this particular order, 
i.e. PW and PL greater than PO,not occurred in these other studies? Is 
it because this experiment considered the three probabilities together 
instead of two in any one presentation, or might it be due to the 
"embedding" of the estimation response in a complex experiment ? The 
second question concerns the relationship, in this experiment, between 
" . 
interaction and the difficulty of the task. Subjects in the A.I. group 
made most errors in the estimation task, and were less consistent in 
the bidding, or gamble evaluation task. It would be more precise to 
say that this was true of three out of the five subjects. Further 
research with a larger number of subjects is needed to ascertain if the 
A.I. task was a more difficult task, if it was just a question of these 
particular subjects, and if these difficulties are related to interaction 
(e.g. it could be that subjects find it difficult to remember the 
winning and losing letter names and the payoff values, and for these 
reasons do not pay enough attention to the probabilistic information). 
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In addition to making these estimates subjects evaluated, by a 
Marschak bidding procedure, the worth of gambles which included the 
probabilities and the associated payoffs. We could then consider the 
inference problem from a new approach, by asking how the estimated 
Probabilities might be related to the probabilties which could be inferred 
from the evaluations, e.g. by using some expectation model; whether 
interaction in the estimates would be evident.in the evaluations; and 
Whether there could be evidence of interaction in the evaluations and 
not in the estimates. 
It was·concluded that there was a close relationship between the 
Probabilities as estimated and the probabilities which entered into the 
evaluations of the gambles. The expectation models provided a good fit 
to responses, although no attempt had been made to measure utility; an 
expectation model which included the probabilities from the estimation 
responses provided a good fit to the evaluation responses of nearly all 
subjects,including the subject who had made so many errors of identifi-
cation; there seemed to be some similarity in distribution of both 
responses - overestimation of probabilities going with a tendency to 
make extreme bids, and close relationships between estimated and 
Presented probabilities, and bids and the expected value of the gambles. 
Given this closeness between estimated and inferred probability 
(inferred from expectation models), two predictions about interaction 
could be made: 
(I) that we could find some evidence of interaction in the inferred 
Probabilities of the A.I.group, and 
(2) there would be no evidence of interaction in the inferred 
Probabilities of groups I. and N.I. 
Unfortunately it is not easy to test these predictions with the 
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present experimental design, and the present set of results. The 
emphasis on the collection of evidence about interaction in the estimates 
of three probabilities, PW, PL and PO, meant that th~ee outcome gambles 
were presented, and the efforts towards economy of presentation means 
that a factorial or orthogonal design of payoffs and probabilities was 
not used. Under these constraints, it is not simple to apply any of 
the inference methods, such as conjoint measurement, functional measurement 
or regression techniques, to subjects' responses. An attempt was made 
to overcome these difficulties by applying a regression model, and 
dealing with the problem of interpretation caused by the correlations 
among the independent variables (the risk dimensions) by comparing the 
beta weights of the subjects with those of the E.V.model. While such 
analysis can only be suggestive, it seems that there can be interactions 
in the inference model and not in the estimated probabilities. As in 
experiment 3-2, the results seem to show that expectation models are only 
an approximation to the subjects' models, and that we must not make 
decisions about interaction in the s~nse of changes in the perception of 
Probabilities on the basis of evidence collected fro~ the evaluations of 
gambles. 
The errors that the A.I. subjects made, and the low correlations 
With the E.V. model of two of them, meant that it was not of value to 
attempt to test for interaction in the evaluation responses of those 
subjects. 
This experiment has been, in this writer's opinion, the.most fruitful 
. 
' 
ot the experiments considered in this study. Instead of trying to find 
''solutions" to the inference problem it has focused attention on that 
Problem. By breaking down the evaluation of a gamble into it's component 
judgments, and by recording both evaluation and probability estimates, 
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many hypotheses about interaction could be tested together for the first 
time. In comparison with many of the experiments of the literature, 
some of the results suggest directions for future research. It is clear 
that, if further research is to be carried out, the inadequacies of 
this design should be avoided, e.g. simpler gambles could be presented 
and less information collected fro~ more subjects. 
The design does seem to have applications in the study of inter-
action beyond the study of the evaluation of gambles, and beyond the , 
study of interaction in the study of how subjects put information 
together to~make decisions. 
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CHAPTER ?wELVE. 
Value as a Determinant of Subjective Probability. 
\Vhen subjects make judgements about the likelihopd that certain 
events will occur, it often happens that the occurrence of these events 
Will have value for him, or that the subject will have a preference for 
the occurrence of one event rather than another. Research workers 
have been concerned with describing the relationship between these 
preferences and judgments of likelihood, to decide if they are or are 
not independent of each other. A non-independence or correlation between 
them might take the form that judgments of likelihood are affected by 
preferences; or that the preference for some outcome is affected by 
the perceived likelihood of achieving it. Our concern in this thesis, 
and the principal concern of the literature, has been with the former 
question - are judgments of the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
event biased by the value to the subject of the occurrence of that 
event? 
Of course, the relationship betw~en subjective probability 
and preference may be very complex, for example: 
One day, in the early days of his acquaintance with Arild, Serezha 
began discussing Moscow with her and checking her knowledge of 
that city. Besides the Kremlin, which she had sufficiently 
examined, she named a few other sections inhabited by her 
acquaintances. Of those names he now remembered only two: the 
Sadovaya-Kudrinskaya and Chernyshevsky streets. Discarding the 
forgotten directions, as though Anna's choice were as limited as 
his memory, he was now ready to guarantee that Anna was spending 
the night at Sadovaya. He was convinced of this, because that 
meant complete frustration. To find her at this hour in such a 
large street, without the faintest notion where or in whose 
appartment to seek her, was impossible. Chernyshevsky street was 
another matter, but it was certain that she could not be there 
because of the way his hopeless longing, like a dog, ran ahead of 
him on the pavement and, struggling to escape, dragged him after it. 
He would certainly have found her in Chernyshevsky street if only 
he could have imagined that the living Anna, of her own free will, 
was indeed in that place where it was merely his desire (and what 
strong desire!) to situate her. Convinced of failure, he hurried 
to test with his own eyes this non-destined possibility, because 
he was in a state when the heart would rather gnaw the hard core 
of hopelessness than remain inactive. (Pasternak's The Last 
Summer, translated by George Reavey, Penguin, 1967, pp.82-83). 
In an experimental situation, and with some simplification of 
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the problem , one may still distinguish among several possible relations 
between subjective probability and values. Slavic (1966) reports seven 
hypotheses:- (1) independence, (2) partial optimism, (3) partial pessimism, 
(4) complete optimism, (5) complete pessimism, (6) "it can't happen to 
me", and (7) 11it can happen to me". In hypotheses (2) and (3), subjective 
Probability depends upon the sign but not the magnitude of value; in (4) 
... 
and (5) upon the magnitude of value, and in (6) and (7) upon extreme 
Positive and negative values. In this paper, partial optimism and 
Pessimism have been called weak interaction, and complete optimism and 
Pessimism strong interaction between probability and payoff. vlhile the 
term 'interaction' is not entirely satisfactory, since it fails to 
distinguish between·subjective probability dependent on value and value 
dependent· on s.p., it has been used here in continuance of its use in 
the literature. 
Interaction between subjective probability and value has been 
reported by several research workers. Marks (1951), Irwin(l953), 
Crandall et al.(l955), and Pruitt and Hoge (1965) examined the frequency 
0 f subjects' estimates that one event rather than another would occur, 
and found that the frequency of such estimates of guesses increased when 
one event was valued or desirable in terms of monetary or points payoff 
to the subjects. The first two authors found evidence for weak inter-
action of guesses and outcome-value, while the last two studies showed 
evidence of strong interaction. 
In experiments where subjects had to estimate probabilities rather 
than make guesses, Pruitt and Hoge(l965) found that estimates increased 
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with size of payoff (strong interaction), but Slovic (1966) found 
that the relationship between value and subjective probability was a 
complex one - "far more complicated, in fact, than any of the 
hypothesized value effects. One of the major complications was the 
fact that value had differential effects of S s •••• These individual 
differences tended to cancel one another when data were averaged over 
S's thereby reducing the size of between group differences'', (Slovic, 
1966, p.28). 
The results of these studies have implicationsfor the study of 
decision mru~ing under risk, but have not received much emphasis by 
research workers in that field, although these implications had been 
recognised quite quickly e.g. 11A most disturbing possibility is raised 
by experiments by Harks and Irwin which suggest that the shape of the 
subjective probability function is influenced by the utilities involved 
in the bets. If utilities and subjective probabilities are not 
independent, then there is no hope of predicting risky decisions unless 
their law of combination is known, an~ it seems very difficult to design 
an experiment to discover that law of combination 11 (Edwards, 1954d). 
The reason for neglect of this proble~ seems to have been that these 
experiments used direct estimates of subjective probability, so that 
there were no pressures on subjects to distinguish between their beliefs 
and preferences. Pruitt and Hoge(l965) and Slavic (1966) had introduced 
Payoffs for accurate estimates by their subjects, but this seems 
Unsatisfactory, since it is not clear what the subject is supposed to do 
in a situation where a payoff is given to him independently of his 
estimate, and a further payoff is made dependent upon the accuracy of 
his estimate. 
Attention was then directed to the inference of subjective 
273 
probability from decisions made by subjects. Irwin and Snodgrass (1966) 
introduced the distinction between Independent and Dependent Outcomes, 
where I.O. :.were payoffs designed to make the occurr~nce of an event 
attractive to the subject, while D.O. is a payoff related to the subject's 
response, such as the amount of money bet (Irwin and Snodgrass, 1966, 
Irwin and Graae, 1968, Phares, 1957), the amount of information required 
before making a decision (Morlock,1967), or the amount of money one is 
prepared to offer for the right to play a bet (Pruitt and Hoge,l965). 
All these studies found evidence for the interaction of I.O. and 
subjective ~robability, if certain assumptions are made about the 
relationship between the D.O. and some underlying subjective probability 
!unction. 
A second source of evidence is the dependence of SEU models upon 
the additivity of utility and subjective probability; experiments which 
have tested this property as a preliminary to constructing measurement 
scales reported no evidence of interaction between value and subjective 
Probability, e.g.Tversky (1967a), Anderson and Shanteau (1970) and 
vlallsten (1971). 
Evaluation of the literature on interaction may be summarized with 
four criticisms: 
(a) the I.O. studies make the assumption that the dependent variable 
should, like subjective probability, be independent of outcome value, 
so that, for example, the size of a bet is a function o£ s.p.only, and 
not a function of both s.p. and I.O. There is no experimental evidence 
to support, such an assumption. In addition, the assumption has to be 
made that changes in these dependent variables are due to changes in the 
Perception of the probabilities rather than to the other necessary 
Changes in the decision situation, such as an increase in its riskiness. 
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(b) while all the I.O. experiments have shown evidence of an interaction 
effedt, little is known about the conditions under which such an effect 
occurs. The form of the probabilistic information, and the size and 
' 
method of payoff do not seem to be important features. 
(c) most results are expressed for groups of subjects, and with such 
averaging procedures it is difficult to examine individual differences, 
or even the 'shape' of the phenomenon. 
{d) the technical limitations of utility measurement models make it 
impossible (at time of writing) to investigate interaction when utility 
has been measured, yet inferences about s.p. from decisions without the 
• 
measurement of utility may lead to erroneous interpretations. 
The experim~nts in this study were designed in an attempt to 
answer the question of what kind of experiment could, without ambiguity, 
give information about the interaction of value and subjective probability. 
The central problem for the investigation of interaction was seen as 
that of making acceptable inferences about subjective probability from 
decisions. Two criteria for a successful experiment were chosen. The 
first suggests that, where necessary, analysis of responses could take 
Place at the level of the individual subject. Furthermore, different 
levels of probability and of payoff would not be so confounded as to be 
incapable of analysis. These precautions would ensure that,if evidence 
of interaction were collected, it would be possible to find if it showed 
itself in the responses of all subjects, at all probability levels and 
at all values of payoff. 
The second demands that it would be possible to say that such 
changes as occurred in the dependent variable due to changes in the 
Payoffs were due to changes in subjective probability, and not to other 
Changes such as information processing considerations or attitudes to 
~isk. 
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Two approaches were made to the problem of designing a suitable 
experiment. The first involves the design of experiments which maintain 
the distinction between I.O. and D.O., and attempt to infer changes in 
probability from changes in some response measure, or decision, brought 
about by pairing that response measure with I.e. These experiments will 
therefore be similar to experiments in the literature; the pri~cipal 
difference is that, in each case, the dependent variable was changed so that 
it would fulfil the first criterion; the experiment could then be carried 
out and the pattern of responses investigated to see if the experiment 
fulfilled the second criterion. 
In the second approach to the problem the dependent variable is 
~ 
the subject's evaluation of the worth to him of a gamble. This approach 
differs from the preceding one in that the response is assumed to reflect 
changes in both the payoffs and the probabilities involved in the 
situation, so that different kinds of inference problems are raised. 
The particular problem facing the experimenter was that of devising new 
tests of interaction rather than cha~ging existing designs. 
Two such designs were considered. In the first (experiment 3-2), 
a prediction was derived from expectation models concerning differences 
in the evaluation of gambles due to changes in the probabilities 
included in the gambles. Such a prediction did not depend on the 
measurement of utility and demanded only the assumption that utility was 
not dependent on subjective probability. In the second (experiment 3-3), 
subjects were asked both to estimate probabilities and to evaluate the 
worth of gambles which included those probabilities. Estimated and 
inferred probabilities could then be compared, and evidence for inter-
action sought in such a comparison. 
The findings and arguments of this thesis may be discussed in terms 
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of two questions. The question to be discussed first is: what have 
the results of the experiments been, how do they compare with the 
experimental results on interaction in the literature, and what hypo-
theses might be set up to explore interaction in the light of these 
results. The second question is the central one of this thesis. Can 
we conclude from this study that a certain experimental design can 
Yield valuable information about interaction. 
The findings about interaction. 
Two assumptions must be made concerning the status of these results. 
To relate tke findings of both the Independent Outcome and the gambling 
approaches requires some assumption about the nature of subjective 
. 
probability and it's role in each of the types of response. It will be 
assumed here that some perception of the probabilities presented to the 
subject will play some part in all the responses, and that careful 
examination of actual responses should reveal the particular role 
Played. Furthermore, for purposes of exposition, the results will at 
first be discussed in terms of the kind of inference made in the 
literature before discussing whether, taken together, these experiments 
provide evidence of interaction. 
Tables A and B summarise, for the I.O. and gambling experiments 
respectively, experimental designs, the results and comparable 
experiments in the literature. 
Table A. 
Summary of I.O. design experiments. 
Experiment. 
Dependent 
Variable. 
Inference 
made. 
Conclusion." 
Payoffs. 
Comparable 
experiments. 
Comparison 
of Results. 
I 
choice of bet 
from quadratic 
payoff scheme. 
choice reflects 
subjective prob-
ability. 
no change due 
to I.O. 
points 
Irwin et al. 
(2 studies) 
:found change; 
choice a deviation 
from optimal 
strat·~gy; 
2-I 
amount and 
direction 
of bet. 
same for 
these 
variables. 
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2-2,2-3 
amount of information 
taken when I.o. as 
opposed to other 
event is presented. 
number of cards 
examined correlates 
with s.p. 
both measures no change in sample 
change(increase)size with I.O. 
with I.O. 
money 
Irwin et al. 
(2 studies) 
Pruitt & 
Hoge(l965). 
found change 
in frequency 
of bet in I.O. 
direction; 
results 
averaged over 
all subjects 
and 
probabilities; 
points in 2-2 
money in 2-3 
Morlock (1967). 
found change; 
differences in 
design, e.g. 
sampling without 
replacement; 
no analysis o:f 
actual decisions; 
Table S. 
Summary of gambling evaluation experiments. 
Experiment 
Dependent 
Variable. 
Inference 
made. 
:Payoffs. 
Conclusion. 
Comparable 
experiments. 
Comparison 
of Results. 
3-3 
estimate of 
presented prob-
abilities 
money. 
evidence of weak 
interaction in 
A.I.group; 
no other weak or 
strong interaction. 
Irwin(l953) 
Marks (1951) 
Slovic (1966) 
All found cor-
relation between 
estimate & I.O. 
these estimates 
'embedded' in 
gambling 
situation. 
3-2 
slope of line 
relating PW to 
lose components 
& PL to win com-
ponent. 
change in slope 
with payoffs 
reflect 
interaction 
money,:· 
changes in 
slope with 
changes in 
payoff; 
complex 
relationship. 
'.Anderson & 
Shanteau 
(1970) 
similar, in 
need of closer 
scrutiny; ' 
278 
3-2,3-3· 
beta weights of 
probabilities in 
regression analysis 
of evaluations. 
beta weights 
reflect s.p. 
distributions. 
money. 
in 3-2 no difference 
in weights of PW & 
PL; in 3-3 some 
difference but 
difficult to inter-
pret; not related 
to probability 
estimates; 
Slovic & Lichtenstein 
(1968a) 
no real comparison 
meaningful in 3-3; 
in 3-2 contradictory, 
Slovic had large 
sample of subjects. 
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This study was not designed primarily to collect information 
about interaction, so conclusions about the conditions under which inter-
action is found must be drawn with care and thought 9f as hypotheses for 
further investigation rather than as hard and fast evidence. No attempt 
had been made to replicate all features of similar experiments in the 
literature, different values of payoff and probability were presented in 
different experiments, and the number of subjects in most experiments 
was very small in comparison with the sample sizes reported in the 
literature. 
Taken together, the results seem to show that there is nothing 
routine about the interaction of value and subjective probability, i.e • 
. 
there are conditions in which it does not appear. While this may not 
seem to be a startling conclusion, it is not one that has been seriously 
considered in the literature; many researchers assume that it occurs 
With regularity, e.g. 
As we have seen, it is very difficult to separate 
individual attaches to an outcome from the degree 
that it will materialise. In other words, u and 
are not dependent of each other. ' 
Cohen and Christensen 
or 
the utility an 
to which he expects 
, generally speaking, 
(1970). 
of course no such interaction is permitted by the SEU model. Is-it 
Possible, as Irwin has suggested, that subjective probability and utility 
Cnot merely sign of payoff) interact? If so, little is left of any SEU 
model. At any rate, the interaction with sign makes it difficult to 
evaluate the many experiments ••• 
Edwards (196la) 
In addition, all researchers into the question of interaction have 
been content to demonstrate the existence of such interaction in a 
(limited) number of experimental designs, without consideration of the 
nature of the inferenc~being made and without exploring the conditions 
Under which such interaction holds. 
If, then, interaction is not routine, are there any clues as to the 
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determinants of the phenomenon in these experiments taken together 
with those in the literature? We may consider first the experiments of 
I.O. design together with the estimation results of ~xperiment 3-3, 
which is similar to some I.O. designs in the literature. Two possible 
conditions suggest themselves but do not find much support. 
If the interaction is one between probabilities and payoffs, then 
the payoffs must be "real" in the sense of being of value to the subject 
for a test of the effect. It may be that the use of points with a 
delayed financial reward as a prize may not be a sufficient incentive 
to provide a test. It might seem that there was some evidence to support 
this as a condition, in that experiments I and 2-2 showed no evidence 
of interaction. Experiment 2-3, however, showed no interaction effect, 
despite replicating 2-2 apart from the change in mode of payoff, and 
there are experiments such as those of Harks (1951),Pruitt, and Hoge 
(1965) and Morlock(l967) where payoffs in points was sufficient to 
induce interaction. 
In the experiments of Irwin and,his associated (1966,1968), and 
Morlock (1967) the subjects were permitted to select the pack of cards 
to be sampled, and it may be that this was sufficient to change the 
situation as perceived by the subjects into one involving skill as well 
as chance. Cohen(l972)argues that a 'subjective skill-chance continuum' 
is an important feature of risk-taking behaviour, while Phares (1965) 
argues that both his skill and chance instructed groups showed interaction 
because the chance group may have perceived the task as one involving 
skill. However, Pruitt and Hoge (1965) and Slovic (1966) included 
stimulus presentation designs where the subjects' role was a passive one, 
and found evidence of an interaction effect. 
If these are not significant features of the situation for the 
subjects, are there any clues from these experiments about hypotheses 
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for further investigation? Two possibilities may be suggested. In 
the probability estimation task of experiment 3-3 the only evidence 
for interaction is in the A.I. condition, where the Fayoff information 
was presented prior to the probabilistic information. Such a presentation 
order is a typical feature of "interaction" experimental designs, 
whereas other experiments, e.g. on the evaluation of gambles, present 
such material simultaneously. It may be that this design of a "filter" 
through which the probabilities are perceived is a condition for inter-
action, although not a sufficient one as the other experiments reported 
here show •• In experiment 3-3, of course, the pattern of interaction 
was not the one predicted, there was no strong interaction, and there 
was some suggestion of task difficulty. Nevertheless it seems an 
hypothesis worthy of further test. 
If we introduce the notion of a gambling situation being "well-
defined", or "structured", in the sense that an optimal policy for 
maximising income is available to the subject, then a clue to some 
regularity in our results may be seen; interaction occurs in those 
situations where such a policy is not readily available or even defined, 
and not in those situations where this is the case. Some support for 
this hypothesis may be seen in a series of comparisons among experiments. 
Morlock (1967) found interaction in an information acquisition task 
involving sampling without replacement; • when this situation is altered 
to a Bayesian one no such effect is found (experiments 2-2 and 2-3). 
Where the dependent variable is a choice from a list of bets, there is 
no interaction when choice is from the quadratic payoff scheme in 
experiment I, but there is evidence of interaction from experiments 2-1 
and those of Irwin et al (1966,1968), where the optimal policy is either 
masked by the experimental design or, in the case of choosing the size of 
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bet (experiment 2-I), difficult to define. Again, it must be admitted 
that the evidence is slight. Our doubts as to whether interaction may 
be inferred from these experimental designs suggest that our 11model 11 
of interaction is a model predictive of choice of response rather than 
of a change in the perception of probabilities or some related notion. 
The model would suggest that, when the task is so well defined for the 
subject that the 'interaction' response would be a deviation from 'obvious 
best policy' then it would not be selected. \'ihen such policies are not 
obvious, the subject searches for one and is guided in his search by 
the values of the payoffs. 
Two questions arise here. If this is a model of responses in 
~ 
experiments, does it apply to those experiments where the response is 
probability estimation and response strategy not well defined, especially 
when "pressures for accuracy" are introduced. The author suggests that 
would be a condition for interaction, except when, as in experiment 3-3, 
the response is embedded in a design where this is not the only response 
and there are different 'demand char~cteristics 1 ; but this is an hypo-
thesis capable of being tested. 
The seco~d question asks what prediction this model would make about 
the evaluation of gambles, which would surely be considered a well 
defined task, and where there seems to be evidence both for and against 
interaction. Outside of this study, only Slovic and Lichtenstein(l968a) 
show evidence of interaction, in the sense that their subjects attached 
different weights to Rv and PL, while many studies, e.g.Tversky (1967a,b) 
and \valls ten (1971) find no evidence. The results of our experiments -
the analysis of slopes in experiment 3-2, the applications of regression 
models in experiments 3-2 and 3-3- together with:the results of 
Anderson and Shanteau (1970)suggest that we lack any clear idea of how 
subjects put together the two components of gambles, and that our 
evidence of interaction seems to be linked to these processing 
considerations. 
Our inference of interaction from gambling evaluations assQ~es 
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that the form of this combination process is known, i.e. is a subtractive 
one, and while this is usually taken as shown because of the good 
predictions of expectation models, e.g. the correlations in experiments 
3-1 and 3-3, and experiment 3-2 suggests that there might be more to it 
than this. The problem needs further investigation. There is no 
evidence of.interaction in the evaluations of one-outcome gambles. 
It may be that this model is presented with too much speculation 
and to little empirical support. It does however have the virtue of 
providing hypotheses that are testable and are in agreement with the 
published research on interaction; also, if it was to some degree a 
description of subjects' behaviour, care would be needed in the design 
of experiments since, generally speaking, more confident inferences are 
made in those designs where an optimal strategy is available, e.g. the 
evaluation of simple gambles or sequential decision making decisions. 
An Experiment to test the Interaction Hypothesis. 
The central problem in the study of interaction is that of making 
inferences about subjective probability from decisions and judgments 
made in risk taking situations. One wants to show that when the payoffs 
and rewards are changed in such a situation then some changes in the 
subjects' responses follow, and that these changes in response are 
brought about by a change in subjective probability. To make such 
inferences it~ assumed that we know how subjective probability is related 
to these responses; the experiments considered in this study introduced 
several response measures, summarized in Tables A and B, and asked 
whether changes in these measures can reasonably be attributed to 
changes in subjective probability. One knows that some perception of 
the likelihood of winning and losing enters into these judgments and 
decisions (since, for example, the responses change in predictable 
directions when only the presented probabilities are varied), but we 
need to know more precisely what role it does play. 
28.4 
The particular experiments were selected to fulfil the criteria, 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, that analysis would not confound 
the responses of individual subjects nor particular levels of the 
presented p~obabilities and payoffs. The first criterion for judging 
whether these response measures are satisfactory is that of deciding 
that changes in Tesponse are due to changes in subjective probability, 
and not to other considerations. 
With this criterion, four response measures seem unsatisfactory. 
In experiment I, where the subjects selected a bet from a quadratic 
payoff scheme, the choice of bet did seem to reflect a subjective 
probability distribution, rather than other, strategic, aspects of the 
decision situation. Examination of the responses of the subjects who 
did change their bet with I.O. suggested however that such a change was 
due to.:a change in decision strategy; these changes were 'extreme', 
but it would be unsatisfactory to regard large changes as evidence of 
strategy change, and small ones as evidence of change in subjective 
probability. It is difficult to find a rule, prior to the experiment, 
that could separate these alternative explanations. 
In experiment 2-I, both the amount of money the subjects were 
prepared to bet and the frequency of such bets that the I.O. event 
would occur changed with the probability of winning and with I.O. To 
regard this as evidence of interaction makes the assumption that these 
dependent variables should not, under the null hypothesis, vary with 
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the payoffs. There seems no support for this assumption in principle, 
in experimental work, or in observation. Further research could usefully 
be carried out into the determinants of rislc taking behaviour of the 
form, "I bet x pence that this will occur" with regard to roles played 
by the x pence and the I.O., their respective utilities, and the 
probabilities of vlinning and losing. 
The regression analysis and examination of slopes of experiments 
3-2 and 3-3 might best be considered together. 
A regression model, of the form 
was fitted to the evaluation responses of individual subjects. The model 
including these four predictor variables provided a good fit to the 
responses in experiment 3-2 (and in Slovic & Lichtenstein,l968a) and, 
with an additional predictor variable b5PO, in experiment 3-3, A 
difference in the size of beta weights for the probability terms (in 
experiment 3-3 relative to the E.V. model) is considered as evidence of 
interaction. The results of these experiments cast doubt on the usefulness 
of this interpretation; in experiment 3-2, there is no difference 
between these weights and yet there is clear 'interaction' in the slope 
analysis. In experiment 3-3, there were differences, and especially 
differences among subjects, while a subjectively expected value model 
Provided a good fit to responses, and there seemed no relationship between 
these weight differences and differences in direct probability estimates. 
Taken vlith the pattern of results in the slope analyses of 3-2, this 
suggests to the author that we have no evidence of interaction in the 
sense of a change in perception of the probabilities involved in the 
gambles, but evidence in the sense of an interaction in the model; or, 
that the additive model for two, or more, outcome gambles does not hold 
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over the range of subjects' evaluations. Further research is needed to 
test this statement, but it seems that, until we are clear about the 
model from which we are making inferences, the case for interaction, 
in the perception sense, has not been shown. If the claim in only that 
of interaction in the model then, of course, this criticism does not 
apply. 
In the case of experiments 2-2/2~3 and 3-3, the criterion seems 
to be fulfilled. In the former it seems possible in theory, by a 
comparison of the amount of information bought, the actual information 
. 
seen, and the decision made, to separate an interaction hypothesis 
from alternatives, including changes in decision strategy. 
~ 
The experiment called here 3-3 is the experiment involving two 
dependent variables - a probability estimate and the evaluation of a 
gamble; a choice of presentation orders; and analysis in terms of a 
comparison of the two responses. It is argued that careful examination 
of these, with the N.I. condition as a control group, should provide 
important information about interaction both in the estimates and in the 
response model~ 
Given that these experiments fulfil the first, and most stringent 
criterion, we may now consider them in terms of further criteria. 
Aspects of both designs have been widely studied and there is a large 
literature on them, so we could relate findings on interaction to other 
work. 
A further consideration would be the ability of a satisfactory 
experiment to test the hypothesis that interaction occurs only in 
situations which are not well defined. It would be difficult in an 
experiment like 2-2/2-3 to compare sample composition and choice of 
decision in a situation that was not suitably structured. Experiment 3-3 
is flexible enough to include the study of different payoff, present-
ation and motivation situations; probability estimates need not be 
paired with the evaluation of gambles, but can be us~d with many 
decision responses, including sizes and frequencies of bets. 
An adequate test of the hypothesis that subjective probability 
is independent of value requires an experiment which asks subjects 
both to: 
(1) make estimates of the probabilities involved in the decision 
situation, and 
(2) make s;me deeieio~.or judgment in a risk taking situation which 
includes these probabilities. 
This kind of experimental design seems necessary to the author 
for the following reasons. 
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(a) The simple design where subjects are merely asked for probability 
estimates is unsatisfactory; there are 'demand characteristics' in 
any such experiment, there are no pressures on subjects to state their 
true beliefs and when these pressure~ are introduced the situation has 
been changed into a complex, and often confusing decision task. 
(b) In the decision tasks from which subjective probability has been 
inferred, e.g. evaluations of gambles, bets, sequential decisions, we 
are not clear about the role played by subjective probability in the 
subjects' decisions. A study of both dependent variables should provide 
information about this role. 
(c) Some of the experiments reported here, i.e.l,2-2,3-2 and 3-3, have 
found changes in response correlated with changes in payoffs which, 
Under the accepted inference models, could be interpreted as evidence 
for interaction, and which we would be hesitant to so categorise because 
their distribution seems unlike any probability distribution. If it 
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could be shown that a subject can make these patterns of response 
and, at the same time, show no such changes in his probability estimates, 
then analysis of this discrepancy would provide important information 
about the status of our results. 
(d) It was suggested above that the extent to which an experimental 
situation was well-defined might be a significant variable in tests of 
interaction. A test of this hypothesis could involve the comparison of 
responses when the relationship of subjective probability to one 
dependent variable, e.g. in a well-defined task, might be much clearer 
than it's relationship to another. In such a test, an experimental 
design which included a direct estimate of probabilities with both 
dependent variables could avoid serious difficulties in the interpretation 
of results. 
(e) The decisions which subjects have been asked to make, and from which 
subjective probability, and it's interaction with value, have been 
inferred, typically involve the subject in computational procedures 
and the piecing together of evidence from different sources. An 
experiment which breaks such tasks into their component tasks, and 
studies how these are carried out in different presentation conditions 
should clarify how subjects carry out these tasks and where any inter-
actions occur. 
(f) Experiment 3-3 has shown that subjects can make estimates of 
probabilities and then combine these probabilities with associated 
payoffs into an evaluation of gambles with consistency. There was a 
suggestion in the A.I. condition that the task made large demands on 
s~bjects' memory. Replication of the experiment with larger samples of 
subjects and simpler gambles would test the effect on responses of 
different presentation orders, and the relationship of task difficulty 
289 
to interaction could be isolated for investigation, i.e. further study 
of this particular experimental design could be fruitful. 
(g) It is of interest in itself to study the relatio~ship between 
probability estimates and probabilities inferred from decisions. 
(h) The risk taking situations we have considered in this study have 
included the presentation of probabilities to subjects, who are then 
supposed to include estimates of these probabilities in their judgments 
and decisions. The more interesting decision problem would involve 
the subjects inferring rather than estimating probabilities, i.e. in 
a reasonin~rather than a magnitude estimation task, and indeed working 
with rather less information about these probabilities. Researchers in 
decision making; or in this approach to the study of decision mruting, 
have been reluctant to forego information about 'objective probabilities', 
since these have acted as a check on the consistency and accuracy of 
decisions. It is clear that an experimental design with two dependent 
variables, one of which being a decision about which something of the 
subjects' approach is known, e.g. a bid for a gamble, could allow the 
researcher to escape from the rigidity of decisions including presented 
probabilities without loss of information about the consistency of 
inferences or decisions. 
Summary. 
This study has been concerned with a particular problem in 
decision making, the question of whether in a decisi~n involving 
payoffs and probabilities of achieving them, these variables are 
independent of each other for the subject. It seemed to the author 
that the problem could not be satisfactorily approached until what 
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has been called the inference problem had been solved, i.e. when could 
it be asserted that changes in response were in fact changes in sub-
jective probability, and not in some other aspects of risk trueing 
behaviour. • 
Responses were examined in two kinds of experimental design -
simple gambling ~xperiments which have been widely studied in decision 
making, and those experiments which maintain a distinction between 
Independent and Dependent outcomes and which had been designed 
specifically to investigate interaction. 
After examination of the patterns of response in several such 
experiments, it was concluded that what was lacked was any clear idea 
of how subjective probability, in the sense of the subjects' perception 
of the probabilities, was related to the decision responses from which 
subjective probability was inferred. The kind of experiment then thought 
necessary was one in which two dependent variables, a probability estimate 
and a decision response, were included. 
That such care about the nature of the inferences made is necessary 
is clear from our principal experimental finding that interaction was not 
routine, as a reading of the literature might suggest, but only occurred 
under some conditions, which have not been isolated, and about which the 
evidence collected here is slight. It does seem to the author that, in 
many of these experiments, subjects are carrying out a 'computation' 
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task, and that such an approach might be incompatible with the interaction 
phenomenon. Is it that this approach changes with changes in payoffs 
or in motivation, or is interaction a bias in computa~ion? As yet, 
there are no answers to these questions. It could be that computation 
is related to the notion of gambling situations being well defined; 
this would be this writer's decision as to the first variable to be 
considered for further study. 
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